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PREFACE 
The Council adopted in March 1992 a Decision in the field of the security of information 
systems1  comprising the development of overall strategies for the security of information 
systems  (action plan) and setting up  a  Senior Officials Group (SOG-IS) to advise the 
Commission on action to be undertaken. The Decision having as objective the development 
of  overall strategies aiming to provide users and producers of electronically stored, processed 
or transmitted information with appropriate protection of information systems against acci-
dental or deliberate threats. 
The scope of  the Decision foresees the following lines of action: 
I.  Development of a strategic framework  for the security of  information systems 
n.  Identification of user and service provider requirements for the security of information 
systems 
lll.  Solutions for immediate and interim needs of users, suppliers and service providers 
IV.  Development of specifications, standardisation, evaluation, and certification in respect 
of the security of  information systems; 
V.  Technological and operational developments in the security of information systems; 
and  · 
VI.  Provision of security of  information systems. 
Annex 1 recalls the Action Lines. 
The Decision is implemented by the Commission, in close association with related actions in 
Member States and in conjunction with related Community research and development ac-
tions. 
As a step towards the formulation of the "Action Plan" identified in the Council Decision and 
in accordance with the opinion of SOG-IS2 a "Green Paper on the Security of Information 
Systems" has been prepared, which addresses, in accordance with the Annex of the Decision, 
an overall view of the 
•  requirements for action in summary form 
•  issues involved 
•  spectrum of  measures that result from an analysis of the issues. 
The present document sets out the background to the development of a consistent approach to 
Information Security in Europe taking into account common interests with other countries. 
1  OJ No L 123, 8.5.1992. p.19 
2  SOO-IS Opinion of 17.11.92 on objectives, scope and approach 
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This document is consultative in nature and comments are invited to be addressed to the 
European Commission before August 1st 1994. 
The purpose of the Green Paper is to share the insight and awareness obtained from the nu-
merous contributions to the articulation of the Green Paper and to consult the parties con-
cerned and interested on the actions and measures considered necessary to address the needs 
of  the European Union in the field of  information security. 
The Green Paper states the main issues related to the security of information systems in their 
context, describes requirements, and summarises the requirements into a series of proposed 
positions and actions. 
The proposed positions and actions address the needs identified for Trusted Services in 
Europe, International Developments and Technical Harmonisation in Information Security. 
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1.  Introduction 
The trustworthiness and protection of information is essential for the functioning of a modem 
society. 
Information Security threats are growing with the diversification and multiplication of com-
munication services and use of electronic information by business, administrations and the 
individual. 
In the last decade, the Community has been working progressively towards the creation of the 
Internal Market and led a policy of liberalisation and harmonisation in the field of communi-
cations services. 
When the INFOSEC Decision was adopted it was recognised that the threat to information 
security would need a  collective effort on the European level and it set as objective the for-
mulation of an Action Plan to complement the national actions in a well understood spirit of 
subsidiarity as far as national and internal security was concerned. 
The purpose of this section of the document is to set out the critical factors for future devel-
opments and the action required to ensure trustworthy information services and applications 
in Europe and in its relations with other parts of the world. It formulates options for future 
policy and identifies actions which promise to best meet the needs of the EC in the context of 
international developments and trends. 
2.  Proposed Positions and Actions 
Based on the results of the enquiry having resulted in the Green Paper, needs for action on an 
EC-scale have been identified. These require a concerted approach within Europe and where 
possible internationally. The following proposed positions and actions are derived from the 
results of  the work so far. 
General Position 
Democratic societies engaged in the global economy need to provide for adequate levels of 
information security. With the growing diversity of services and applications of telematics the 
security of information systems Will need to evolve with demand and reduce the threats to se-
curity, privacy and safety while avoiding to obstruct innovation or economic and social de-
velopments. 
A  Trust Services 
Proposed Positions 
•  In the emerging infonnation society traditional techniques of securing information, 
such as signatures, envelopes, registration, sealing, depositing and special delivery need 
to be matched by electronic equivalents. 
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served and the balance between freedom and responsibility not changed in an uncon-
trollable manner. 
•  Service offerings need to cater for the needs for seamless infonnation security for busi-
ness, the general public, video and multimedia communications and teleworking, in the 
non-classified domain. 
•  The working of the Community Institutions and the EC-wide operation of public ad-
ministrations of the Member States, can be expected to rely on a combination of these 
services, as appropriate. 
•  The definition of information crime and the rules governing the technical realisation 
and use of electronic evidence in civil and criminal court proceedings need to be har-
monised within the EC to be able to address cases involving trans-European services 
and applications. In the absence of such harmonisation, "safe havens" for illegal activi-
ties can form to the detriment of  the EC. 
•  As the economy becomes global, and the interrelationship among the different actors 
tighter, the accepted practices and rules to which these actors operate need to be well 
· defined and transparent, implying a coherent codification of  essential practices and rela-
tions. 
•  As Europe formulates and implements policies depending on, or affecting, information 
security, the consistency overall is demanding a greater attention. Specifically this re-
lates to the new policies under the Maastricht Treaty, Internal Market, Competition, and 
Telecom  Policies  and  specific  actions  such  as  Open  Network  Provision  (ONP 
Directives) and Trans-European Networks (TENs). 
Proposed Actions 
•  to provide for the setting up of trust services and for consistent means to interact with 
these services. Trust services include digital signature, non-repudiation, claim of origin, 
claim of ownership in negotiable documents, fair exchange of values, untraceability, 
and time stamping 
•  to provide for the establishment of  Europe-wide confidentiality services for non-classi-
fied information. These could include the following categories: 
>  minimum IS assurance to be maintained by all service providers (level of  present 
letter mail and telephony under national privacy legislation) 
>  enhanced IS assurance for private and professional use Oevel of registered mail 
or courier delivery as needed for normal business transactions such as ordering 
and billing) 
>  professional IS assurance as needed for recognised categories of commercially 
(or otherwise) sensitive information 
•  to establish, accredit and audit a network of  Trusted Third Parties for the administration 
of the service provisions such as for name assignment, key management, certification 
and directories 
•  to formulate a common EC-wide legal and regulatory Framework for the alignment of 
national conditions to meet the needs of the Internal Market and international develop-
ments in information security 
Page 4  Green Paper on the Security of  Infmnation System •  to establish the liability principles for information providers, intermediates, Trusted 
Third Parties,  and value added service providers 
•  to put in place arbitration mechanisms to resolve liability conflicts 
•  to establish the common principles for legislation covering communication crime and 
for electronic evidence 
•  to develop generic codes of practice for the handling of non-classified information, in-
cluding rules for security labelling 
•  to develop sector-specific codes of  practice and base line controls. 
B  lntemational Developments 
Proposed Position 
•  In view of the rapidly evolving international communication and security scene, the se-
curity needs of the European organisations and individuals must be safeguarded and the 
competitiveness of  the European industry maintained. 
•  The creation of barriers to trade and services based on the control over security mecha-
nisms and digital signature schemes needs to be avoided. In case acceptable interna-
tional solutions can not be found a European option should be considered. 
Proposed Action 
•  to work towards international solutions for information security requiring global assur-
ance 
•  to strengthen the support for international standardisation 
•  to formulate common positions swiftly with respect to international developments, as 
they arise 
•  consider offering European options for confidentiality and digital signature services in-
ternationally. 
C  Technical Harmonisation 
Proposed Positions 
•  Vendors and service providers need to innovate to survive commercially. They have a 
vital interest in ensuring that their products are adequately secure and safe. 
•  Electronic products, systems, services and applications must operate to generally 
recognised levels of trust. 
•  A differentiated approach to the evaluations of trusted solutions is needed which in-
cludes vendor declaration, self evaluation or fonnal evaluation. The choice of either of 
these mechanisms will depend on the costs and delays involved in formal certification 
processes, the level of assurance required and national constraints. 
•  The international character of service and product supply requires the establishment of 
mutual recognition of  testing, validation, auditing and liability assessment. 
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duce cost and delays in evaluations. 
Proposed Actions 
•  to establish an international scheme for evaluation, certification and mutual recognition, 
that provides for integrated security, safety and quality evaluations for applications, 
Services, systems and products 
•  to raise the general level of information security and safety by promoting development 
assurance 
•  to establish the principles for incident reporting obligation for evaluated solutions, and 
their dissemination 
•  to establish principles for incident containment 
•  to establish a scheme for service provider and vendor self-evaluations and declarations 
•  to specify community-wide quality criteria for the safety of systems, incl. methodolo-
gies for the assessment of  threats, vulnerabilities, and hazards for safety critical systems 
•  establish rules for the assurance of embedded systems. 
Page 6  Green Paper on the Security of Information System ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The present document is the result of numerous contributions received from experts, working 
in the framework of IBAG, SRI, ETNO, the Security Investigations and SOG-IS (over 200 
contributions received). To develop the thinking on specific groups of issues, the SOG-IS 
Advisory Group, reinforced by other experts, were consulted and contributed to the develop-
ment of the document. In a spirit of openness, qualified contributions were accepted from all 
parties ready to contribute and to discuss their input in the context of international work-
shops3, that served to consolidate the views into a coherent presentation. 
While the experts acted in a personal capacity, their affiliation is included in the list below as 
an indication of  the range of experience which was drawn upon. 
The contributions and active involvement in the preparation of this document of the following 
personalities is gratefully acknowledged: 
c.  Amery  Zergo Consultants Ltd.  UK 
K.  AnstOtz  BIFOA  D 
Mr.  Auer  Siemens Nixdorf  D 
G.  Axelsson  Swedish Agency for Administrative Development  s 
E.  Barreto  CECDGlli/B 
M.  Baum  Independent Monitoring  USA 
T.  Benjamin  Mence Research Agency  UK 
E.  Bible  Cameron9 Markby and Hewitt  B 
HJ.  Bierschenk  IBAG  D 
D.  Birch  Hyperion  UK 
J.  Birenbaum  France Telecom  F 
J.  Blackwell  CECDGXIll/C 
c.  Blatchford  Panacea Ltd  UK 
R.E.  Bloomfield  ADELARD  UK 
K. 
A. 
S.E. 
AJ. 
L. 
R. 
P. 
s. 
E. 
D. 
BJ. 
J. 
c. 
R. 
3 
Brady  Unix Operating System  Engineering  USA 
Brignone  Protexarms  F 
Brummel  Akin9 Gump9 Strauss9 Hauer9 Feld & Dassesse  B 
Butcher  MOD .. Royal Air Force  UK 
Cabirol  SCSSI  F 
Cadwallader  ENACT Ltd.  UK 
Caniot  France Telecom  F 
Castell  CASTELL  UK 
Cauvin  Agence pour Ia protection des programmes  F 
Cerny  Bundesministerium des Innern  D 
Chorley  NPL  UK 
Christensen  CECDGXIll/C 
Clark  IBAG  UK 
Clark  University of Dublin  IRL 
A previous draft of the document (draft 4.0) was made widely available through paper copies and electronic means. It 
was scrutinised by over 1000 experts in the field. 
A workshop was held on December 15, 1993 to which interested parties were invited to: 
a)  comment on the conclusions and recommendations (section "Summary of  Requirements for Action") 
·b)  identify existing work and activities  that could contribute to the  implementation of some or all of the 
recommendations 
c)  fonnulate suggestions for the implementation of the recommendations 
d)  signal interest to participate in the implementation of  the recommendations. 
A wealth of information was communicated prior and during the workshop, but no clearly defmed solutions to the 
problems were identified. There are no apparent ready-made solutions that can be applied in an international context 
Green Paper on .the Security of Information Systems  Page? B.  Collins  PCSL Consulting.  UK 
J-F.  Comet  ECOLORG  F 
CJ.  Coumou  Coseco International BV  NL 
J.M.  Court  Institute of  Chartered Accountants  UK 
E.  Daclin  Acatel Alsthom Recherche  F 
H.  Daniel  BSI  D 
P.  Daniel  GEC Marconi Secure Systems Ltd.  UK 
J.  DeDecker  mM  B 
D.  DeGeest  ESN  B 
B.  De Schutter  Free University of  Brussels  B 
M.  DeSoete  Philips I.T.S.  B 
D.  DeWinter  Siemens Nixdorf AG  D 
Mr.  de Kervasdoue  CAPSESA.  F 
A.  de Ja T01re Prados  Ministerio de Industria  E 
E.R.  de Lange  Ministty of  Transpon, Public Works and Water Management  NL 
P.  del..auzanne  GSIT  F 
T.  de Vries  KPMG Management Consultants  NL 
P.  Dellios  Ministry of  Transports and Communications  OR 
Y.  Deswarte  LAAS-CNRS & INRIA  F 
R.  Dierstein  DLR  D 
G.  Dietzel  CECDGXIWC 
R.  Dunkel  IBMEW'Ope  F 
D.  Duthil  Agence pour Ia protection des programmes  F 
G.  Eisen  IABG  D 
G.  Endersz  Telia Research AB  s 
R.A.  English  Communications Security Establishment  UK 
G.  Enste  CAP debis GEl  D 
A.  Eriksen  Ministty of Justice  N 
P.  Fagan  Secure Information Systems Ltd  UK 
A.  Fisher  Fischer International Systems Inc.  USA 
Mr.  Fravezzi  Ministty of  Defence  B 
A.  Fujioka  NTT Laboratories  Japan 
P.  Furberg  c/o Swedish Agency for Administrative Development  s 
s.  Gaskill  Dibb Lupton Broomhead  UK 
M.  Gasparinetti  CEC Consumer Policy Service 
H.P.  Gebhardt  CECDGXIll/A 
s.  Geyres  VERILOG  F 
L.  Glanert  Deutsche Telecom  D 
S.E.  Greenfield  NIST  USA 
H.  Hagemann  FemUniversitat Hagen  D 
A.  Hallan  L 
R.  Hanouz  CEPME  F 
N.G.L.  Harding  Health Systems C(H)rdination  UK 
G.  Hardy  Touche Ross & Co.  UK 
N.  Harwood  BT  UK 
P.  Haufman  SPRI  S· 
s.  Herda  GMD  D 
V.  Heyvaert  Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, Feld & Dassesse  B 
N.  Higham  UK 
G.  Hoberg  BELGACOM  B 
P.  Hoving  TeleTrust S  s 
E.  Humphreys  XiSEC  UK 
D.  Hurley  OECD 
F.  Iribame Navarro  E 
K.  Iversen  Norwegian Centre for Medical Informatics  N 
E.  Jahren  Ministty of  Government Administration  N 
c.  Jansen  Philips Crypto B. V.  NL 
M.  Jones  DTI  UK 
L.  Kahn  E1NO- Telia AB  s 
M.  Kemna  CEPIS Task Force  NL 
M.  King  CESG  UK 
H.M.  Kluepfel  Bellcore  USA 
P.  Knopf  Swiss Mission to the E.C.  B 
PageS  Green Paper on the Security of Information System T.  Knowles  DMR Group Ltd.  UK 
M.  Kopecky  SNCF  F 
s.  Kowalski  Stockholm University  s 
M.  Krimizis  G&K Multimedia  GR 
H.  Kurth  IABG  D 
s.  Kurzban  PACE  USA 
D.  Lafont  SCT·DPusers  F 
R.  Lam pard  NPL  UK 
P.  Landrock  Cryptomathic A/S  DK 
J.  Lang  Perihelion Software Ltd.  UK 
c.  Laske  Free University of Brussels  B 
Y.  LeRoux  Digital Equipment  F 
. J.  Leach  Zergo Consultants Ltd.  UK 
A.  Legait  SYSECA  F 
0.  Leiberich  D 
E.  Lemmens  Programmation de Ia Politique Scientifique  B 
J.M.  Lemuzeau  Alcatel Alsthom Recherche  F 
K.  Lind up  SRI  UK 
w.  London  Cameron, Markby and Hewitt  UK 
F.  L6pez Crespo  Ministerio para las administraciones publicas (MAP)  E 
C.P.  Louwerse  CEN{fC251/WG6 -Leiden University HospiUll  NL 
M.  Macken brock  BSI  D 
w.  Madsen  Computer Sciences Corporation  USA 
N.P.  Mansfield  Shell Internationale Petroleum Maatschappij B. V.  NL 
L.  Martin  National Security Agency  USA 
s.  Mathews  PCSL Consulting  UK 
M.  Mavis  ETNO·OTE  GR 
R.AJ.  Middleton  British Computer Society  UK 
M.  Miloikovitch  Thomson-CSF  F 
s.  Mohammed  European Parliament 
R.  Moses  Information Systems Ltd.  UK 
G.  Moustalqls  G&K Multimedia  GR 
P.  Mailer  Bull Ingenierie  F 
M.  Nasrullah  Ministry of Transport, Public Works & Water Management  NL 
S.·l.  Nilsson  ECITC  B 
J.  Norman  SGS· Thomson Microelectronics  F 
M.  Ohlin  Swedish Defence Material Administration  s 
T.  Olhede  Spri  s 
T.  Osvald  ECTIC·CEN  B 
K.W.  Ott  Ott Technology Software sprl  B 
A.  Paron do  ISDEFE  E 
A.  Patel  Tel tee  IRL 
L.  Pauwels  Belgacom  B 
A.  Peralta  Univ. Politecnica de Cataluna  E 
P.  Perrot  France Telecom  F 
H.  Peuckert  SiemensAG  D 
c.  Pfleeger  Trusted Information Systems (UK) Ltd.  UK 
F.  Piau  Pari Mutuel Urbain  F 
E.  Pimentel Saraiva  Banco Totta & Acores  ,P 
D.  Pinkas  Bull  F 
R.  Pizer  Certification Body, UK ITSEC Scheme  UK 
D.  Poelmans  EDSBnv  B 
R.I.  Polis  Groupe de Management Geneve  CH 
K.  Presttun  Alcatel  F 
G.R.  Price  The Institute of Internal Auditors -Glynwed Group Services  UK 
M.  Purser  Baltimore Technologies Ltd.  IRL 
G.  Rabe  Technischer Oberwachungs-Verein Nord e. V.  D 
K.  Rannenberg  Universitaet Freiburg  D 
R.  Rehorst  Telecommunications and Post Department  NL 
K.  Rihaczek  DuD  D 
E.  Roback  Computer Systems Laboratory  USA 
G.  Roelofsen  PTTNL  NL 
T.  Roraas  Norwegian Telecommunication Regulatory Authority  N 
Green Paper on the Security of Information Systems  Page9 c. 
R.A. 
G. 
G. 
M. 
E. H. 
I. 
T. 
G. 
u. 
H. 
F. 
R. 
s. 
J. 
J.W. 
H. 
w. 
c. 
M. 
R. 
I. 
P. 
P.WJ. 
H. 
w. 
M. 
N. 
A. 
A. 
M. 
L. 
M. 
c. 
H. 
w. 
K. 
G. 
D. 
s. 
H. 
Page 10 
Rossi 
Rueppel 
Ruggiu 
Rumi 
Salmon 
Schafer 
SchaumUller-Bichl 
Schoeller 
Shuringa 
Sieber 
Sieben 
Simoes 
Slegtenhorst 
Smith 
Sneep 
Steed 
Sttack 
Suchun 
Sundt 
Tuset 
Urry 
Uttridge 
van Dijken 
van Dole 
van Dorp 
van Oils 
van Lith 
van Zuuren 
Veller 
Venijn-Stuart 
Volpe 
Voorham 
Waidner 
Weber 
Weerd 
Whitehurst 
Wiessing 
Williams 
Willis 
Winkelmann 
Wirth 
Ffi 
R3 Security Engineering AG 
Benin 
ETNOTEAM SpA 
ThomsonCSF 
Deutsche Telecom 
Genesis GmbH 
BSI 
Radobank 
Universitlt WUrzburg 
mM Deutschland 
European Parliament 
Organisation and Technology Research NV 
EDSB 
cos so 
EISS - Universitat Karlsruhe 
FUNDP 
ICL Secure Systems 
Digital Equipment Corp. 
Logica Defence & Civil Government Ltd. 
, Shell International Petroleum 
Cooperative Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. 
Bazis Foundation 
Intercai 
KPMG EDP Auditors 
Prodata Systems 
Cullen International 
CEPIS -Leiden University 
STET/SIP 
CEC Security Office 
E.I.S.S. - Universitat Karlsruhe 
Tandem Computers GmbH 
Coopers & Lybrand 
mM Corporation 
The Dutch Government Centre for Information Security 
ACT  IBIS Information Systems Ltd. 
DTI 
Hochschule ffir Technik u. Wirtschaft 
Auswartiges Amt 
I 
CH 
F 
I 
F 
D 
A 
D 
NL 
D 
D 
B 
B 
NL 
,  UK 
D 
B 
UK 
E 
B 
UK 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
NL 
B 
B 
NL 
I 
D 
D 
NL 
USA 
NL 
UK 
UK 
D 
D 
Green Paper on the Security of Information System .  1.  INTRODUCTION 
Individual, corporate and national wealth expresses itself increasingly in the form of informa-
tion. The growth and perfonnance of an estimated 2/3 of the economy relies on manufactur-
ing or services heavily dependent on information technology, telecommunications and broad-
casting, and therefore depends critically on the accuracy, security and trustworthiness of in-
formation. This is of as great importance and interest for individuals as for commerce, indus-
try and public administrations. Correspondingly, the protection of information  in all its as-
,pects, here referred to as Infonnation Security4, has become a central policy issue and a major 
concern world-wide. 
The Council Decision of March 31, 19925 in the field of security of information systems 
recognises this situation and calls for the "development of strategies to enable the free move-
ment of infonnation within the single market while ensuring the security of the use of infor-
mation systems throughout the Community". 
A consistent approach at European level could help to promote the interoperability of sys-
tems, lower existing barriers and avoid the formation of new ones between the individual 
Member States and with other countries6 in compliance with the competition rules and the 
Internal Market policies.  Therefore, there is an urgent need to address requirements and op-
tions for action in the field of security of information systems at national, Community and in-
ternational level in close collaboration with sector actors and national governments. Any ac-
tion must take into account both national and international commercial, legal and technical 
developments. 
The key issue is to provide effective and practical security for information held in an elec-
tronic form to the general users, the business community and administrations without com-
promising the interests of the public at large. 
Since information security is involved in the protection .not just of property and people, but 
even of society itself, Member States regard it as a topic which, like defence, touches on na-
tional sovereignty. 
4 
5 
6 
Information Security is concerned with the protection of  information stored, processed or transmitted in electronic form, 
against deliberate or accidental threats. 
Information is acquired, communicated, processed and stored by Information Services.  Electronic Information services 
need a secure communication infrastructure, secure terminals (including processors and data bases) as well as secure 
usage.  The management of the service provision itself must also and foremost be secure.  Therefore the approach to 
information security starts form an analysis of the needs of an individual or organisation for Information Services. 
9211A2/EEC 
This danger has already been identified and OECD Member Cotmtries have, in the context of  Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Data Flow of Personal Data, recognised the risk of new technical barriers forming.  They have therefore 
agreed to endeavour to remove and to avoid to create in the name of privacy protection. unjustified obstacles to 
transborder flows of  personal data, co-operate in the implementation of the Guidelines and agree as soon as possible on 
specific ]X'ocedures of  consultation and co-operation for the application of these Guidelines. 
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Security is a pervasive subject that arises whenever information is being used in private, busi-
ness and public life. The scope of the subject and a clear distinction of the of the different di-
mensions needs to be kept in mind throughout. The diagram below provides a statement of 
the scope in an aggregate form. 
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The core of  the document is describing issues and the resulting req~irements for action. It was 
felt necessary to state the problems clearly and concisely before attempting to define solu-
tions. In this sense, the document, in its present form, represents a rather comprehensive anal-
ysis of the problems, without being a work programme. The requirements for actions are 
stated in a general form, without implying any particular organisational responsibility. These 
issues are grouped under the following headings: 
•  General issues. Here some of the basic issues relating to the security of information 
systems are described. These place security into a fast evolving world economy and 
states issues like rights and obligations, human rights, openness and protection. 
•  Demand related issues. Issues under this section are concerned with requirements, se-
curity objectives, Codes of  Practice, and the needs for digital signature and privacy en-
hanced communications. 
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ing the demand for security and include security services, Trusted Third Parties, evalu-
ation and R&D. 
•  Rights, responsibilities and liabilities issues. Under this heading issues relating to the 
consequences of security breaches are dealt with. These include civil law and insurance. 
The measures one can consider addressing the issues identified are aggregated  in a separate 
section. This presentation is used to accentuate the profile of issues which can be addressed 
by the same kind of measures. 
The diagram below depicts this structure. 
-._ 
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3.3. ttlman Rightl•nd the P1mlc:tion of CCimlftlllicdonl 
3.4. Soci8l Acclpl8nce d  ldenftC81ion •nd AulttenkiDon Methods 
3.5. Hum8n Flghta•nd the s.t.ly  d  Sysaema 
3.6. Conidence in Comnulic:Don Sylteml.nd S.W:. 
3.7. M8nllg4NI'IM of OpenMU .nd P1mlc:tion 
3.o..r.l--
3.1. ConwnDn Ccncema d  Corrmeft:i81- ~Security 
3.1. Security 8nd Law Enforclmlnt on I~  Scll8 
3.1 0. Economicl d ..  Security d  lnlarmdon $pt8rnl 
; 
3.11. Soc:i81 Aecoglition of lnlorrnnon Crimt 
3.12. ttlm8n F.-. 
3.13. s.t.ly  Crib~  EnviftMimllltl 
3.14. Errbedding ~..,_ 
3. 1. Globalisation of the economy and mobility 
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The internationalisation, diversification, pluralisation and popularisation of the use of com-
munications and information systems. 
Discussion 
The unprecedented increase in mobility and the provision of global communications has re-
sulted in manufacturing, trade and leisure activities extending world-wide. Distributed manu-
facturing, publishing, and financial operations form the back-bone of the modern economic 
system. Travelling and communications for business or pleasure are common place. This is 
being supported, and sometimes driven, by a spectacular development in the field of commu-
nications and by the proliferation of affordable and easy to use information systems. In the 
last decade the cost-performance of long-distance transmission has improved by 5 orders of 
magnitude. This change is providing the basis for a rapid diversification of world-wide ser-
vices customised to provide access to a full range of information services and utilities wher-
ever and whenever required. Terrestrial, satellite and mobile networks provide the physical 
infrastructure and an unrestrained number of service applications provide the customised ap-
plications. 
The nature and scope of provision of Information Security in this new world of open, multi-
service and multi-media communications with a multitude of alternatives to routing, man-
agement and access has profoundly changed the requirements and options for Information 
Security (IS). 
Flexibility of access, openness of the network and the service environment have to be bal-
anced against the requirement of accountability of the user and the service provider and the 
protection of possible third parties involved. Associated with this is a new network of re-
sponsibilities and liabilities. 
Requirements 
•  Revision of the scope and approach to information security to reflect the new condi-
tions, challenges and requirements brought about by globalisation  · 
•  adaptation of the respective policies and regulations 
•  clearly defined conventions on the expectations, responsibilities, duties and liabilities, 
related to levels of security, harm, and good practices. 
3.2.  Internal Market; (  .. four freedoms") 
Issue 
Alignment of the national conditions relating to Information Security with the requirements 
of the functioning of the Internal Market. 
Discussion 
The Internal Market, as adopted in the "Single Act", provides for the "four freedoms " within 
the Community, ie free movement of goods, capital, services and people. The legislation of 
Member States provides for the internal needs for information security, however the require-
ments in the case of trans-European communications remains to be addressed. Inconsistent or 
incomplete provisions of information security and safety represents a technical obstacle to the 
working of the Internal Market. 
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goods and services. Standardisation, certification, mutual recognition and administrative pro-
cedures should provide for the unobstructed working of the Internal Market. This requires 
· standards that are valid but not overly restrictive on technological solutiops, and certification 
regimes that recognise the international aspects of many of the markets (eg in avionics, motor 
vehicles), the costs of certification, and the likely acceptance by the market of any certifica-
tion regimes put in place. 
Beyond the technical aspects, the administration of information security needs to reflect the 
realities of the needs of the Internal Market. Services are to be increasingly provided on the 
principle of "one-stop" and "pay-per-use". Information security, as an integral part of ser-
vices, needs to be provided in a seamless manner throughout the Community and support EC 
actors in their business world-wide. 
Related are the issues of liability and insurance. The impact of different states legal systems 
and the associated liability issues needs to be understood. 
Requirements 
•  Adaptation of the existing provisions with respect to their conformance to the Internal 
Market policy of the EC implying the removal of existing internal barriers and the 
avoidance of the formation of new technical barriers due to divergent application of se-
curity and safety rules, regulations and legislation 
•  provision to business and the public of solutions available throughout the Community 
and preferably at the international level respecting the "one stop" and "pay-per-use" 
principles 
•  consistent deployment of standards and certification where critical for the working of 
the Internal Market 
•  certification and standards that reflect the needs of the different market segments. 
3.3.  ~uman  Rights and the Protection of Communications 
Issue 
To reconcile the human right to privacy and the obligations of law enforcement to protect 
public order. 
Discussion 
Privacy and the protection of private information is considered one o(  the fundamental human 
rights of individuals and is protected to varying degrees in Member States. The European 
convention on Human Rights states "Everyone as a right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence". Individuals have the legitimate expectation that this 
right is respected and that solutions are made available to him that ensure the safeguard of this 
right. This applies to conversation in the home and to a lesser degree when telecommunica-
tions is being used. However, prevailing national solutions do not, at present, provide for 
trans-European services and communications and this lack can be exploited, inter alia, by or-
ganised crime. With the rapid growth and diversification of communication services the rights 
and duties of individuals and law enforcement are being reviewed and redefined, eg FBI sup-
ported legislation and the proposal of the government to provide US business and citizens 
with cryptographic devices including explicit provision for intercept by law enforcement 
agencies. 
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related to human rights, reconciling these objectives represents a delicate political issue. 
The diagram below gives an overview of international, Community and national responsibili-
ties for different application categories. 
International 
Obligations of tt1e lnWMtionlil.communlly 
...  WorldPNoe 
Requirements 
Hunn  Rights 
Fair and FrMTr.de 
Envtronnnt 
•  Common approach defining rights, responsibilities and duties of individuals, business 
and of the authorities. 
3.4. Social Acceptance of Identification and Authentication 
Methods  · 
Issue 
To reconcile the human right to privacy and protection and the use of identification and au-
thentication methods for access control, authentication ~d  accountability. 
Discussion 
The use of biometric methods and smart cards is technically feasible and becoming more eco-
nomically feasible as an identification technique and access control.  -
Biometric methods rely on a system of machine recognition of a set of personal characteris-
tics to verify the identity of an authorised user in order to allow access to some physical envi-
ronment. Such personal characteristics are categorised into physiological - hand geometry 
(faceprints, fingerprints,  non-retinal and retinal blood vessel analysis, palm prints) and be-
havioural- voiceprints (signature dynamics, keystroke dynamics). Methods being researched 
include machine phrenology, lip prints and the response of the skeleton to a physical stimu-
lus. Many other different personal characteristics and recognition techniques are being inves-
tigated. Some of these affect the human right for privacy more than others and some are so-
cially unacceptable. 
As an example, the retinal blood-vessel pattern of a human eye (retinal vasculature) is highly 
characteristic of the individual. A typical system might work as follows. The individual is re-
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crosswire whereby the recognition machine will locate the fovea of the individual, and scan-
ning with a low intensity infra-red beam detect the nodes and branches of the retinal pattern 
falling within the scanned area. The measured pattern is· compared with the stored pattern of 
the individual and access is granted or denied depending on the result of the comparison. This 
method of machine recognition may or may not be considered sociably acceptable on the 
grounds of hygiene, due to the type of information being stored about the individual (a record 
of which may be built up which may reveal other information relating to a persons health 
conditi~n) or the general problem of  protection of medically relevant information. 
There are systems under trial for the recognition of human profiles eg the human face. Again 
these systems may not in general be  soci~ly acceptable and the issue of privacy and human 
rights may come into play. The use of voice-prints has been introduced in Australia and does 
not require the consent of the persons concerned. It is used to scan calls for individuals. 
The banking industry in the UK has extensively researched the whole range of biometrics and 
has recently published tough criteria for biometric systems in point-of-sale applications. At 
present it is believed that no existing biometric product can meet every aspect of these crite-
ria. Nevertheless in other application environments biometric products have been successfully 
trialled and are in operational use. The use of fingerprint recognition at Expo'92 in Seville for 
all season ticket holders demonstrated public acceptance of the methodology. Likewise the 
use of hand geometry systems (which originated back in 1971) by the US  Immigration & 
Naturalisation Service as a means of verifying regular visitors at selected major US airports is 
being extended to include other major airports in North America and Europe (Frankfurt). 
Earlier studies confirmed that to be successful in an "Open" application - involving large 
public user populations, any verification process has to satisfy a .number of criteria: 
•  operational simplicity 
•  ease of use 
•  robust and error free 
•  safe use 
•  no health risk for eye or other physical contacts 
•  potential cost savings, for both the user and the system operator 
•  greater security 
•  long-term acceptability 
•  avoiding major system changes. 
In addition to biometric controls, the role of smart cards containing megabytes of personal 
data may potentially represent an issue. Even a magnetic stripe on a passport or national 
identity card may contain around 200 characters of information. Security and privacy controls 
should reflect national conventions and practices. Smart identity cards and national identifi-
cation numbers may serve as conduits to greater amounts of personal data contained in data 
bases. Member States treat such technology differently. As identity cards and passports be-
come machine readable embedded chips or magnetic/optical stripes, privacy and security 
controls must be incorporated to prevent abuse of the personal data they contain. 
Progress in bio-technology raises new questions as to the definition of privacy and as to the 
rights of  the individual over btfonnation relating to his person and the assurances required for 
its use. Information relating to genetic defects are of obvious sensitivity and implies corre-
sponding measures for protection. Work may need to be undertaken to set out a clear defini-
tion between things that are biometric and things that are medical. At the present time there is 
low confidence by the general public in the honesty of commerce or government in the field 
of bio-technology. 
Requirements 
•  Claiification of the ownership and privacy issues related to the use of biometric data 
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data 
•  definition of the rights of and responsibilities of individuals, busiqess users, corpora-
tions and administrations using biometric tech~iques. 
3.5.  Human Rights and the Safety of Systems 
Issue 
To reconcile the human right to  expect the supply of goods and services that are not life 
threatening, with the vendors commercial needs to supply goods and services that exploit in-
formation systems in safety critical functions. 
Discussion 
Safety critical systems differ from  security critical ones in that if they fail death or serious 
injury to people may result. The law treats the liability of suppliers in this situation differently 
from that where information is lost or property damaged. Suppliers are held strictly liable. 
Codes of practice for the development of safety critical systems exist in order to reduce the 
chance of failure  and design  techniques  are  invoked to  analyse  all  possible  hazards. 
Nevertheless risks remain. 
At a Community level, harmonisation of such codes of practice and design techniques would 
enable citizens to ~ly  on a consistent level of safety in any Member State, and it would re-
duce the costs of development of codes of practice and design techniques in each country. 
Community-wide procurement would be facilitated, as would the development of safety criti-
cal systems by Community-wide consortia. 
· Requirements 
•  Community wide standard for design practices and codes of conduct 
•  harmonised legal environment for vendors and users of safety critical systems. 
3.6.  Confidence in Communication Systems and Services 
Issue 
To establish confidence in communication services and systems for all the parties involved 
(users, public, service providers etc.). This includes confidence in the general ability of the 
technology as well as confidence in specific solutions and the way they are managed. 
Discussion 
Confidence in the security and safety of communication services and systems is a basic re-
quirement if  regulators are to discharge their duties, if service providers and vendors are to be 
able to operate in the communication market, and if consumers and users are to benefit from 
the technologies. In considering confidence we need not only to address it from an idealised 
objective viewpoint but also to take into account the behaviour of users, their perception of 
risks and its volatility. It might only take one incident to undermine user confidence with sub-
stantial financial and political repercussions. eg reluctance to use air travel, rejection of cer-
tain makes of cars. 
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sources of  evidence from the process used to develop the system,  properties of the system as 
revealed by analysis and testing, and through experience with the particular systems and other 
similar ones. The confidence in a service or system should be rigorously and  scien~fically 
based: the confidence should not be misplaced. There is a need to understand this integration 
of  evidence and engineering judgement and to develop procedures and techniques for it. 
I 
An important contributor to confidence is the experience with the system under consideration 
and similar systems. While many suspect that software and design errors are important factors 
undermining confidence in systems this is normally  supported by anecdotes rather than by 
statistically significant evidence. There is a need to establish what dependability is being 
achieved in practice, the relative importance of different parts of the computer systems and 
how the dependable computer systems are compared with other components in the wider sys-
tem. Mechanisms should be put in place for feeding this data back to the development of 
systems and for providing early warning of problems before these develop into incidents. · 
Ideally,  the experience with systems should be related back to the techniques and procedures 
used to .develop them. 
There is also the issue of how confidence in a service or system can be expressed and com-
municated. 
While undoubtedly independent diverse viewpoints are important in the verification and vali-
dation of systems and in motivating vendors and service provides the issue of whether these 
practices need to be codified into formal requirements for third party evaluation and certifica-
tion needs careful consideration and evaluation of the costs, risks and benefits. The alterna-
tives of self-evaluation, supplier declarations and of using other mechanisms such as liability 
and the insurance market may be more appropriate. 
Linked to the concept of confidence is the need to anticipate whether a system could poten-
tially meet the requirements and to prevent the development of unassurable systems. It may 
be possible to develop simple rules (eg the notion of claim limits used in parts of the nuclear 
industrY to disallow claims of reliability greater than 1  o-5 failures per demand for a single 
system) that, while not restricting innovation unduly, prevent delimiting what is assurable. 
Requirements 
•  Real-time indication for the user of the trustworthiness of a service or system 
•  feedback mechanisms for security and safety related incidents involving communica-
tions 
•  independent assessment of  the levels of trustworthiness being achieved 
•  investigation of the reasons why the security and safety of systems are compromised 
•  understanding of the relative importance of the different system components and the 
components of  the wider system and usage context 
•  methods/frameworks for evidence reporting 
•  role (costs, benefits) of  certification in providing confidence and communicating this in 
the market place 
•  establishment of agreed claim limits to establish assurability. 
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Issue 
Openness and protection are partially contradictory user requirements, which need to be rec-
onciled depending on the specific circumstances. The user must be able to define the security 
controls based on need, consistent with national, international and regulatory constraints. 
These controls need to managed in a way that provides protection in an open environment and 
do not unduly impede the functioning of the service or usage. 
Discussion 
In considering management, one must introduce the concept of a  user of an Information 
System, and the role that they perform in using that system. At any time the user of an 
Information System will be performing a role, which could be one of: system owner, adminis-
trator, auditor, investigator, data provider, or user. It is quite possible for the requirements of 
these roles to be logical in conflict with each other. Openness of access may be in conflict 
with protection from general availability. There may also be national, international or regula-
tory constraints which impose role requirements beyond those needed to satisfy the opera-
tional use of the Information System. An open environment must be provided with controls 
that are capable of  providing protection without technical limitations. 
A single,  ~solated computer may be effectively protected, as far as confidentiality is con-
cerned, against threats from outside by physical separation and human administration. This 
does not apply in the context of telematics. Telecommunications and telematics applications 
are increasingly being designed for maximum openness and inter-operability since the utility 
of ITT  &B-based services and applications depends largely on the possibility of users world-
wide being able to freely inter-operate over communication links. Major international efforts 
are underway to establish standards permitting this,  in particular through Open System 
Interconnection (OSI), Open Distributed Processing (ODP) and Open Network Provision 
(ONP). 
The acceptance and use of telematics services depends on meeting the justifiable interests of 
all parties: in particular to be able to chose trade-offs between "openness" and "protection"'· 
The comparison with the way this dilemma is traditionally addressed leads to some observa-
tions which also apply when information is handled electronically. These include, for exam-
ple 
•  The User/Originator requires  the  freedom  to decide  over the  degree  of open-
ness/protection depending on his appreciation of the requirement or the applicable rules 
of  conduct for the given activity. 
•  Profiles exist setting out the needs of both openness and protection that need to be sup-
ported. A single level proftle will not support the requirements of all the users invol:ved, 
and there may need to be mechanisms which allow for negotiation between profiles to 
determine temporarily agreed common profiles. 
7  Openness necessitates the following requirements 
1)  Accessibility to anyone 
2)  Accessibility at any place 
3)  Accessibility at any later time 
4)  Transparent functionality 
5)  Standardised modes of  use 
6)  Formalised legal evidence 
'These requirements must be met and protected by appropriate security measures. 
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openness/protection. 
•  To the role holders, both the visibility of and the transparency of  .the degree of open-
ness/protection is crucial. 
•  Accountability for the application of appropriate levels of openness/protection require 
objective records, which are themselves protected. 
•  The management of the openness and the protection of Information Systems requires 
the definition of security domains. These correspond to the security policies which are 
in force for the Information Systems in use, as modified by the constraints of the role 
holders. It should be remembered that computers which are not directly under human 
supervision may fonn part of the security domains involved. 
The development of a generic framework for the management of open and protected com-
munications in a user/business oriented environment must include: 
1.  Reinforcement of  the options to define security domains 
Terminal users, servers and other computer based resources link into business processes to 
provide information domains which require corresponding security domains. Such facilities 
must not only promote the correct degree of openness, but must also provide filters against 
unauthorised access. This needs to be possible not only at one site eg on LAN-Based applica-
tions, but also via MANs and other communication-links. The definition and management of 
such security domains needs to be possible either from within the user group or provided by a 
trusted third party. Virtual Private Networks have some of the features, but these would also 
need to be available in the context of public network base4 applications. 
2.  User Interface for the management of  openness/protection 
The normal usage requires the ability to communicate either with specific correspondents, a 
select group, an open group' or indiscriminately. The choice being determined by the nature of 
the information, its function and the applicable rules. The user-interface needs to cater for this 
as well as the underlying services and applications. 
3.  Objective records and procedures for the accounting of  open/protected transactions 
Processes must be available that provide non-refutable evidence of the origin of, and delivery 
of, information to all involved partners. 
Requirements , 
•  Generic framework for the management of open and protected communications in a 
user/business oriented environment: 
Page22 
definition of  agreed security domains 
user interface for the management of  openness/protection 
objective  records  and  procedures  for  the  accounting  of open/protected 
transactions 
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Issue 
Infonnation  Security  is  a  common concern of business,  administrations,  citizens,  law 
enforcement and defence.  · 
Discussion 
Though not to the same degree, commercial and personal information security shares many 
aspects  with  the  defence  and other classified governmental  affairs.  This  provides  an 
opportunity for commercial and personal applications to build on experience and expertise 
from the defence and classified government area. 
1be reverse is also true. As commercial security advances and becomes available at a large 
scale, governments and defence organisations may wish-to take into account this body of 
experience. In  addition governments themselves are, of course, in  the need of adequate 
protection of their non-classified information and will wish to make use of public services of 
this kind. 
Requirements 
•  Common requirements of business, citizens and authorities  to adequately protect 
commercial and personal information and its communication. 
3.9. Security an~  Law Enforcement on International Scale 
Issue 
Crime is exploiting weak information ~ecurity to further its ends. Strong information privacy 
may also be used to escape investigation by law enforcement. 
Discussion 
Crime, and here organised crime and terrorism in particular, are relying on weak information 
security to prepare and execute their operations. As quite powerful means for information 
security have been published and are freely available, their increased use in protecting such 
operations is perceived as a growing problem. Public authorities have in the past used legal 
and regulatory powers to restrict the use and dissemination of related technologies. With the 
growing availability of computing power and open networks, this approach is getting less 
effective, as organised crime, contrary to the legitimate user, feel free to use products that are 
not authorised. The overall result is that business is seriously constrained in meeting its 
security requirements, particularly in international communications and in its relations with 
other organisations. If business requires the legal and regulatory powers to relinquish total 
control over these security related technologies, business has a "duty of care" to manage and 
control their use for their commercial and business purposes, including the policing and 
auditing of management environments. Correspondingly, authorities maintaining control 
carry _the responsibility for the potential damage to business, individuals and the economy at 
large. 
Privacy and security are impacted by the growth in interconnected law enforcement/criminal 
information systems; There is an increasing availability of criminal and law enforcement 
information from  a variety of national data bases (eg, United Kingdom's Police National 
Computer 2  ~ PNC2; Germany's INPOL; France's fichier des personnes recherchees- FPR; 
the United States' National Crime Information Centre - NCIC;  Canada's Canadian Police 
Information Centre- CPIC and Australia's Law Enforcement Access Network- LEAN) and 
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data base network and the EUROPOL!frevi Information System). Incorrect information can· 
lead to false arrests and a general denial of  civil liberties. Non-vetted information can result in 
individuals being arrested and/or investigated for spurious and non-criminal reasons such as 
political, trade unionist and religious activities. 
Requirements 
•  Effective, internationally agreed,  economic, ethical and usable  solutions  to  meet 
business, administration and personal needs 
•  mechanisms for authorised interception for law enforcement 
•  reporting of  incidents and crimes, adjusted to the conditions of the Internal Market 
•  equipment, software and an infrastructure of trusted third parties. 
3. 10. Economics of the Security of Information Systems 
Issue 
The use of information security impacts on costs, performance and availability. It may also be 
used to achieve a competitive advantage. 
Discussion 
The cost of security is an integral part of cost of ownership of an information system. The 
cost of  protection against breaches of security needs to be commensurate with the costs (both 
direct and indirect) that may be incurred from  a breach in security. A security breach may 
have shon term (and perhaps, localised) implications such as loss of sales and revenue or 
fraud or theft. It may also have longer term (and wider) impacts on business communities 
through loss of  confidence and consequential loss of business. 
The costs of detection, resistance and recovery can be both tangible and high, and although 
there are techniques available to quantify risks there are no generally applicable methods for 
estimating the potential costs arising for example from denial of service or loss of integrity. 
The application of security measures may also make it harder to use and may constrain 
overall  performance.  However,  where  the  security  risk  is  high  enough  to cause  an 
unacceptable level of compromise, leading to considerable commercial and financial loss, 
then security measures must be given high priority commensurate with the nature and value 
of the business in question. 
If infonnation security is too expensive, clumsy, not effective in the context of actual usage or 
not available in time its use is avoided and high risks are taken  until something drastic 
happens. The issue for information security is therefore, not only to be effective but also to 
address other requirements which impact the acceptability and application of information 
security. 
In particular, countermeasures may have to be put in place that meet specific regulatory or 
legislative requirements, with associated mandatory assurance n~s. 
To a business, securing information can be thought of as being like an insurance policy - the 
cost of protection must be balanced against the likely consequences of the perceived threat 
occurring. This cost is made up of a number of elements, including: 
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case 
•  impact on business performance 
•  liability of management for incidents and relationship with customer confidence 
•  legal costs. 
An important experience from the past two years shows that, in commercial applications, the 
aspects of cost and ease of use are critical for the introduction of information security. For 
this reason a number of enterprises, including many Governments, are looking to procure 
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS)  security products  to  meet their needs,  rather than 
developing bespoke systems. 
The unit cost of security is affected by market volume. Market volume is unlikely to be 
achieved without commoditisation of security products to the point where they are part of the 
IT infrastructure rather than a  separate cost factor (on  cars, ABS  was  expensive until it 
became generally fitted). 
High volume and commoditisation can be achieved by: 
•  the provision of a common architecture and security building blocks which can be used 
across the widest possible community so that low prices can be achieved 
•  development of world-wide standards for secure systems 
•  raising awareness of security risks in order to stimulate demand 
•  common or mutually recognised security evaluations world-wide 
•  supplier self-certification, with appropriate liabilities 
•  agreed protection levels with corresponding sets of protection measures (to focus 
products onto common needs). Current work on baseline controls could provide a basis 
for an agreed minimum protection level. Other protection levels may be needed for 
more sensitive or critical information. 
It may be that separate security evaluation criteria and methods need to be developed to allow 
for low assurance assessments to be carried out at low cost 
Requirements 
•  "IS-to-cost" techniques for business and private users 
•  incorporation of good information security design practice in  the  development of 
products and services 
•  definition of information security as business and marketing factor 
•  ·identification of acceptance levels for insurers, regulators and the commercial courts 
•  specification of duties and responsibilities of parties to the use of information systems 
and their security requirements 
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minimising the cost of providing commonly needed levels of security. 
3. 11. Social Recognition of Information Crime 
Issues 
Negligence, ignorance and recklessness are some of the causes of many security breaches and 
create the opportunity for information crimes. 
Discussion 
Information security breaches, like failures to observe safety rules, can in many instances be 
attributed to a lack of care or ignorance. This is  compounded by the fact that the loss of 
immaterial goods, for example information, is not considered as serious as the loss of material 
goods. This is due in part to the fact that electronically stored information can be reproduced 
at close to zero costs without the loss of the original. Stealing information is therefore often 
considered as a gain for the thief without a loss to the owner. It is perceived by many to be a 
game rather than a real problem because people are unable to relate the electronic world to the 
real one. This has the double effect of inciting negligence by the owner of the information and 
little concern for the illegal acquisition of information. Because of the widely practised back-
up of information resources, this applies even to the intentional or accidental destruction of 
information. 
There is much work in establishing and reinforcing "ethical principles" as applied to specific 
actions of information ownership, creation, dissemination, etc. These need to be related to 
sector actors, their control perspective and the assets over which they exercise either explicit 
or implicit authority. This needs to be related to codes of practice and conduct, legislation and 
regulation to establish the extent to which protection is dependent upon a formal or informal 
control environment or can rely on the enhancement of ethical and professional standards. 
Changes  to  traditional  programming  techniques  have  made  it  possible  for  non-IT 
professionals to deliver programming and systems  analysis  methods.  In  many smaller. 
enterprises such work would often be done by non-IT professionals. 
Two examples of computer crime illustrate the diversity of situations which may arise: 
Example 1 
In  a  German  company  (belonging to  the  "Association  for  Security")  a  programmer -
unsatisfied with his salary - caused damage by a specific computer-programme. This program 
modified the data of a data bank by randomly controlled ·write operations. The programme 
was intricately hidden among other programme-parts. Within two years the data-bank became 
more and more defective and damaged. The costs of damages and of reconstructing the data 
bank were about 500 000 ECU. 
Example2 
In an office of the German Government a huge computer-system, comprising various storage 
means and terminals was installed. Suddenly the computer-execution-times and the response 
times became much longer than expected. After a difficult investigations it turned out, that a 
programmer,  who had founded  together with  his  wife  a  shop for sending out photo-· 
equipment, has done his complete accounting, mailing, etc. for his shop on the computer in a 
hidden area. He had camouflaged or suppressed the protocolling of this programme. He 
caused damage of about 100 000 ECU. 
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•  Education and training on the information security requirements and concepts needed to 
operate in a secure manner in the Information Age 
•  clarification of "Info-Ethics" for the professional and individual user in its relationship 
to information security 
•  clarification of responsibilities of the sector actors in general and in their relations 
within each other, with particular reference to open and distributed applications. 
3. 12. Human Factors 
Issue 
Human interference with information systems constitutes the biggest risk factor to security 
and the most difficult to address. 
Discussion 
The largest potential threat to IT systems arises from the people involved in them be  they 
designers, programmers, operators or users. And more security breaches are caused by human 
error, often by well intended people, than any other causes. 
Apart from providing "fool-proor' system and services, there is thus a need for organisations 
to give due consideration to the non technical techniques which they should consider to meet 
this threat. Such techniques could come under the heading of personnel policies and forced 
users - positive vetting, removal on notice, monitoring changes in life style, avoidance of 
collusion, job organisation, contracts of employment, etc. And the role of good supervision. 
Allied to this is the need to emphasise that controls in a system must not only relate to the 
technical mechanisms but to the system overall, including the clerical and manual workforce. 
And, of  course, they must relate to the overall objectives of the organisation. 
"Security is an attitude of  mind, practice and discipline." 
Requirements 
•  Adjustment of  personnel management practices and organisational procedures to reduce 
the vulnerability by the actions of staff and other people 
•  greater use of non-technical management controls. 
3.13. Safety Critical Environments 
Issue 
Protection of  information in safety critical environments. 
Discussion 
Safety and security have a common technological basis, but differ in their objective. In 
complex systems there is in many cases a duality of  objectives. Safe systems need also to be 
secure. The reverse is not necessarily the case. 
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lead to an  accident, given certain environmental conditions.  The analysis of the  safety 
environment involves identifying the hazards within a safety critical environment and then 
either verifying that hazardous states cannot be reached or that the risk is acceptable. Risk is 
defined as a function of the probability of a hazard occurring, the probability that the hazard 
will lead to an accident, and the worst potential loss associated with such an accident. You 
can diminish risk by reducing any or all of these factors, and there are environmental-safety 
techniques that focus on each. 
There is an increase· in the use of information systems within various areas of application 
which are considered as  part of a safety critical environment. For example in the area of 
healthcare  (eg  medical databases),  air traffic  control,  transportation  of hazardous  and 
dangerous goods, industrial processes etc. The increased reliance on electronic information in 
thes.e  various areas of application specifically related to the control and management of 
safety,  has  resulted in an increased need for the protection of the  information  system 
supplying such information. Therefore the protection of information systems used in safety 
critical environments is a factor to be addressed when considering hazards and associated 
risks in such environments. 
Consideration needs to be given to the common requirement of security and safety, common 
methods for analysing the  threats,  vulnerabilities and  hazards,  and the role of se~urity 
evaluation for safety-critical systems. 
Requirements 
•  Common approach to the handling of security and safety critical requirements 
•  methodologies ·for threat,  vulnerability  and hazard analysis  for the  protection of 
information systems used in safety-critical environments 
•  methodologies for the design, development and procurement of safety critical systems, 
covering  project  management,  development  environment,  auditing  of process, 
configuration management and change control 
•  common approach to security evaluation of information systems in safety-critical 
environments 
•  common approach to information systems recovery in safety critical environments. 
3. 14. Embedding Systems 
Issue 
There is a  marked trend to  embed information  systems  in  other products.  This raises 
particular security and safety issues. 
Discussion: 
Increasing use of computers  and information processing is  occurring in a  manner that 
incorporates information/computers into other products to make those products more usable, 
flexible, etc. These embedded systems, that are usually hidden from the user, depend upon the 
accuracy of the programs they contain and the information inputs/outputs to preserve the 
usefulness of the products in which they are placed. Failure of the processor or corruption of 
Page28  Green Paper on the Security of Information System the programs or information contained may cause failure or destruction of the device or 
hazard to the user. 
Embedded systems  are already being used in  automobiles  for  controlling ignition and 
carburettor systems or braking systems, in television sets and VCRs, in microwave ovens, and 
so on. As embedded systems proliferate they create potentials for physical hazard to users 
beyond simple loss of the functionality of the devices in which they are embedded. The 
potential will also exist that such embedded systems could constitute a hazard to the well-
being of bystanders or property. 
Security hazards can be  introduced quite unwillingly. For flexibility reasons, suppliers of 
communication systems are  moving towards installable firmware in the field. They may 
thereby overlook the fact that such a facility may create an undefined platform. IEEE standard 
1149.1  calls for standard test access  ports  and also foresees  the  possibility of remote 
diagnosis. It is therefore possible to extract data flowing between the components on a printed 
circuit 
To some extent, liability laws will cover product failures which 'Create damage to users. 
However, there may need to be some added means of ensuring the reliability of embedded 
systems and the integrity of the systems as they leave the factory  0 
Requirements 
•  Methods of testing that enable standards of reliability to be ensured, including tests to 
destruction. wl;lere appropriate 
•  approach for the certification of safe products 
•  definition of  requirements for fail-safe system architectures and implementations 
•  anti-tampering and protection specifications and standards 
•  qlJality label, that indicates the quality level of the embedded system 
•  awareness of designers of the potential impact of innovation in  the validity of test 
technology  0 
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4.1. Requirements for Enterprises and Individuals 
4.2. Requirements for Security Fundions 
4.3. Requirements for the Safety of Communication Systems 
4. Demand Related Issues  4.4. Requirements for Evaluations 
4.5. Requirements for Security and Safety Methodologies 
s 
4.6. Requirements for Audits 
4.7. Information Valuation 
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4.1.1. Agreement on Security Requirements far Enterprises 
4.1.2. Security Administration 
4.1.3. Security Objectives for Enterprises 
4.1.4. Exploiting Innovation 
4.1. Requirements for
1Enterprises and Individuals  4.1.5. Sectoral Specifics 
4.1.6. Security Domains 
4.1. 7  .-Security Labelling 
4.1.8. Administration of Access to Security Related Data 
4.1.9. Security Requirements for Individual Users 
4. J. 1.  Agreement on Security Requirements for Enterprises 
Issue 
Identification  of real  world  security  requirements  and  objectives  for  business  and 
administration. The derivation of security requirements from  business requirements is 
complex and not well understood. 
Discussion 
The protection of infonnation systems must include all relevant aspects. Consideration must 
be given to requirements from the view point of the enterprise, taking into account corporate 
and organisation plans, goals and strategies of the business or administration. Requirements at 
this level can be then translated into "Security Objectives", ie why the security functionality is 
required as it applies to the operation of the business or administration environment. 
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•  identifying business requirements which have a security dimension 
•  relating that security dimension to security objectives. 
These  security  objectives  need  then  to  be  supported  by  a  definition of the  security 
functionality and related services required necessary to support the user/business. 
Enterprise  The Enterprise's Goals & Requirements of 
~ 
Environment  the •Business• or the goals related to the  requires  - View  user environment 
Q) 
J 
'"C 
0 
~  Enterprise Rules, Objectives & Semantics as they 
Enterprise  apply to the operational environment of the 
~  Application  business and its security requirements & objectives  ...  View  ·a::  SECURITY OBJECTIVES- Why the Security  requires 
::l  Functionality is Required  I 
(.) 
Q) 
en  The Functional Capabilities & Support Services  , 
supports 
'"C  Functional  necessary for the Enterprise and its security 
Q)  View  SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY- What  Security  ... 
c:  Functionality is Provided  specifies 
Q)  i  J  t 
•t: 
0  The Implementation of the Security 
Q)  Functionality &  Support Services 
UJ  SECURITY MECHANISMS- How Security  conforms to 
•t:  Functionality is Provided and Implemented  Cl. 
~  The ASSURANCE (ie CORRECTNESS and 
Q)  EFFECTIVENESS} in the Implementation of  the  ...  Functionality & Mechanisms  c: 
w 
The security model has not included legal, accounting or regulatory requirements which may 
be  imposed upon  enterprises  rather than  forming  any  integral  part of the  Enterprise 
requirements. 
Given the complexity and diversity of user/enterprise requirements for such protection it is 
necessary to classify the requirements in some structured way consistent with real world 
'  business and operational environments. 
The protection of information systems needs to consider the enterprise requirements of the 
"business". These requirements  not only include functionality  that is "owned" by  the 
enterprise but must include inter-enterprise requirements as  well.  It must consider the 
functionality and assurance of IT building blocks, end user applications, integration enablers 
(such as electronic mail), operating systems, communication services and protocols, and basic 
hardware and software platforms. 
The balance of functionality (what it does) and assurance (how well it does it), both generic 
and application specific, will determine the extent to which electronic information systems 
are accepted as an integral part of both the public and corporate IT infrastructure to underpin 
business actions. 
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• The prime requirement for any secure system must be a set of architectural principles that can 
be effectively translated into an overall design framework. Secure systems must be created at 
different "grades of assurance" from a set of policies, standards and procedures. 
Specific security requirements relating to open systems will come from a threat· assessment 
and risk analysis which will form part of the overall system security policy process. 
The cost of security is an integral part of the cost of ownership of an IT system. The cost of 
protection against breaches of security needs to be commensurate with the costs (both direct 
and indirect) that may be incurred from  a breach in security. A security breach may have 
shon term (and perhaps, localised) implications such as loss of sales and revenue or fraud. It 
may also have longer term (and wider) impacts on business communities through loss of 
confidence and consequential loss of  business. 
The cost of detection, resistance and recovery can be tangible and high, and although there 
are techniques available to quantify risks there are no generally applicable methods for 
estimating the potential costs arising for example from denial of service or loss of integrity. 
The provision of security measures may also make it harder to use and may constrain overall 
performance. However, where the security risk is high enough to cause an unacceptable level 
of  compromise, leading to considerable commercial and financial loss, then security measures 
must be  given high priority commensurate with the nature and value of the business in 
question. Sectoral requirements vary widely, as do requirements by size of  enterprise within a 
sector. Sectoral requirements may be varied by regulation, bilateral international agreements, 
general trading agreements or conventions. 
Increased demand for Electronic trading from all kinds of businesses, both public and private 
sector, will place requirements for security on  the communal service infrastructure that 
provides the capability for such business activities. The regulatory and legal environment 
within which such service organisations work will.  become a factor for economic growth in 
the community, and security of service provision an element of such services. 
Requirements 
•  Taxonomy and directory of user requirements and security objectives derived from 
experience with practical applications. 
4.1.2.  Security Administration 
Issue 
Security administration operates within the overall management. It should not compromise its 
mission. 
Discussion 
Security  administration  is  an  indispensable  function  for  the  normal  working  of any 
organisation and falls within the "control" aspect of management's activities. 
The function's objectives will be to ensure the existence and maintenance of security of: 
•  hardware, fumware, software 
•  personnel 
•  communications and networks 
•  physical environment. 
It will also be concerned about disaster recovery and contingency planning; compliance with 
legislation such as data protection and privacy laws, and maintaining auditability. Corporate 
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publicly whether they consider that their companies' system of internal control has been 
workin~  and this specifically includes information security consideration. 
Security administration represents a non-negligible cost factor in an enterprise. It may also 
unduly restrict personnel to do their job. Therefore, security administration and management 
needs must be reconciled. 
Personnel in the security administration function need not only to have adequate awareness, 
information and training in order to recognise threats and vulnerabilities and to be aware of 
appropriate counter-measures, but also to understand the enterprise's mission. 
Management is responsible for reviewing audit reports and taking corrective action where 
necessary. Audit is responsible for ensuring that security technology has been implemented in 
accordance with the organisation's security policy. 
Specific items to be considered under this area also include control over safety critical and 
process control information, and security logs and the need for real-time alarms to detect 
intruders, where appropriate,.. It is important to be realistic about controls and not overlook 
simple matters such as the possibility of passwords being sold. 
Requirements 
•  Guidelines for establishment of security administration function 
•  recommendation on moving  towards  commonality of laws  on  data privacy  and 
protection, particularly relating to individuals 
•  means to provide increased awareness and relevant education and training 
•  guidelines for consideration of balanced security, taking account of level of risk in 
different areas (physical, personnel, hardware, software, data, etc). 
4. J  .3.  Security Objectives for Enterprises 
Issue 
Definition of Security Objectives for enterprises. 
Discussion 
A security objective is a description of what security the enterprise is trying to achieve eg 
why this security controVfunction is wanted. It is a mission statement of the user/enterprise 
which describes why an aspect of security is needed. It is a user/business target or purpose to 
which security is being addressed. For example, consider the subject of data integrity and the 
objective "Prevent unauthorised modification to data". The security objective has the purpose 
to ensure that appropriate mechanisms should exist to preserve the integrity of data. For 
example this may be related to data held on a medical database, on a company financial 
database, in airline reservation system or a geography information system. 
' The organisation of security within enterprises in terms of business control structures or in the 
case of some user environment (eg legal, accounting, audit etc.) and functions (eg IT, human 
resources, insurance) needs to be integrated with a set of security policies, standards (both 
public and in-house), and made compliant with laws and regulations (eg computer crime 
manual), guidelines and codes of practice etc. 
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methodologies, tools and evaluation criteria. For example risk analysis methods, baseline 
controls, and evaluation criteria (eg ITSEC, Federal Criteria etc.). 
Security objectives thus encompasses a set of'objectives (and possibly sub-objectives) and a 
set of related issues that reflect specific points of concern, problems, questions relative to 
business requirements, controls and applications. 
The  diagram  below  shows  the  relationship  between  Security  objectives,  Security 
organisation, and Security methodologies. Laws apply to the user environment directly. Their 
presence generates some of the security objectives. Standards may be both mandatory and 
discretionary, and may incorporate methodologies. The final box covers security methods and 
techniques. 
/ 
Requirements 
Types of Enterprise/User 
Environment 
Security Organisation 
Structures and functions 
•  Standard techniques for drawing-up security policies for typical situations 
•  methods and techniques for agreeing levels of security and security objectives. 
4.1.4.  -Explofflng  Innovation 
Issue 
To establish how service providers and vendors could exploit the  benefits of innovation 
without compromising security and safety. 
Green Paper on the Security of Information Systems  Page 35 Discussion . 
Vendors and service providers need to innovate to survive commercially. They hav~ strong 
vested interest in ensuring that their products are adequately secure and .safe. Businesses by 
their very nature need to take risks to survive and this commercial imperative for a risk taking 
culture has to be reconciled with the needs for an inherently  risk averse security and safety 
culture in a way that is effective yet does not stifle innovation. 
There are many aspects to innovation. On the one hand there is innovations which change the 
technology that is being used to implement systems (eg from  electrical or electronic to 
programmable).  Other innovations  concern the  domains  of application  (new  forms  of 
command and control, remote diagnosis and maintenance, ultra-critical applications) and 
other innovations concern the technology. This can either be in the technologies deployed (  eg 
new forms of fault tolerance, different types of open systems) or in the technologies used to 
develop systems (eg code ·generation. novel testing regimes, formal methods, neural nets). 
These  innovations  are  likely  to  continue  the  trend  for  greater  integration  and 
internationalisation of systems, a convergence of  dependability, safety and security problems, 
a blurring in the distinction between hardware and software. Systems are likely to be more 
open than in the past, be  the result of evolution, and make extensive use of components 
already deployed in other applications. The safety and security concerns will change as  a 
system evolves, and changes in the environment of a system (eg organisational changes, 
removal of other systems ensuring safety) can cause a system to evolve into a higher level of 
criticality. 
There is a need that the measures taken to provide confidence in systems can cope with these 
innovations and that businesses have predictable certification or regulatory costs where these 
are relevant. This has a number of implications for the regulatory and ,certification regimes 
and poses challenges to the standards making process. 
Innovation can bring with it new hazards. There is a need to identify these and either remove 
them via redesign, provide measures to tolerate them or at worst, measures to mitigate their 
consequences. 
Requirements 
•  Assessment methods for impacts of  changes on systems 
•  procedural and regulatory frameworks  need to address convergence of safety and 
security (implications for standards) 
•  methods for identifying early on where innovations are likely to be unacceptable from a 
safety perspective or will result in such economic penalties that they are not viable 
commercially. 
4. J  .5.  Sectoral Specifics 
Issue 
Beyond the normal requirements common to different business sectors and user environments 
there may also be additional requirements and priorities specific to the operational nature and 
commercial mission of a particular business. These specific requirements can be normally 
expressed in terms of  codes of practice and baseline controls. 
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Legal and regulatory provisions can be supported by Codes of Practice in an attempt to 
achieve due care and diligence. There are those of general application and tliose  that are 
industry specific. A general Code of Practice may be achieved by  the establishment of a. 
security management handbook,  maybe based upon the approach taken for achieving a 
Quality code of practice (IS09000). The application of information security is a prerequisite 
for the successful conduct of business for particular sectors, especially when these sectors are 
highly interactive. The traditionally prominent among them are: 
•  Finance 
•  Trade 
•  Medical 
•  Telecommunications 
•  Manufacturing industry 
•  Process industry 
•  Administrations  . 
There may be other market led requirements, that will result in a different security based 
segmentation. 
Requirements 
•  Consolidation and development of a set of Codes of Practice and baseline controls 
addressing specific business sector requirements. 
4.1.6.  Security Domains 
Issue 
Openness and protection. 
Discussion 
In practice, the level of information security is dynamically adapted to a given situation. This 
leads to the concept of  Dynamic IS Management and the need to be able to define domains, in 
which information security is applied homogeneously. 
Domains are user groupings sharing some of their functions and support. For some activities 
they operate as virtually closed user groups, but have the possibility to interwork with other 
domains as long as certain minimum requirements ensure no loss of trust or a transparent 
downgrading. 
The notion of a security domain is therefore important for two reasons. Namely, 
•  It can be used to describe how security is managed and administered, and 
•  It can be used as a building block in modelling security relevant activities that involve 
elements under distinct security authorities. 
Examples of domain activities are: 
•  .accesses to elements (eg a database for network management) 
•  provision of a communication links 
•  operations relating to a specific management function 
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The organisation of security within enterprises in tenns of business control structures or in the 
case of some user environment (eg legal, accounting, audit etc.) and func.tions (eg IT, human 
resources, insurance) needs to be  supported by a set of security policies, standards (both 
public and in-house), laws and regulations (eg computer crime manual), guidelines and codes 
of  practice etc. 
The security policy defines what is meant by security within the domain, the rules by which 
security may be obtained to the satisfaction of the security authority, and the activities to 
which it applies. The security policy may also define which rules apply in relations with other 
security domains in general, and in relations with particular other security domains. 
The management of inter-domain openness and protection may be different depending on 
similarities in purpose, and agreements will  be  needed to achieve appropriate levels of 
assurance. Mechanisms by which TIPs achieve efficient, coherent management of policies, 
procedures and controls between domains need development: 
· Requirements 
•  Mechanisms for management of policies, procedures and controls between domains for 
TIPs 
•  generation of guidelines for domain creation, management and control 
•  development of a common framework for domain interworking 
• ,  agreement on management,  TIPs, accreditation,  auditing and relations  with  law 
enforcement agencies. 
4. J  .7.  Security Labelling 
Issue 
Transfer of information  among  domains .  requires  agreements  on the expression of the 
sensitivity of infonnation, ie the syntax and semantics of the associated security labels, and of 
the procedures and mechanisms for handling labelled information. 
Discussion 
The basis for the trustworthiness of a domain and the trust between domains is the assurance 
that the processes that are used to manipulate infonnation behave in a way that corresponds to 
the protection requirements of the information in terms of confidentiality and possession, 
integrity and authenticity, and availability and utility. 
Labels are a method for expressing the  sensitivity of information. They can be based on 
different scales, like the value of  infonnation or the impact of a security breach affecting the 
infonnation. 
The need for comprehensive labels has become acute because of the increasing degree to 
which organisations interoperate electronically. This has led to increased reliance on technical 
measures to achieve adequate security. It is quite feasible for trusted systems to .switch on or 
off technical measures automatically providing that the  label  adequately expresses the 
security requirement associated with a piece of information. Labels could then be used to 
make  decisions  on  information  routing,  transmission  enveloping,  requirements  for 
confumation and so on. 
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some indicator of the categories of information which can be allowed into end-systems or to 
users. 
Organisations have to agree on the range of options that do meet any particular security 
requirement.  Part of the  solution  to  the  handling of labelled information  lies  in  the 
development of Codes of Practice specifying procedures and mechanisms. There is also a 
need for accreditation and audit of communicating partners. The introduction of independent 
third parties avoids the pairwise interactions that would otherwise be necessary to establish 
trust. 
Requirements 
•  Guidelines for security labelling. 
•  standard on how to express labels and on the meanings of a basic set of security labels 
•  Codes of Practice and accreditation methods for domains claiming to support standard 
labels, and their mutual recognition. 
4. 1.8.  Administration of  Access to Security Related Data; 
Issue 
Support of  functions for the administration of security related data. 
Discussion 
Management of rights is an administrative function available to both security administrators 
and resource owners. While management functions reserved to security administrators can be 
rather sophisticated, functions available to resource owners have to be kept simple and easy to 
use. The management of  rights can be separated into security information related to users (eg 
privileges, keys and/or passwords) and security information related to resources (eg access 
control lists, labels; keys). Management functions need to be performed form the place where 
the administrator/resource owner is sitting and apply to a number of remote resources. It is 
therefore important that the management of access rights is done in a secure fashion (eg using 
·appropriate security protocols). 
Requirements 
•  Easy to use tools for access right management and key management 
•  secure solutions for remote administration 
•  awareness for control issues concerning ·security related data, and implications of non- . 
action. 
4. 1. 9.  Security Requirements for Individual Users 
Issue 
Individuals  and small companies have  "enterprise requirements"  but often have  little 
opportunity to choose appropriate security protection when dealing with large organisations 
(eg equipment and software suppliers, service suppliers, banks). 
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The individual user, in their role as a private citizen or as a member of a liberal profession (eg 
a lawyer or medical doctor), has a natural interest, and sometimes a legal requirement, to 
protect some of their information. Unlike in the case of the enterprise, the individual user will 
not normally go through a systematic process of establishing goals, definition of security 
objectives, etc., unless they are subject to professional standards of  conduct. 
The individual normally has  at his disposal a PC (or small network of PCs) and some 
communication links, eg telephone, fax, e-mail. Often physical security is likely to be weak. 
Most liberal profession work under some codes of practice or conduct. These codes are of a 
general nature and do not normally specify particular security arrangements. 
The common and specific requirements of individual users, with regard to the protection of 
their computer installation (physical and electronic), the protection of their data (against 
accidental and deliberate loss) and  the  protection of their communications  (  eg signed 
communications, privacy enhanced communications) must be established. 
The individual user has also an interest that the totality of processing of any matters relating 
to the user is cOJTect and confidential to the extent required. 
Requirements 
•  User profiles identifying standard types of users together with typical requirements. 
4.2.  Requirements for Security Functions 
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Issue 
Access control procedures to many systems need to be standardised and well managed to 
meet their objectives. 
Discussion 
Computer systems and services impose control procedures on persons (or other systems) 
attempting to access them directly or over local or wide-area networks. These access control 
procedures apply to "connections"; that is,  they determine whether or not a connection, 
association or session is allowed to be established. These control procedures have been often 
primitive and relatively insecure, as the occurrence of "hacking" demonstrates. 
The requirement for secure access control is not confined to access to host computers by 
persons at terminals. Reciprocal (mutual) access control is often needed between two (or 
sometimes more)  systems.  Access control can apply  across  general  telecommunication 
networks, determining (for example) who may call whom by telephone; or who may receive 
which programme on  a cable TV network.  In addition to applying to end-to-end (trans-
network) communications, access control also applies to users and (even more importantly) 
operators accessing the network and to access by human users to terminal devices. 
Although the importance of access control is widely recognised, the practical application of 
security techniques in solving the problem is more limited. This is for a variety of reasons 
including technical complexity, lack of agreed standards and lack of user acceptability. 
Secure 41ccess control relies on a mixture of: 
•  identification mechanisms (authentic naming) identifying the remote person or system 
•  authorisation mechanisms, determining the authority of the remote person or system to 
carry out different types of actions 
•  random (unpredictable) components, affording protection against the re-use of once-
valid access control messages under invalid circumstances (replay) 
•  cryptographic techniques to protect the above from modification, copying, etc. 
The automation of physical or logical access control procedures based on biometrics has been 
in use for a number of years, most notably utilising voice verification techniques. These latter 
focus on the vocal characteristics that produce speech and not on speech itself. Today there 
are several organisations that are actively marketing and/or developing voice verification 
systems. There are two basic types of voice verification system - telephone-based systems and 
stand-alone equipments which can  be networked within a discrete building or group of 
buildings. A further distinction exists between those systems which are text-dependent, where 
a pre-registered word, phrase or number is used for verification, and text-independent, which 
can handle a fuller vocabulary. 
Without some analysis of access control scenarios, followed by some outiine standardisation 
work,  users  and systems  are  going  to find  themselves  having  to  implement and use 
(depending on their current application) a range of incompatible techniques, which in turn 
rely on only partially interoperable infrastructures  (such  as  naming  and identification 
authorities, certification authorities, key management systems, directory services, etc.). 
Access  control very often  involves only two parties:.  one  making  the  access  and one 
granting/denying the access.  In  some environments this is  however inadequate as  some 
intermediaries cannot do the access on their behalf but on the behalf of someone else. This 
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processing. For example, in a distributed service the requester addresses its request to the 
nearest server able to fulfil the service and then the request has to be forwarded so that it can 
be honoured by the appropriate server within the service. This problem is called delegation. 
For the server point of view different policies may apply: it may be interested only by the 
privileges of the initial requester and by the privileges of all the intermediaries. The access 
control decision may then be based on the properties of the initial requester only or on all of 
the entities involved. In addition restrictions about what intermediaries are or are not allowed 
to do may be specified by the initial requester. 
There is a need for widely accepted solutions to the most common access control scenarios. 
Requirements 
•  Group access control scenarios and schemes based on levels of  commonality 
•  techniques, products, specifications and standards addressing access control matched to 
the scenarios identified 
•  parameters common to most or all of the above techniques, products, specifications and 
standards and the feasibility of  establishing common formats for them 
•  identification of  the key features for coherence in the supporting infrastructure 
•  basic access control mechanisms for pilot implementation 
•  development of  delegation scenarios 
•  identification  of techniques,  products,  specifications  and  standards  addressing 
delegation and their association with the identified scenarios. 
4.2.2.  Requirements for Electronic Cash 
Issue 
A general purpose system is needed for providing electronic cash. 
Discussion 
The securing of electronic cash shares some problems with negotiable' documents, and may 
also need additional properties such as privacy (untraceability) and dividability. 
Large scale solutions already exist for paying small amounts of money in special situations, 
such as special cards for telephones and travel. Other systems exist for large amounts of 
money- prepayment and credit cards. Between these two, there is a need for a system to 
make general purpose payments for relatively small amounts of money. This means that the 
system must have low transaction costs, and will thus be able to compete with existing special 
cards. 
The system should ideally include the following properties: 
•  ,unlimited transferability (from one user to another) 
•  dividability into any sub-amount required 
•  independence from on-line TIP services 
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•  security and uniqueness - ie cannot be forged or copied. 
It should give users complete control over the 'amount transferred in each transaction, and 
allow them to know the amount remaining. It should be relatively easy to refill the device 
with electronic money, possibly via unsecured network setvices. 
Requirements 
•  Agreement on the concepts underlying electronic cash 
•  international standards. 
4.2.3.  Requirements for Security Services 
Issue 
Various security services have been identified. Agreement on their requirements must be 
established. 
Discussion 
A variety of security services has  bee  identified. Although several of these are used in 
practice at a limited scale,  their general requirements have not yet been agreed and their 
availability to the general user is not yet established. Some of the more important services are 
described below. 
Non-Repudiation Services 
Non-repudiation of origin respectively receipt means  that  a  particular user,  called the 
originator respectively the receiver, cannot repudiate (ie deny) to have signed respectively 
received a particular electronic document. It does not prove who has actually created the 
document. We have exactly the same problem with paper documents: the fact that someone 
puts his signature on a hand-written transcript of music does not mean he is the composer. 
Non-repudiations services are precisely the services which in electronic communication can 
cover all legal functionalities of a hand-written signature, but in a much more secure way: 
The main difference is that the digital signature which supports the non-repudiation provides 
a logical connection to the message. 
Claim of  Origin 
Copyright is a very important security service in the electronic handling of a document. The 
major problem with enforcing copyright of, say, a software program, is that of two different 
versions it is difficult to decide which one is the original. This problem is of course not 
restricted to electronic documents only. In fact,  one runs into exactly the  same kind of 
problems as in the paper world. 
The service required here is "claim of origin". This is the counterpart to non-repudiation in 
the sense that the point is to allow the creator to prove who created the document, as opposed 
to non-repudiation of origin, which allows everybody to prove that someone has signed a 
particular document (which typically commits him to something). The difference is that with 
non-repudiation services, the receiver is able to prove something, whereas claim of origin 
pertains to the transmitter.  , 
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Some conventional physical documents, such as eg the bill of lading and the bill of exchange, 
must be negotiable. The possession of the document must allow to give tj.tle to anybody who 
cart present it. The electronic equivalent is also needed. 
The goal to achieve here is that an electronic document at any particular time can be proved 
to be the (temporary) property of a particular user. 
With ordinary paper documents, the problem is solved by giving the original of a document 
cenain physical attributes that are difficult to reproduce. With this precaution, it makes sense 
to speak of the original of  a document, and define the owner simply as the person holding the 
original. 
Negotiable documents entail that their physical  uniqueness  must  be protected against 
duplication; it must be easy to distinguish a copy from its original. This is the case with hand 
signed paper documents; the hand-written signature cannot be copied such that the copy could 
not be distinguished from the original. Although a digital signature does protect the integrity 
of the signed electronic document, it can, however, easily be copied so that the physical 
original cannot be distinguished from its copies. 
This impedes the usage of electronic communication eg in maritime trade. The sender of a 
cargo produces a unique document, the bill of lading, hands a copy to the shipper and sends 
the protected original to the receiver. The receiver may trade the original and its title or keep 
it Whoever presents the original to the shipper will be handed over the cargo. 
The shortcoming of the paper bill of lading is the fact that it takes time to transport it, 
particularly as it is a piece of value and must be well protected. Therefore, an electronic 
substitute should be found that protects the uniqueness of the original document, and which 
can be transacted over communication systems. The technique should support recovery after 
equipment or communication failure. 
Besides issuing negotiable documents there  are other ways of securing correct title to 
property. Instead of a person proving his claim by the presence of a token, the claim may be 
addressed to a distinct person who then is expected to prove his identity. This is the case with 
the freight bill, which is another way to deliver a cargo to the authentic receiver. However, 
the freight bill cannot be traded as effectively as the bill of lading. 
The provision of  electronic negotiable documents must include: 
•  document uniqueness, ie a document should only exist in one single valid copy (and 
can therefore not be sold more than once by an owner) 
•  document authenticity, ie a document should not be able to alter, and the origin of a 
document should be possible to identify 
•  transferability, ie the document should be possible to transfer through communication 
networks 
•  fail-safe storage and communication, ie recovery after failure should be possible both 
when the document is stored or transferred between parties. 
One should expect that, unless proper electronic documents will be available, the use of  paper 
for negotiable documents will be continued at the expense of  effectiveness and more paper. 
Transaction of negotiable documents are often a part of a larger business transaction, eg the 
seller of a document receives a payment, or negotiable documents are exchanged between the 
parties. When such transactions are taking place over a telecommunication network, there 
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that either will the whole exchange be performed or it will perform no exchange. Such a 
service will secure fraud during exchange of values. 
Fair Exchange ofValues 
When negotiable trade documents change hands, they are often handed over in exchange for 
something else, for example another negotiable document, some form of payment, or simply 
some piece of  information that may be of sufficient value to the receiver. 
The pany who gives a document away may of course be concerned with the possibility that 
he may not receive in exchange the object or the information he was supposed to. 
If  the parties meet physically and exchange ordinary documents, this concern may not be very 
serious; an attempt of abuse is likely to be detected early enough to prevent a successful 
fraud. In the world of (interactive) EDI, however, the problem can be more serious. Efficient 
.communication is possible over great distances with parties to which there may be little or no 
existing business relations. Such parties may well be found worthy of less trust than those 
with which physical meetings can be arranged. 
Untraceability 
As electronic registration and transportation of data becomes more common, there are an 
increasing number of scenarios where individuals face new threats against their privacy. 
Since many types of personal data can easily be traced to particular individuals, the fact that 
the data are electronically stored introduces the possibility that  someone could efficiently 
collect comprehensive dossiers on individuals, even without this becoming known to the 
users themselves. 
In its most general form, anonymity or untraceability is a service with the goal of preventing 
su,ch personal data from being traced and collected. 
The issue is therefore to  allow accesses, calls or transactions to be performed without 
revealing the identity of the user. 
In some cases, anonymity of the user is required or identification of the user is unnecessary. 
Examples where anonymity is required are about electronic cash or electronic shopping where 
this is related to the privacy of the user. Practical cases are about road toll systems and mobile 
phone billing without revealing location history of user. Examples where identification of the 
user is unnecessary by the target system is where a service is opened to thousands of users but 
where subscription to the service is not managed directly by the service but by another 
company: The service manager is only interested in the fact that charges can be paid when the 
service is used. Who is using the service is not relevant. In some cases the user would also 
like to know that the service manager is not able to trace back the user. 
Another category where anonymity is required is non-traceable calls. Reponing fraud or 
corruption will only happen if the call (either phone or e-mail) is not traceable to the caller. 
There is a  need to have mechanisms able to fulfil these needs. However these kinds of 
techniques should not be used when there is at the same time a requirement of auditability. 
For cases where both requirements exist there can be solutions where tracing an event can 
only be achieved by co-operation between different auditors. 
Time-Stamping 
In electronic communications, a digital equivalent is required for the date and time stamp in 
the paper world. Such a time stamp must be issued by an organisation that is trusted. If time 
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litigation, it will be difficult to establish if these were erroneous or  ·have been forged. 
In direct communications, both parties may agree on a mutual time refe.rence, but in store-
and-forward type communications time stamping by a third party is particularly important . 
Depending on sectoral differences, different granularities of time stamps may be needed. 
Some sectors may be content with the date, some with the nearest second. 
Requirements 
•  Scenarios for the use of  electronic security services 
•  user specifications for electronic security services 
•  establishment of  international application rules that can operate under the different legal 
frameworks and that ensure international communicability 
•  identification of different scenarios where it is appropriate for the public interest to 
mask or hide the identity of the end user, taking into account the balance between full 
anonymity and audit. 
4.2.4.  DigHal Signature 
4.2.4. 1.  The Individual Right to Signature 
Issue 
Individuals have the right to sign any information. 
Discussion 
Like with hand-written signatures, anybody is entitled to use a digital signature. Therefore, 
the distribution of keys for the purpose of signature must be non-discriminatory and non-
restrictive. Separate from the signature is the question of entitlement, ie if a certain person is 
empowered to sign a ·certain element of  information, document or transaction. 
Signature verification is therefore a two step process: formal verification of the signature and 
verification of  the entitlement of the sender. This process is depicted below. 
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• non-repudiation: does 
the document come 
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document intact? 
• does the sender 
have the power 
to sign the 
document? 
It is assumed in this simple model, that the sender adds his certificate (name plus his public 
key) to the signed document. The formal verification then establishes that a person with a 
certain name has correctly applied his signature and that the document has not been modified 
in transfer. Verification of entitlement checks that the name has the legal power to sign a 
particular document. 
Note that as a consequence, the powers given to a person should not be included in the 
attributes ofthe certificate, otherwise any change in these powers would invalidate the 
certificate. 
The situation maybe further complicated by the fact that several signatures maybe required 
for certain documents, eg husband and wife plus notary, two company directors. 
Requirements 
•  Clarification of the right to signature and the attached entitlement. 
4.2.4.2.  Consiste.ncy of Legal Principles for Digital Signatures 
Issue 
The legal functions have to be clearly identified for the authority of digital signatures, before 
a code-of-practice can be developed and introduced. 
Discussion 
In legal practice security and functional requirements for hand-written signatures differ 
widely.  In some cases a  hand-written signature is only to indicate that the signer has 
concluded his train of thought or his expression of will; under the given circumstances its 
authenticity may be obvious and needs not be provable. In other cases, for evidence, the 
signature must be provably authentic. In yet other cases authenticity requirements may 
demand attestation or even ask for more than one person's signature or for public notification. 
Another important case are "process signatures", where a process and not a natural person is 
the signer. 
The spectrum of legal requirements can be matched by the spectrum of technical realisations 
which may differ with respect to security provisions just as widely as legal requirements. Yet 
the  signing process must be transparent to the  signer.  For this  reason  it must follow 
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must follow a standardised layout principle.  1 
For ease of transition (in judicial thinking) from hand-written to digital sjgnatures traditional 
functional  requirements  for  hand-written  signatures  should  be  met  by  the  technical 
implementation of  digital signatures as closely as possible. 
A particular problem is the validity period of a digital signature. One must distinguish the 
validity period of the signature itself and the validity period of the entitlement. 
The validity period of the digital signature itself may have to be· limited for technical reasons. 
These reasons include: 
•  Insufficient key length. One may discover that some years from now, new progress in 
mathematics and technology makes it plausible that keys of the originally chosen 
limited length can be broken. (For instance, several European banks have introduced 
remote banking with RSA keys of length 512 bits. One cannot guarantee that this will 
be safe in 10 years, or even less, from now.) 
•  Poor key generation. One cannot be sure that programs at the desired quality level will 
be used by all key management centres. Hence users of those key management centres 
may find that their keys are breakable, and they have to cancel their certificates. 
•  Weak protection of workstation.  The  secret key of a  user may  be  compromised 
accidentally or through negligence. It may also be possible to tap the password of  a user 
through a Trojan horse on his  PC and subsequently get access  to the  secret key. 
(Fraudulent users may even claim this happened, and give away their key on purpose, 
in order to dispute that a certain signature did originate from them.) 
Taking the necessary precautions, and taking a differentiated approach to the validity period 
of signatures, then most digital signatures would fall inside the scope of applicability of hand 
written signatures 
The entitlement attached to a signature normally changes much faster. The authority given to 
a person should therefore not be included in the attributes of the certificate, otherwise any 
change in entitlement would invalidate the certificate. 
However, in all the work that has been carried out so far, there is no solution offered to the 
following problem: If messages have been signed with a key and needs to be kept for a 
number of years, and that key is denounced by the user as being compromised, how can the 
value of the already calculated signature be left intact? One possibility might be to use a TI'P 
for time stamping, but further study into this problem seems in place. An example may 
illustrate this point. 
If a user A signs a message in 1993, which has legal consequences to user B until2003, and 
A then cancels his certificate in year 1995, claiming that his key has been compromised, he 
will probably claim that the signed document from  1993 was falsified in  1995 by B, who 
could have bought a copy of A's secret key. However, ifB upon receipt in 1993 had gone to a 
TI'P and had the signature of A time stamped and signed by the TIP, or even registered, he 
can prove that A in fact did produce the said signature back in 1993. 
For some sectors and/or applications the granularity of the time stamping will be critical. It is 
conceivable that trusted time down to one second accuracy will be needed. 
Requirements 
•  EC-wide/internationcil agreement on the legal functions of signatures 
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legally binding purposes, ie as substitute for hand-written original signatures 
•  recommendation for the implementation for a public digital signat~  scheme for use by 
business, administrations and the general public 
•  legislative rules and, where appropriate, liabilities, for keys, certificates and TIPs to 
cover revocation of any or all the entities involved in the "chain of proof' needed in the 
signature technique. 
4.2.4.3.  Universal Acceptance of Digital Signatures 
Issue 
For digital  signatures to become a  full  alternative  to  hand-written  signature  universal 
acceptance is required. 
DiscussioA 
All functions of the hand-written signature should also apply to digital signatures. 
Where legal functions are carried out by digital signature, consensus with the legal profession 
is essential. 
Enterprises and individuals require greater legal certainty with regard to the use of Digital 
Signatures, and all transactions involving computers. 
Requirements 
•  Development, together with the legal profession, of recommendations for the practical 
use of digital  signatures  as  a  full  equivalent to  hand-written  signatures in legal 
transactions including the conditions required for evidence 
•  demonstration, through pilot projects, that digital signatures can be used as equivalent 
to hand-written signatures 
•  inclusion in the curriculum of relevant educational institutes (eg e·ngineering, biw and 
business schools) the use of  digital signature. 
4.2.5.  Privacy enhancement Issues · 
4.2.5.1.  Perception of Requirements for Privacy Enhancement 
Issue 
Confidentiality is, at times, essential for the good functioning of administrations, business and 
human relations. 
Discussion 
Business user of telecommunications and information systems cannot obtain full business 
benefit  without  confidentiality  services  being  available.  There  is  a  clear  need  for 
confidentiality services in the exchange of information in the business as well as in the private 
use. Today the exchange of sensitive information requiring confidentiality is often done in 
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available or its use not permitted. With the increasing demand for fast exchange of all kind of 
data, demand for "confidentiality" will  become pressing.  It is  already present in some 
applications such as medical information systems. 
Most business and private users of communication systems are aware of the conflict between 
their confidentiality requirements and national security issues which require the possibility to 
intercept the communication in a way regulated by national laws. They accept the national 
authorities ability for this interception provided there are adequate safeguards to prevent 
unauthorised interception even by government employees. 
Expectations of confidentiality of electronic message-services can currently not be met in the 
absence of international standards or internationally accepted methods. Uptake of these 
services by commercial users to support business processes will therefore have a natural limit, 
ie to those messages that someone usually writes on a postcard. Examples of commercially 
sensitive information includes pricing and bidding strategies, mergers and take-overs, or from 
a privacy point of view (transmission of  personnel and medical data). 
User needs for confidentiality, 
In analogy with confidentiality offered by existing physical mail and archiving services, ie 
envelopes, registration, courier services, etc., there is a need for confidentiality in the situation 
of  electronic interchange and storage of data. Even more so because electronic data can much 
more easily be copied or disclosed in its usual form, eg only channel coding and formatting as 
the "envelope", than its physical counterpart. 
At present certain unclassified but sensitive information on physical media such as  paper, 
microfilm, or photograph, of business enterprises or medical centres are protected against 
unauthorised disclosure by physical and procedural methods. 
Today the trend is towards more electronic communication and storage of data and hence 
there is a need for appropriate confidentiality services in an agreed or standardised form to be 
readily available for all users of  electronic information systems. 
Service provision 
The extent to which confidentiality services are provided for a specific business or citizen 
could depend on a system of licenses or certificates. 
A particular business might qualify for a confidentiality license depending on its internal 
procedures and activities. A general (minimum) level of confidentiality could be provided to 
all users. 
It should be possible for certain user groups or businesses to use other confidential services 
(eg proprietary) than the standard ones provided. 
There are strong indications of emerging "bottom up" solutions for these needs (eg the fretty 
Q.ood frivacy offering on Internet, beginning 1993). 
Other initiatives (eg the announcement of the "Clipper Chip", 16 April 1993) illustrate the 
growing awareness of governments of the needs of their citizens for confidentiality services. 
Awareness 
In general users of  electronic data processing systems are not aware of the threats involved in 
using those systems. Only after they have noticed (the consequences of) an unwanted or 
unauthorised disclosure  of their  information  will  they  start  to  think  of the  inherent 
vulnerability of the system they are using. In view of this one should try to create more 
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cenain minimum level of awareness of the issues involved in using confidentiality services 
before embarking on their use. 
Granularity (meeting differentiated needs) 
Confidentiality services at different granularity and for different types of telecommunication 
services are  needed.  Based on his risk analysis the user can then decide which level of 
confidentiality he needs and then use the services which provides this required level. 
Some users may want a range of services of different assurance levels (analogy of courier 
services, registered mail, ordinary mail). Some users may want visibility of assurances to 
different extents. 
Impact of  loss of  information and Impact of  theft of  information 
By its nature, actual risks and impacts ·of disclosure are hard to quantify. But the absence of a 
baseline of protection  of confidentiality  will  undoubtedly  have  a  negative  impact on 
commercial (and other) usage of international electronic communications in a wide range of 
business processes.  · 
Actors and roles 
Individuals may have a number of roles in more than one organisation - these need defining 
or clarifying. Their "role" as a private citizen is an important case. The organisations that act 
as custodians of roles need to be classified also. These are essential ingredients for domain 
management. 
Mutual confidence and TrPs 
Users and mechanisms to ensure that they get assurance of compliance to agreed "rules of 
procedure" from  their trading partners, or other private citizens,  with  whom  they  are 
interacting using confidentiality services. TIPs are one mechanism for achieving this, but 
other lower assurance, lower cost solutions may also need to be considered. 
Requirements 
•  Frameworks and architectures which are accepted as well by the business users as by 
the national security agencies and the service providers 
•  standards for services and service provision 
•  compatibility of confidentiality services with existing communication standards and 
practices where possible 
•  verification of practicability of  proposed solutions through suitable pilot projects 
•  model contracts for confidentiality services 
•  awareness improvement of sector actors of the potential losses due to the absence of 
confidentiality services. 
.. 
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Issue 
The provision of public confidentiality services have to reconcile the needs of the business 
sector and general public with the  obligation of public authorities  to provide adequate 
protection while at the same time maintaining its capability to fight organised crime, maintain 
public order and national security. 
A well developed public confidentiality service  would provide for the  obligations in  a 
transparent manner. 
Discussion 
Business  operates  increasingly  in  an  international  and  open  environment.  The 
communications take place via private and public networks. Modern network management 
techniques use alternative routing depending on traffic conditions. This implies that the 
physical communication is under the control of a variety of intennediaries working under 
different regulatory and legal conditions for data protection and privacy, and therefore one 
must consider the network as inherently vulnerable. This means that end-to-end protection is 
required.  This  applies  also  to  th~ general  public  using  international public  telephone 
networks. 
It is a fact that business and the general public have been addressing their needs with public 
domain  solutions  (published  algorithms  and freely  available  software).  However,  the 
approach is awkward and its utility therefore limited, since, for example, there is no public 
directory and he  has  to manage the keys himself.  A public solutions open to all users 
requiring electronic signature and confidentiality would remove the need for the use of  ad hoc 
solutions. It would also provide for a transparent solution to the need for legally authorised 
intercepts. 
If a public confidentiality scheme is offered, organised crime could also subscribe to such a 
scheme, but as it would include provisions for legal intercept, it would hardly be attractive. 
One would expect that such uset;s  would continue to find their own solutions as will the 
classified domain. 
An open and public service offering  a·  credible level of confidentiality would therefore 
provide for the honest user, while not worsening the situation with respect to public order or 
national security. 
The combination of international communication and national security regulations require a 
common framework for confidentiality services, which on the one hand interoperate within 
all Community Member States as  well as  with countries outside the Community which 
themselves may establish their confidentiality services.  This requires either an overlay 
approach or gateways which link the different national or regional services. These gateways 
are only required where multinational  agreements for co-operation on  national security 
concerns is not yet established. In this case these gateways may provide at least an interim 
solution. 
In order to fulfil its function and eliminate the need for "home-made" solutions, the public 
confidentiality service must be open to world-wide use and provide its service in a non-
discriminatory way. 
Confidentiality services should ensure that 
•  Users are protected and obtain  assurance  against non  authorised interception and 
disclosure. 
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such by all Member States  . 
. •  Authorised disclosure of the  protected user information  (undo. the confidentiality 
service) is under certain well-defmed circumstances possible, eg by secret-sharing. 
With this  approach, confidentiality mechanisms details (description) do not need to be 
published or disclosed to the public in general. 
While die use must be largely unrestricted, the systems and sub-systems or equipment for the 
independent implementation of aforementioned confidentiality services can be made subject 
of  export controls, eg export is possible if : 
•  The users comply with the rules of the exporting nation (end-user declaration) with 
respect to the disclosure mechanism. 
•  Multinational  business  users  from  EC  countries  communicate  with  "central" 
organisations. 
•  Other countries on a bilateral agreement liaise with EC if they comply with the rules. 
Export restrictions are, inter alia, based on the concern that cryptography may be  used by 
ho.stile governments or other organisations for the concealment of subversive information. 
The same concern does not apply to the use of cryptography for integrity and authenticity 
enhancing service. 
There are technical solutions to provide only integrity, integrity plus signature, and integrity, 
signature and confidentiality. Confidentiality enhancement is de facto only meaningful in 
communications with also the two other functions being provided. 
The problem remains that organised crime and hostile governments are not restrained from 
adopting  public  domain  solutions  or  from  developing  "home-made"  mechanisms. 
Furthermore they are able to exploit legitimate users of systems and solutions to their own 
ends by use of  "traditional" criminal mechanisms of bribery, blackmail or threats to personal 
safety. Legislation could discourage non-authorised use, but cannot be expected to prevent it, 
particularly in the case of organised crime. Restrictive legislation impacts the "law-abiding 
user" much stronger than others. 
Choice versus interoperability 
The users and service providers may feel  the  need to choose solutions to achieve the 
assurance levels they require. But interoperability will dictate a limited set of possible choices 
being available, and costs of service provision will also focus debate onto efficient solutions. 
Advice and instruction versus prohibition 
This may vary from  country to country, however certain minimum-rules will need to be 
adhered to between parties offering interworking public schemes which includes beyond 
simply usage also systems and sub-systems or equipment for the independent implementation 
of such confidentiality services 
The confidentiality that users enjoy will depend upon the robustness of the service that is 
offered. This in turn  will depend upon  the robustness of the  architectures available to 
perceived threats: key theft, masquerade, deliberate denial of service, inadequate disaster 
recovery are examples of threats the vulnerability to which may be different for alternate 
architectures. 
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This will require collective or multilateral agreements for interoperation. 
Requirements 
•  Architecture that minimises service vulnerability 
•  framework for the provision of trans-domain confidentiality services 
•  guidelines for pan-European confidentiality service providers (including accountability) 
•  model contract for relationship between service providers across national boundaries 
•  assurance criteria for service providers and operators 
•  accreditation process for mutual recognition. 
4.2.6.  Use of  Names and  Certification of  Credentials 
Issue 
Use of names and of credentials (eg the public key) in international communications. 
Discussion 
Name Assignment and Certifications Authorities are Trusted Third Parties. Their purpose is 
to allow for individual and authentic addressing of communication system users by means of 
their authenticated Distinguished Names. A user may ask a Naming Assignment Authority for 
a Distinguished Name. The Naming Authority will give him a Relative Distinguished Name 
and supplement it by its own Distinguished Name to the user's Distinguished Name. Thus, 
although a person may ask several Naming Authorities for the same Relative Distinguished 
Name, each of his Distinguished Names will be unique, because the Distinguished Names of 
the Naming Authorities, by definition, will be unique. The concept of an agent that handles 
the interfaces between the end-user and the naming authorities is important in providing a 
user friendly interface to this process. 
The two functions of name assignment (or identification) and certification are "binding" 
operations. Name assignment binds a particular name to an entity (a person or device), and 
certification binds certain credentials to a name. The diagram below shows the double binding 
process. 
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Credentials. The Public Key can be used to verify a (ciphertext) signature which has been 
effected  by  the  user's  complementary  Secret  Key  (not contained in  the  Credentials). 
Credentials are signed/certified by the Certification Authority. Thus the user's Certificate 
consists of the Credentials, their signature by the Certification Authority and, if necessary, the 
Certification Authority's own Certificate. The user is  given his certificate, preferably in a 
tamper resistant chipcard. 
After signing a message with his Secret Key the user concatenates his  Certificate to the 
message and its signature. The receiver of the  signed message can use  the Certification 
Authority's widely available Public Key to verify the signer's Certificate and Public Key. 
With the latter the authenticity and integrity of the message can be verified. 
The  security  services  related  to  name  assignment  and  certification  need  further 
standardisation as well as legal recognition, both preferably on an international level. 
The United States have already begun to apply relevant US  national standards. Therefore, 
corresp6nding standardisation action should be started on a European level. Its results should 
be made the basis for a European contribution to international standardisation. At the same 
time an interface toward a legal usage of naming and certification services should be defined 
to ease the adaptation to and to provide for the compatibility of the various EC legal systems. 
Other related issues are pseudonyms and anonymity, for which a business requirement has 
been identified. Different degrees of anonymity should be provided for according to the 
specific needs in digital cash, tele-shopping, registration in data bases for statistical purpose 
etc. 
As  described above,  the ability to sign a piece of data is to  be distinguished from  the 
entitlement an entity possesses. This relationship is depicted below: 
•entity• Identification  ·credential• Certification 
I  I 
Distinguished  ___.. r=====iil 
Names  ~ 
·entitlemenr  J 
Certification 
It is necessary to identify requirements and to develop guidelines for the use of names, in 
relation to: 
>  requirements to meet by naming authorities 
>  requirements to meet by the user 
>  naming principles 
>  format of  Distinguished Name/Relative Distinguished N  arne 
>  handling protocol between naming authorities, user and certification authority 
>  change of names 
>  recording of information pertinent to de-referencing of names (by the Directory). 
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relation to: 
>  certificate semantics and format 
>  certificate handling (production, issuance) 
>  signature and its certification (method, process) 
>  authentication of  certificate owner (method, process) 
>  expiry dates 
>  renewal of  certificates (periodical) 
>  renewal of TrP public key (periodical) 
>  handling compromises of secret information (secret keys, PIN etc.) 
>  revocation of certificates and notification 
>  black listing and execution of certificates 
>  security standards to be met by certification authorities. 
Requirements 
•  Guidelines covering the use of  names 
•  guidelines covering the use of  certificates. 
4.2.7.  Security of  Electronically Stored Information 
Issue 
As legally and commercially significant information is transferred and stored electronically, 
the implications of this on long-term (lO's of years) secure storage and retrieval must be 
properly understood.· 
Discussion 
Industry is moving increasingly towards electronic trading in all its aspects. Governments are 
encouraging the use of electronic communication of commercially and legally significant 
information. As a result, there is a need both to establish irrefutably the origin of, and the 
delivery of, such information and, particularly, that the information has been signed and 
stored in an unforgeable way. This unforgeable electronic signature must be trusted for at 
least lO's of years for some information, and the associated information must be retained in a 
secure manner that is capable of human interpretation at any time during that period. Any 
system proposed for electronic signature storage must be  as  secure and robust as  that 
currently used for hand-written signatures. 
Any such system must allow for not just technical evolution, but also social change and other 
factors  (  eg the continued existence of trusted public key directory centres, or the way 
businesses merge, change or collapse).lt is  not currently clear that the  way this can be 
achieved is yet accepted legally, or the full implications are even properly understood 
Requirements 
•  Common approach to the security of  electronically stored information 
•  unforgeable secure storage. 
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Issue 
Safety requirements for communication systems must be expressed in ways that capture users 
expectations, reflect the engineering viewpoints of vendors and service providers and are 
appropriate for regulators.  · 
Safety requirements have to be integrated with other types of requirement, eg reliability and 
security. 
Discussion 
End user requirements for safety of products or services are often implicit or stated in very 
"soft" tenns or in tenns that assume regulation and certification is looking after their needs. 
These user requirements can be contrasted with the engineering specifications needed by 
vendors and service providers to build systems and provide for their assurance. 
In addition, safety is just one attribute that has to be integrated with all the other types of 
requirements and potential conflicts identified and resolved. For example, the requirement for 
visibility of  evidence for safety assurance may conflict with security considerations, the need 
to make access impossible for security reasons may conflict with the need for emergency 
procedures. (eg evacuation). However users main concerns are ones of cost and choice and 
these have to be addressed in the dialogue between service providers, vendors and regulators. 
In the safety field, the notion of the tolerability of risk and the use of both qualitative and 
quantitative risk assessments, provides a  lingua franca between regulators and service 
providers as well as, in a modified form, for users and those with professional interests. This 
discussion needs to be broadened and integrated with security requirements particularly for 
domains  (eg medical informatics) where open,  heterogeneous  computer systems  have 
significant IT security and safety components. 
In addition to the risks from products or services that the user is willingly engaging in or 
purchasing there are the risks from indirect accidents (eg major chemical or nuclear accident) 
and normally in discussions of policies towards the acceptability of risk a distinction is made 
between these two types of risk with the requirements for indirect risk being more onerous 
than those entered into voluntary. Again, there is the need to integrate the discussion of these 
risks with those from security breaches. 
Requirements 
•  Platform for a  dialogue on risk including users, regulators,  vendors  and service 
providers 
•  policy on risk management on a  societal level based on objective risk assessment 
methods 
•  techniques that permit an integrated approach to the different types of risk (safety, 
security, commercial, direct, indirect). 
Green Paper on the Security of Information Systems  Page 57 4.4. Requirements for Evaluations 
4.4.1. Trustworthiness of Communication Solutions 
4.4.2. Motivation to Acquire Evaluated Solutions 
4.4. Requirements for Evaluatior 
4.4.3. Consistency of Procurement Practices 
4.4.4. Operational Systems Accreditation 
4.4. 1.  Trustworthiness of  Communication Solutions 
Issue 
Establishment of  trust in components, products, systems, services and applications . 
Discussion 
The trustworthiness of a given communication solution and its use imply that the system 
owners and especially the users need confidence in its security and safety. They also need to · 
be able to compare different solutions with regard to the security and safety capabilities, cost, 
functionality, perfonnance, availability and reliability.  1 
The diagram below shows schematically the major roles of the actors involved. The end-user 
nonnally runs an application, eg a particular banking application. The application is provided 
by the application provider, who, in  turn,  may  use  various services, offered by service 
providers, eg communication services. 
To run and provide applications and services, systems are required, supplied by, nonnally, 
several system suppliers. System suppliers purchase components and products from  sub-
suppliers. 
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In  the  end,  the  trustworthiness  of the  application  must  be  established.  This  overall 
trustworthiness is a function of the trustworthiness of the application provider, the service 
providers, and the systems, products and components. 
Depending on  the  needs  of the  user,  vendor declarations,  self evaluations  or  formal 
evaluations may be required at the various stages. The choice of either of these mechanisms 
will depend on the costs and delays involved in formal certification processes, the level of 
assurance required and national constraints. 
Another major factor is the recognition of certificates in other markets and their utility, eg in 
protecting the user or vendor against liability claims, where it is possible to do so. 
The qualifications, experience and motivation of project managers, evaluators, certifiers, 
accreditors and system administration staff also affect the resultant level of trust achievable in 
the operational system. 
Users continually need to upgrade their hardware platforms and change or add to software 
systems to remain commercially competitive and to follow trends, etc. Thus the ease with 
which systems and products can be re-evaluated or the portability of evaluation results are 
important issues when deciding on the needs of the user. For example, portability of  products 
and systems across different hardware platforms. For how long will a vendor support the 
evaluated hardware and software configuration? Will a vendor re-evaluate all upgrades of 
their product in a timely manner? 
Requirements 
•  International agreement on criteria and evaluation methods, and mutual recognition of 
test results 
•  clarification of the commercial value of "certified products", eg in terms of liability 
limitation 
•  clarification of the status and implied liability of vendor declarations 
•  international agreement on the  methods for evaluating security and safety critical 
system development processes, and the  qualifications and experience needed for 
individuals that are involved in these processes. 
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Issue 
The advantage of the  use of evaluated/certified solutions is  not generally accepted for 
commercial applications. 
Discussion 
Formal security evaluations have been carried out at a national level by a comprehensive, 
costly and time consuming process. The investment in the evaluation process by the vendor 
has resulted in  higher prices for the  resulting  secure IT product.  The duration of the 
evaluation process, has resulted in many secure products falling behind the technical state of 
the art. 
· Up to now, this has often detracted from their broader relevance in the commercial market. 
Users have often preferred lower cost, more functionality rich products unless forced to 
purchase evaluated and certified products through some public procurement policy. 
Vendors, historically, had products evaluated separately by each national market and their 
supporting criteria. The resulting limited revenue opportunity did not justify the high cost of 
getting products evaluated. 
It is necessary to change this view by convincing users of the advantages of purchasing 
evaluated/certified solutions. Rapid adoption of Common evaluation and certification criteria 
is essential to reduce cost and speed-up mutual recognition of the resulting certificates. 
Requirements 
•  Rapid adoption of Common Criteria 
•  agreement on common evaluation method 
•  portability of test results and mutual recognition  · 
•  work sharing between vendors, test centres and users to speed up the evaluation process 
•  establishment of the "value-added" for the use by administrations and business, eg in 
terms of  liability protection and in relation to insurance costs 
4.4.3.  Consistency of  Procurement Practices 
Issue 
National-procurement guidelines for the purchase of  evaluated/non-evaluated products are not 
consistent throughout the EC, nor is there a general agreement on when there is an obligation 
to use evaluated products, and when it is recommended but discretional. 
Discussion 
Some security evaluated IT and communications products are purchased as a result of a risk 
analysis where it is determined that the evaluated communications product better suits the 
organisation's security needs than a non-evaluated product.  · 
However, a survey conducted of over 200 organisations indicated that, to a large extent, 
evaluated products are purchased today by organisations in the EC because of the expectation 
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occurring especially in- those Member States that were involved in  the development of 
IT  SEC. 
Unless the procurement policies in  the  EC are  harmonised, the public sector use of IT 
products will become a patchwork of evaluated and unevaluated products. This may create 
new barriers to the efficient flow of  information. 
Ways should be found to assist those member states not involved in the early stages of ITSEC 
to  develop and test procurement policies  that are based on evaluated communications 
products. 
Requirements 
•  Identification of categories of  applications requiring evaluated solutions 
•  alignment of  national procurement policies concerning evaluated products 
•  development of guidelines on applicability of evaluation levels. 
4.4.4.  Operational Systems Accreditation 
Issue 
Procedures for accreditation of operational systems in many (non-military) environments are 
not standardised or well-managed. 
Discussion 
Management needs assurance that their total operational system meets their security needs. 
The use of  off-the-shelf (including evaluated) products does not remove this requirement for a 
whole system approach. 
This assurance can be provided by establishing methods for operational systems accreditation, 
which, is the fonnal acceptance by management of the residual risk associated with the use of 
a system, and hence its approval to operate. 
This accreditation needs to be based on an assessment of the: 
•  threats and vulnerabilities (risks) associated with the system 
•  legal obligations 
•  impact of the realisation of the risks,· and any resultant consequences or  costs 
•  existing protection measures within the organisation 
•  measures provided by the system itself (e.g. by evaluated products) 
•  additional countermeasures typically in the following categories: technical, physical, 
personnel, and procedural. 
Accreditation  needs  to  be  fonnal,  both  in  order to  focus  responsibility  within  one 
organisation, and because there is a need for organi$ations to trust partners' accreditation 
methods and to demonstrate their own security to others. This would provide potential for 
mutual recognition of accreditation within a community of  organisations. External bodies (for 
example banking organisations or regulatory authorities) may wish to set minimum standards 
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standards. 
Requirements 
•  Definition of the  inputs,  process  and  outputs  involved  in  operational  systems 
accreditation and their agreement by relevant communities 
•  guidelines for the establishment of schemes for operational systems accreditation within 
different communities. 
•  guidelines for organisations to determine the appropriate individual or body to perform 
the accreditation including the skills and training required by operational systems 
accreditors 
4.5.  Requirements for Security and Safety Methodologies 
4.5. Requirements for Security and Safety Methodologies 
. 
4.5. 1.  Risk Analysis and  Management 
Issue 
-
4.5.1. Risk Analysis and Management 
4.5.2 Metrics for Loss Assessment 
4.5.3. Technology Assessment 
4.5.4. Analysis of Audit Trails 
4.5.5. Safety Specific Methodologies 
A number of Risk Analysis and Management methods are available within the market place. 
However, potential purchasers have no recognised method to establish which method is the 
most effective for their purposes. 
Discussion 
It is  a  fundamental requirement that each enterprise should manage the security of its 
Information Systems. The strategy to manage information security must be based on, and 
compatible with, overall Corporate Security Policy, which, in turn, must reflect and support 
the key business objectives of the enterprise. However, in addition, any security implemented 
must be commensurate with the levels of risks to which the enterprise is subject, so as to 
ensure that adequate, but not excessive, investment is made to protect corporate assets. 
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will, where appropriate, ensure a consistent approach to security across a range of different 
systems. How the Information Security Strategy is to be implemented should be described in 
detail in a Corporate Information Security Policy. Strategic objectives s}lould be produced. 
Thes~ are general security objectives which may be defined, for instance, in terms of the 
levels of confidentiality, integrity and availability that the enterprise .  wishes to attain. The 
application of baseline security standards has a place within an Information Security Strategy, 
but not as a substitute for Risk Analysis and Management. 
I 
The implementation of the Corporate Information Security Policy is thus based upon the 
process of Risk Analysis and Management: that is the assessment of the levels of risks to 
which corporate assets are subject and the implementation of appropriate security safeguards. 
Risk Analysis and Management is therefore the key process for the effective protection of 
information. 
Risk Analysis and Management is relevant to, and should be applied over, the complete life 
cycle of each information system. It can be applied at differing degrees of detail and rigor 
depending on the size of the organisation and the complexity of the information system. 
To enable successful Risk Analysis and Management requires a set of security methods, tools, 
evaluation criteria, and, of course, products, standards and guidelines. 
There are a number of.Risk Analysis and Management methods, supported by appropriate 
tools, available in the market place and some organisations will have developed their own in-
house methods. Enterprises need a means by which they can establish which method is the 
most effective for their purposes. It is appropriate that such a means is agreed, implemented 
and fully supported within the EC. 
As a result of  previous CEC sponsored projects, Risk Analysis and Management models have 
been  developed and encompassed in  the  supporting  "Claims  Structure".  This  "Claims 
Structure"  will  allow the evaluation of Risk  Analysis  and Management methods  to  be 
achieved. Currently it is being actively considered by the ISO SC27 Working Group 1 for 
inclusion in international standards. This is a good example where European expertise, 
backed  and supported by  the  CEC,  is  influencing  the  establishment of International 
Standards. 
Related to these issues are: 
•  the proposed standards for security incident reporting schemes, the output from which 
can improve Risk Analysis and Management reviews; 
•  the availability of methods and tools for contingency planning/disaster recovery, which 
need to be aligned to the  "Claims Structure" and Risk Analysis and Management 
methods; 
•  evaluation criteria within ITSEC, the Federal Criteria (Draft criteria produced by NIST 
in the  US)  and  a  EC/US  Government  Editorial  Board to  produce  a  "Common 
Information Technology Security Criteria". 
Requirements 
•  Consideration of the "Claims Structure" as a standard mechanism for specification of 
requirements, evaluation  and the selection of Risk Analysis and Management methods 
•  evaluation of  the "Claims Structure" for applicability in the safety domain 
•  support for the "Claims Structure" as an international standard 
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•  accreditation of organisations to conduct Risk Analysis and Management method 
evaluations. 
4.5.2.  Metrics tor Loss Assessment 
Issues 
There is a fundamental need for guidance of any kind on how to assess the loss and damages 
an organisation might face  and how much of this might be addressed by evaluation and 
certification. Such metrics would increase the perception of the value of a formal evaluation 
scheme. 
Discussion 
Action is necessary to ensure the effective international exploitation of the security product 
evaluation and certification scheme. There must be  a competitive business advantage of 
developing, implementing and using certified security products, and there must be a well 
understood correlation between a certified security product and the problems that it can solve. 
Progress is hindered by lack of independent measures of the business relevance of the certified 
product. 
Measures can be obtained by: 
/ •  vendor/user studies (from actual risk assessment) 
•  product comparisons (using loss reduction models) 
•  insurance contracts (both direct and consequential damage assessment) 
•  vendor cost/benefit profiles (market penetration, Software engineering costs, etc.). 
Such studies would prove invaluable to the ·SMEs who cannot justify extensive Security 
controls yet are probably the most vulnerable to the consequences of information abuse. 
The ITSEC actions should reflect a balance between the product based concepts of security 
objectives (codes of good practice) and quantitative risk/loss assessment. 
This should result in measured, affordable controls as a prerequisite to developing a European 
and international security market. 
Requirements'. 
•  Mapping of  certified product features to specific security incidents 
•  common, product independent risk analysis processes. 
4.5.3.  Technology Assessment 
· Issue 
The solution of many IT security issues requires anticipation of complex future scenarios. 
Technology Assessment (T  A)  provides a framework in which the use of new and future 
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under consideration. 
Discussion 
When considering new applications, especially those that are likely to have a sul>stantial life 
cycle, new or developing technology may be of use in providing effective security safeguards. 
Technology Assessment is designed to involve relevant factors from different areas and to 
consider all pertinent perspectives (technical, economical, psychological, political, etc.). 
Technology Assessment aims at preparing options for political action based on the results of a 
multidisciplinary approach. Technology Assessment is. well established in the US. There is a 
pilot Technology Assessment project in the field of  IT security in Germany funded by BSI. 
Requirements 
•  Identification of the  information  security  issues  that  may  be  solved  within  the 
Technology Assessment process 
•  Technology Assessment pilot in Europe in the field of  information security to assess the 
consequences for future information  security applications and provide options for 
political and legal actions. 
4.5.4.  Analysis of  AudN Trails 
Issue 
The lack of efficient tools and associated framework prevents the efficient management and 
analysis of  audit trails. 
Discussion 
The analysis of audit trails is the last recourse solution to facilitate detection of misuse of 
information systems. However several drawbacks prevent their efficient analysis in large and 
distributed information systems: 
•  Even though the nature of audit information is often well-defined by existing security 
standards, there are no standards for the storage and distribution of such information. 
•  The hierarchical ordering and merging of information coming from numerous security 
services of various nature and location is not possible, thus preventing an  efficient 
synthetic analysis thereof. 
•  The enormous volume of audit information requires specialised analysis tools. Existing 
tools are often based on statistical or relational search techniques. They usually leave 
the Security Officer with fastidious and boring scrutinising tasks and often significant 
combinations of events remain unnoticed. Artificial Intelligence (AI) based techniques 
could be of help in this domain. Of course, such tools canQot provide absolute and 
exhaustive scrutiny. 
The acquisition and exploitation of audit information may infringe on the right to privacy of 
individuals, eg in teleworking systems where such information could be exploited to oversee 
workers' performance on the job. Similarly, the analysis of credit card payment records 
provides insight on holder's private habits, even though it is necessary to detect security-
critical behaviour. These concerns may warrant the recourse to TIP services to prevent 
abusive analysis of audit trails. 
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•  Rules  and  regulations  for  the  design,  handling  and  exploitation  of audit  trail 
information, in conformance with privacy laws and practices 
•  preveDtion of audit data base compromise (eg techniques of separation of  information) 
•  services for the independent acquisition, management, and/or analysis of audit trails 
•  development of innovative technologies (AI-based) for the exploitation of large audit 
trails. 
4.S.S.  Safety Specific Methodologies 
Issues 
To establish the processes, techniques and methodologies for achieving safety. 
Discussion 
Despite the large resource devoted to research and development in software and systems 
engineering there is still little data on the effectiveness and costs of different methods and 
techniques for building dependable systems. The best consensus that can be achieved is 
reflected in emerging generic international safety standards which either decline to provide 
guidance or do so in very vague terms. There is a need to define what software engineering 
processes should be put in place to build systems, how these should be applied and how the 
results from them can be demonstrated to meet the requirements. 
There is also a need to establish variation of  requirements throughout the system lifecycle and 
to understand the role of process maturity and models and their interaction with technologies 
for development. The tendency in safety (and other) applications, to require a bureaucratic 
documentation based process, needs review and its cost/benefits established. The relative 
importance of process based approaches, the competency of those involved and analytical 
techniques need to be addressed. 
Safety is of course just one aspect of dependability and many of the problems in achieving 
safety are general problems.  In  order to facilitate  the  exploitation of generic  work on 
dependable systems and to focus this work on the needs of safe and secure systems there is a 
need to understand in what ways the engineering of safety systems are different. For example, 
we need to understand how safety analysis techniques (Hazops, fault tree analysis etc.) fit into 
requirements capture, the need for special fail-safe  architectures and design, the special 
requirements for hardware fault detection, tolerance and management. 
The approaches to achieving safety should also recognise not just the software issue but also 
the problems of designing trusted hardware and the increasing blurring between hardware 
engineering and software arising from the use programmable ROMs. 
Requirements 
•  Assessment  of areas  of common  interest  between  safety  critical  and  security 
information practitioners 
•  software engineering processes and techniques for safety applications including their 
application and evaluation 
•  understand the special needs for engineering safe systems. 
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Issue 
Identification of security and control weaknesses and the identification of  corrective actions. 
Discussion 
Audit and auditability are becoming increasingly imponant and should be an independent part 
of an organisations approach to security administration, or brought in on a contract basis. The 
purpose of an audit function is to identify security and control weaknesses and/or failures in 
enterprises so that corrective action can be recommended to management. An independent 
audit review ensures that all authorities are not under the same management. 
It is necessary to confmn compliance with standards, check system records and activity, and 
to ensure that organisation policies are being carried out. 
Management is responsible for reviewing audit reports and taking cotrective action where 
necessary. 
An increasingly imponant area of  information security auditing activity is the involvement of 
auditors (internal or external) at the initial stages of system development, both to ensure that 
adequate controls are built in to the system and also to assess whether the development 
process itself is adequately controlled. This applies not only to in-house developments, but 
also third-party developers where bespoke work is being undertaken. The latter situation may 
need a  legal or contractual requirement for audit access  to the development staff and 
environment. Such a requirement (to audit development stages and methods) should be 
included in public codes of  practice and relevant professional standards. 
Requirements 
•  Guidelines for audit review of information security activities 
•  audit tools to enable reviews of security implementations and identify weaknesses (eg 
using artificial intelligence) 
•  guidelines on reviewing any or all security changes 
•  suitable and consistent level of competence for security auditors and organisations to be 
accepted throughout the Community 
•  greater commonality of formats for audit trails,  so that they can  be  used between 
systems. 
•  mechanisms to enable qualified auditors to be involved in system development. 
4.7. Information Valuation 
Issue: 
A recognised and common means is required to value information for a range of information 
security purposes, including insurance, tort law cases, risk analysis and management. 
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Within the infonnation security arena Information Valuation is required for a number of 
p~ses.  111eseinclude: 
•  insurance purposes, where, essentially, a financial cost is required for an insurable asset 
against an insurable event 
•  tort law cases, where again a financial cost is required to assess corporate or individual 
loss, and therefore compensation, for a failure or action involving the provision of or 
use of information systems 
•  risk analysis and management activities, in which Information requires to be valued not 
only on a financially quantifiable basis but also on non-financial impacts, such as 
failure  to meet legal  responsibilities  and obligations, personal  safety,  corporate 
embarrassment;  infringement of personal  privacy,  etc.  Some  Risk Analysis  and 
Management methods do this already, but not in any standard form.  · 
In addition should Green Paper information security activities be extended to cover safety 
critical systems, further valuations associated with loss of life or injury will become relevant 
To value the cost of re inputting lost information is relatively easy. However, to value the 
impact of, for instance, the disclosure of highly confidential information which causes the 
resignation of the Managing Director is less straightforward.  -
Thus there is a need for a common approach that will allow information to be valued in a way 
that will allow relative comparisons between financial loss and non-financial impacts, through 
unavailability of information,  unauthorised disclosure  of information  or unauthorised 
modification of information or software. 
Requirements 
•  Development of  common practices for information valuation 
•  assessment of  current methods for information valuation 
•  definition of the rights and duties of information ownership 
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5. L Supply Related Issues - Ways to Meet the Security Demands 
5.2. Supply Related Issues - Security Management 
5. Supply Related Issues  5.3. Supply Related Issues - Evaluation of Trusted Solutions 
5.4. Maintenance of Safety and Assurance 
5.5. Supply Related Issues- Technological Change 
5.1. Supply Related Issues - Ways to Meet the Security Demands 
5.1.1. Security Services 
5.1. Supply Related Issues - Ways to Meet the Security Demands  5.1.2. Signature Schemes 
5.1.3. Confidentiality Schemes 
5.1.1.  Security Services 
Issue 
Agreement on the provision of particular security services is  needed to meet the needs of 
business, administrations and the indiYi:dual. 
Security services are offered mainly to prevent disputes, or resolve them in a way that is 
structured, efficient, accepted by all parties involved and non-controversial. 
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'Prevention of disputes arises essentially from  the very ability of security services to assign 
responsibility and fault, should one occur. 
•  Thus, security services must essentially be  able  to verify the  application or non-
application of  rules and the evidence pertaining to them. 
•  Security services may or may not generate the evidence itself.  In other words  the 
question is whether a third party offering a trusted service also arbitrates litigations 
pertaining to its principal service. For example, does a signature generation service also 
provide·  signature-verification services ? 
Two issues arise in this topic : 
•  What is the legal status of evidence generated by security services? Does it imply 
liability ? What is the legal status of decisions made par security service providers when 
they are not judicial but private (and corollary, what are the rules of  appeal) ? 
•  If evidence  is  not  generated  by  the  arbiter,  how  is  the  evidence  acquired  and 
authenticated and how is  responsibility assigned ? One is faced with  the general 
problems of TIPs : operating rules and legislation, standardisation, inter-operability 
and accreditation. 
Possible solutions to the following service categories have been identified: 
Non-Repudiation Services 
These  can  be  achieved  through  straightforward  application  of the  digital  signature 
mechanism.  · 
In an open environment, this would imply the use of public key techniques. Each entity (user) 
possesses a public key pair, consisting of a public key P, which can be made known to 
everybody, and a matching secret key, S. The secret key is used to create a digital signature 
on a message, and the corresponding public key is used to verify the digital signature as been 
created by means of the secret key. If the public key scheme is an encryption scheme, like 
RSA, the public k~y  may alternatively be used by anybody to encrypt a confidential message 
to th~ owner of the secret key, as this is the only key which can recover the original message. 
Claim of  Origin 
It is possible to prove that claim of origin can only be achieved by using a trusted center, 
where the electronic documents are registered or authenticated. The point is that in order to. · 
establish the origin, we need a digital signature. Of  course, anybody can apply his own digital 
signature to the document, but this  will not imply origin or ownership. Hence the only 
solution is some kind of  registration or notary service. In particular, cryptographic techniques 
have nothing useful to offer in any other way than to apply nonrepudiation services to prove 
that a document was registered, or by using encryption to protect the content of  a document. 
Claim of  Ownership  in _electronic negotiable documents 
By the use of  digital signatures and TIPs electronic negotiable documents can be provided in 
different ways. Three schemes are presented here. 
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can provide a copy of the document and the name of the document owner. The TIP 
guarantees that the document is unaltered and that the correct owner is registered. 
Document transaction is performed on request from the document.owner, which could 
even be authenticated by a digital signature, which also secure against repudiation. 
In this scheme the users have to have unconditional trust in the TIP. If the TIP is 
corrupted it might alter the documents or the owners identity. Several systems exist 
today that use this approach. 
2.  If digital signatures are used in the scheme presented in (1) in that the negotiable 
documents and the "sales contract" proving document transaction are digitally signed, 
the TIP has only to be trusted to keep the documents securely stored. The owner of a 
document can be identified by anyone by verifying the signatures of the document -and 
all the "sales contracts" (the identity given in the last "sales contract" in the chain will 
be the document owner).  · 
In this scheme only functional trust in the TTP is established to keep the digitally 
signed documents and "sales contracts" securely stored and presented in copy to anyone 
(or at least to potential document buyers) upon request. 
3.  By the use-of chipcards the negotiable documents can be securely stored and protected 
against copying or multiple selling by an owner. 
The only other way to provide uniqueness is to physically prohibit free copying. This 
would involve tamper resistance to realise a protected communication with restricted 
functionality. A message encrypted under a key known to only one entity (eg, the 
entity's public key) is unique, as long as it is encrypted, and establishes indisputable 
ownership by the mere fact that it will only be useful to the owner of the key. Only the 
person in possession of the right key can make any use of the document, which in effect 
is the property of uniqueness. 
A negotiable document is transferred from one chipcard to another, through a public 
network, in such a way that 
a)  It can only be transferred to one particular chipcard only. 
b)  Recovery is possible, if the transfer is unsuccessful 
c)  the protocol cannot be simulated by any other device than an authorised chipcard. 
This solution would require a functionally trusted centre to register the chipcards by 
their public key. 
Also for non-negotiable documents a  limit to proliferation may be useful.  Consider eg 
contracts. Generally each party to a written contract holds one original document which 
cannot be proliferated. When the contract is superseded by a new version, the old version can 
-be located and devalidated. This cannot be paralleled with the usual electronic means. Unless 
the number of  original electronic documents can be limited, devalidation is of little use. 
The Document originality can be provided by the use of chipcards. A chipcard can store a 
secret and protect it. The secret is essential to authenticate the signature of the document. As 
the chipcard cannot be explored, the secret cannot be transacted into another chipcard. Thus it 
is practically impossible to duplicate the original chipcard. Such a chipcard can be made a 
substitute of the negotiable paper document. 
In order to produce and to transact chipcard documents via telecommunication trusted 
equipment is needed. It should be operated by trusted third parties, eg by public notaries. 
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and receive them  by means of their trusted equipment. Transaction may be performed by 
depleting the original chipcard at the sending end, securely transmitting its information and 
feeding it into another chipcard at the receiving end. This process must .be protected for its 
integrity and confidentiality. Not even the :·public notary" must be in a position to alter the 
information. 
Beside issuing negotiable documents there are other ways of securing correct title to property. 
Instead of a person proving his claim by the presence of a token, the claim may be addressed 
to a distinct person who then is expected to prove his identity. 
This - continuing with the above example - is the case with the freight bill, which is another 
way to deliver a cargo to the authentic receiver. However, the freight bill cannot be traded as 
effectively as the bill of lading, although, by omission of additional chipcards and other 
trusted equipment, it makes it easier to design the electronic substitute process. 
One should expect that, unless proper electronic documents will be available, the use of  paper 
for negotiable documents will be continued at the expense of effectiveness and more paper. 
Fair Exchange of  Values 
It is possible to exchange electronic documents of value, such as  unique documents or 
commitments with digital signatures in an interactive protocol, which will not allow any 
participating party to cheat. The framework for this could be the forthcoming UN/ED  IF  ACT 
recommendation  for  Interactive  EDI,  which  is  sufficiently  flexible  to  integrate  the 
communication required for fair exchange of values. 
Untraceability 
Methods have been developed in cryptography, which would allow the implementation of 
central data base systems, based on individuals in say the EEC, which at the same time would 
provide complete anonymity to the individual, yet be open to extract any reasonable statistical 
information. The impact would be quite important. It would be possible at the same time to 
have all data available for statistical evidence, say for AIDS infected persons, who volunteer 
to register, yet guarantee the protection of the individual, not based on unconditional trust, but 
on  logical  protection,  which  can  only  be  penetrated  if some  of the  hardest  known 
mathematical problems can be solved. 
Time-Stamping 
The third party must be trusted by both parties, or at least the dispute resolution mechanism, 
for the correctness of the date and time supplied, but also for the confidentiality with which 
they handle the contents of the correspondence. 
Requirements 
•  Hannonisation of legislation on the legal status of evidence generated by any ITP and 
especially on the intra- and extra- community recognition thereof 
•  litigation services based on existing international bodies  such as  the International 
Chamber of Commerce 
•  techniques for the establishment, handling and recording of electronic negotiable 
documents 
•  date and time stamping for time-critical transactions and applications, including a range 
of granularities of timing 
Page 72  Green Paper on the Security of Information System •  international hannonisation of rules and services for time stamping, with the objective 
of achieving general recognition and acceptance of time stamps and their provision by 
suitably accredited service providers. 
5. 1.2.  Signature Schemes 
Issue 
Introduction of an international digital signature and of  identification schemes. 
Discussion 
Open communication requires standardised publicly available algorithms. It is  possible, 
however, to develop a scheme for digital signatures, to get laws, regulations or directives in 
place, to develop supporting profile standards and to develop fully implementable models for 
ITPs, without specifying in detail the underlying algorithms. 
The characteristics required of a digital signature mechanism include that it 
•  is practically unbreakable 
•  has  a  sufficiently large key space, performance  (time and space requirements for 
signing and verification), reasonable size of key, etc. 
•  includes key generation. 
In  order to  allow  for world-wide,  unrestricted  use  of a  digital  signature  scheme,  the 
mechanism should not be usable for the concealment of message content. 
The minimum requirement should include 
•  an estimate of  error probability if probabilistic methods are used 
•  an estimate of  probability of occurrence of weak keys (perhaps completely improbable) 
•  a guarantee of sufficiently high degree of uniform distribution. 
In  so-called identification  schemes  (for access  control),  which  do require  public key 
techniques rather than conventional schemes, practical zero-knowledge protocols must be 
developed and standardised that fit a corresponding digital signature standard. 
Requirements 
•  Specifications and standards for an international signature scheme 
•  specifications and standards for the integration of the signature schemes into practical 
applications 
•  general application programming interface  (API)  for the  integration of signature 
schemes into applications. This should include codes which explain the purpose of the 
applied signature 
•  development of transaction-oriented multiple signature schemes 
•  licensing of  cryptographic algorithms. 
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Issue 
Agreements on the confidentiality schemes to be used, taking into account the needs of 
individuals, business, administrations and the duties of law enforcement. 
Discussion 
Confidentiality of message contents can be achieved in many different ways and, historically, 
many ingenious methods have been proposed and applied. 
Different requirements exist because of different levels of sensitivity and of different media, 
eg for data, audio.and video communications. 
Symmetric encryption, where the sender and the receiver share a  common key, is the 
classically preferred method, because of the speed that can be achieved. The common key 
must be exchanged via a secure channel before communication can take place. Examples of 
widely used symmetric mechanisms  are  the  Data Encryption Standard (DES)  and the 
proprietary mechanisms used in mobile communications. 
Asymmetric methods, where the sender and receiver use different, but related, keys are 
simpler to use, because key exchange via a secure channel is not required. These methods are 
also called upublic key cryptology", because the encryption key can be made public. 
However, it is not possible to use asymmetric encryption in high speed applications (the 
fastest hardware implementations work in the area of several tenth of kilobytes per second). 
An example of  an asymmetric mechanism is Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA). 
For practical applications, a combination of symmetric and asymmetric methods is often 
used. In these cases, the (session) key is exchanged via an asymmetric mechanism and the 
actual data to be protected is encrypted at high speed with a symmetric algorithm. Other key 
exchange schemes are also possible, eg the Diffie-Hellman method, where each panner in a 
(two-way) communication contributes part of the session key. 
The confidentiality level that can be achieved depends on many factors. Besides the quality of 
the algorithm itself, these factors include its mode of operation, the key length and the key 
generation method. 
Key management is an important factor in confidential communications. In asymmetric 
encryption, in addition to key pairs being generated, the public key is certified and included in 
a directory. 
For confidential communications to take place, the sender and the receivers require agreement 
on the method and protocol used. If confidential communication between different domains 
using  different  methods  is  required,  security  gateways  may  perform  the  necessary 
translations. These gateways must be secure and trusted. 
Although not required for normal business use, it is possible today to produce hardware and 
even  software  solutions  that  produce  practically  unbreakable  cryptograms.  This  fact 
potentially represents a threat to public order and may hinder law enforcement in their duties. 
Requirements 
•  Consensus  on  the_  principles of confidentiality  services  for  use  by individuals, 
enterprises and administrations 
•  trustworthy confidentiality scheme and its supporting administration. 
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5.2. 1.  Role of  Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) 
Issue 
Some of the security services necessarily require involvement of a third party. Any such party 
is trusted in some way. These trusted third parties (TIP) can also be involved in the provision 
of administrative services. This may satisfy business as well as law enforcement needs. 
Discussion 
When a group of users wants to communicate securely using cryptographic methods, some 
measures must be taken to distribute and update the keys that are needed. Typically, each user 
must obtain a key coming from every other user he wants to communicate with, no matter 
which  service  is  required.  For a  small,  constant  user  group,  this  may  be  a  fairly 
straightforward problem, which can be solved without involving any other parties than the 
users  themselves. For larger and more open user groups, the problem quickly becomes 
difficult, however, and one needs to involve a so called Trusted Third Party (TIP). 
Although several variants exist, there is a main distinction usually made between two types of 
TIPs: functionally Trusted Third Parties and unconditionally Trusted Third Parties. 
The ftrst type arises from the obvious need for reliable registration of users of the system. If 
public key  methods  are  used,  this  will usually include certification of public  keys  as 
belonging to certain users.  A TIP trusted to perform this  function is called functionally 
trusted. It is clear that if the registration is not done in a reliable manner, users cannot even be 
sure with whom they are communicating. So functional trust represents a minimal amount of 
trust that must be placed in a TIP. Note that this type of TIP does not need to know the 
secret key of any user, nor does in  need to know  any conventional keys  used for data 
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functionality of a phone book.  It provides a reliable connection between people, or their 
residence, rather, and their phone numbers. 
The second type of TIP is typically needed in systems that use conventional cryptography 
only. In addition to the registration function mentioned above, such an unconditionally trusted 
TIP will generate keys for data communication and then communicate them securely to the 
users who need them. This means that the TIP knows and in principle could make use of all 
the secret information in the system. Thus measures must be taken to prevent such misuse. 
This usually involves the use of  tamper resistant hardware, ensuring that no key will appear in 
the clear outside of the trusted environment. 
In any case, whichever approach is chosen, Trusted Third Parties must be introduced to 
handle a number of administrative functions related to the management of users, in particular 
registration, and the distribution of all relevant information Qn keys. However, a number of 
other functions, such as time stamping, are relevant, and all these requirements must be 
clearly understood to reach the objectives. 
One single TTP world-wide is clearly impractical. So there will be one or more networks of 
TTPs. Some network may only support closed user groups. International networks for an 
open environment need some framework. 
Trusted Third Party services can be considered as  value-added communication services 
available to users wishing to enhance the trust of the services he uses. Therefore TIPs have to 
be  able  to offer value  added with  regard to  availability,  integrity, confidentiality and 
assurance. Although TIPs may be set up on a national basis within national law, they must be 
trusted by the international community. 
There are different types of functions which may all or in part be fulftlled by TIPs. The exact 
nature and extend to which these functions are provided by TTPs will be dictated by practical 
considerations and may vary considerably. 
In general the TIPs operate on the basis of information provided by the user. Certification of 
information is carried out on the basis of evidence of correctness provided by the user or 
generated by the TIP itself, eg the keys. 
The major services a TTP may offer include some or all of the following: 
•  Name assignment, ie the function of assigning individuals' and enterprises' unique 
names and addresses. Individuals may possess several different distinguished names, 
according to their role, eg as private citizen and as employee of a corporation. 
•  Certification, ie the function to validate that a name and address has certain credentials, 
ega public key for signature. 
•  Key Management for signature, ie the  generation, distribution, establishment, and 
administration of public and private keys. 
•  Key  Management for confidentiality,  ie  the  function  to  generate, distribute  and 
administer keys used for confidential communications. 
•  Management  Services  for  Names  and  Credentials,  ie  the  function  to  establish, 
administer and make available registers with the names of individuals and their certified 
credentials. 
•  Security services, ie functions  usually performed by  the  legal profession,  mostly 
concerned with non-repudiation. These include: 
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Claim of origin 
Claim of ownership 
Fair exchange of values 
. Untraceability 
Time stamping. 
Common to Trusted Third Party service providers is that they have to  be  accredited and 
audited, and that they have to operate under the law of the country using common guidelines. 
The figure below provides an analysis of the different functions involved in the establishment 
and operation of  TIPs. 
National  J  ~ 
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, r 
Provide Rules 
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Regulations 
forTTPs 
Standards for communications 
Good practices, rules and 
regulations for the accreditaion, 
operation and audt of TTPs 
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and laws for the use of 
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.....  .....  __  ___,_...Operate TTP  ..,.. __ 
~editation/Repons  ,.  ,.  ,. 
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The diagram identifies four functions in this process. The functions are: 
•  the provision of the required good practices, rules and regulations for the accreditation 
and operation of  TIPs 
•  the accreditation, re-accreditation and audit of  TIPs 
•  the TIP functions themselves 
•  the use of  communications and of the TIP. 
This diagram does not imply any particular allocation of responsibility for the functions 
indicated. 
The infonnation flow contains the following major elements: 
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which they are located. It is conceivable that some legislation has to be  updated to 
allow TfPs to operate in an international environment. 
•  Good practices, rules and regulations for the accreditation, operation and audit of  TfPs. 
•  Standards for communications. 
•  Good practices, regulations and laws for the use of  communication services. 
Requirements 
•  Establishment of  international framework for the operation of  TIPs 
•  Setting up of conditions for the operation of TfPs in the EC adapted to the needs of 
national and international users. 
5.2.2.  Key Usage 
Issue 
Digital signatures imply the specification. of a full set of procedures dealing with the three 
phases of key  management  - user  enrolment,  key  and certification  distribution,  and 
operational maintenance (revocation, blacklist, destruction),  which  must be  agreed and 
accepted. 
Discussion 
To apply security to any message or process, four logical layers are relevant: 
•  Legal intentions and implications (including social requirements) 
•  The defmition and identification of the relevant security service to be. applied. 
•  The underlying mechanisms. 
•  The algorithm and protocols. 
Without standardising or agreeing on the 4th layer, it will not be possible to communicate. 
In order to adopt electronic versions of negotiable and quasi-negotiable documents, such as 
bills of lading, new security services have been identified to meet business requirements, in 
particular claim  of ownership  for  exchange  of values.  This  needs  to  go  through  a 
standardisation process.  · 
But also for more " classical" services, the current standards do not reflect the granularity of 
eg non-repudiation needed by  business requirements.  ISO 7498-2 only addresses non-
repudiation of origin and delivery (sometimes called receipt). However, one needs at least 
origin, submission, delivery and receipt, where submission and delivery would correspond to 
the services required when a registered letter is mailed. 
For hand-written signatures, a person typically knows what he is signing, which is important 
for legal implications. This is not so easy to achieve with electronic data. In particular it must 
be clarified to what extent the system must indicate to the user what he is actually signing. 
Requirements 
•  Standards and profiles in particular to support and improve CCITI X.509. 
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Issue 
Key  management  services  for  signed and privacy  enhanced communications  between 
organisations and individuals. 
Discussion 
General 
•  Definitio~ of responsibilities and obligations for services that provide trust in  the 
integrity of communications and those that provide confidentiality. 
•  Development of codes of practice for the  generation, distribution and storage and 
destruction of keys for both purposes (integrity and confidentiality) in environments 
that have varying levels of assurance. 
•  Definition of  escrow services. Some of  the secrets may be of paramount importance and 
may have to be distributed among trusted parties (distributed-secret-escrow agents) so 
that none of the parties know the complete secret and not less than a defined minimum 
of those trusted parties must contribute their part of the secret in order to produce the 
complete secret.  ' 
•  Mechanisms and criteria for assessing applicants suitability for the use of ITP services. 
Not all potential users of TIPs may have the necessary attributes (eg legal status, 
financial viability, etc.). This essentially applies to TIP services for closed user groups. 
Integrity and digital signatures 
•  Relationship  between the  key management functions,  directory  management and 
certification needs to be clarified. 
•  Timeliness of issuing  signatures  when  an  application  is  made  - verification  of 
"signature worthiness" of applicant - periodic review of "worthiness" of existing 
constituency of signature holders. 
•  Removal of signatures from  "active list" and initiation of "attempted illegal use" audit. 
This is a "certificate management" - "key management" interface management issue. 
Privacy Enhancement 
•  Manage~ent  of the domain within which the confidentiality keys are valid. The identity 
of authorised subjects within the domain: Key distribution to those authorised subjects 
(people and automated processes.). 
•  Should the TIP define the domain as well as manage it: if not, should another TIP hold 
the definition of the domain (ie table of authorised subjects). 
•  Assessment of the assurance level of the domain within which the confidentiality keys 
are to be used, ranging from  vetted, cleared people with physical and logical access 
controls to un-cleared people in open environments. 
Domains are an important concept in confidentiality provision. The following questions 
require an answer: 
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confidentiality mechanism? Who manages the domains? Who manages inter-domain 
issues ? Does each domain need a different TTP ? 
2.  Who determines the scope of a domain ? Who is authorised to change it ? (for both 
certification  and  confidentiality.)  Is  a  domain  a  "contract",  and  under  which 
circumstances ? 
3.  What are the assurance criteria for domain  management ?  Who audits  a  domain 
manager ?  Who maintains  the  principles  of domain  management as  technology 
changes? 
4.  Should domains for certification and confidentiality be different in view of the fact that 
a  confidentiality  domain  will  be  transitory  and  that  therefore  key  management 
principles are different? 
5.  When should the use of  escrow services be mandated to ensure domain integrity. 
Requirements 
•  Single digital sigqature mechanism and specifications preferably consistent with other 
leading countries 
•  adoption  of a  confidentiality  algorithm  standard  and  specification,  and  a  key 
distribution mechanism based on an asymmetric public key algorithm 
•  establishment of "domain  assurance"  levels  and  criteria  for TIPs  to  use  for 
confidentiality key management purposes 
•  codes of practice for TIPs engaged in key management activities, and the provision of 
escrow services and the methods by which. those codes of  practice would be audited 
•  set of criteria for mutual recognition between TIPs acting on behalf of organisations 
who wish to communicate securely. Merging of signature directories and secure inter-
domain communications are fundamental issues. 
5.2.4.  Distributed-Secret Escrow Systems 
Issue 
Some secrets (eg the secret key of a user) may be of paramount importance and may have to 
be distributed among trusted parties (escrow agents) so that none of the parties knows the 
complete secret and not less than a defined minimum of those trusted parties must contribute 
their pan of the secret in order to produce the complete secret. 
Discussion 
Such schemes are intended to protect the secret against corruption or destruction of the secret 
holder. Escrow agents are jointly more trustworthy than any of its members. 
Normally escrow ·agents, like information brokers, will use communication services to 
provide added value services. 
A US Presidential Initiative of April 16, 1993, announced a "key-escrow system" Which is to 
protect both confidentiality of (basic) telephone communication as  well as  the society's 
interests against misuse of legal encryption for illegal purposes. 
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conversations. Each such device will have two unique keys, numbers that will be needed by 
authorised gove~ment  agencies to decode messages encoded by the device. When the device 
is manufactured, the two keys will be deposited separately in two "key:-escrow" data bases 
that will be established by the Attorney General. Access to these keys will be  limited to 
government officials with legal authorisation to conduct a wire tap. 
There are many possible ways of using distributed-secret escrow systems.  The  system 
proposed in the US provides improved protection against corruption of a single secret holder; 
however, it increases the threat of destruction, because loss of either of the two key-escrow 
data bases will render the system unavailable. This threat can be met by distributing the secret 
over a larger number of  escrows, so that a subset can reproduce it (eg 2 out of 5). 
In view of the international character of communications, the consequences of the US 
Presidential Initiative and possible improvements should be studied. The US development 
should be closely observed and should be influenced towards a better compatibility with 
European regulations. 
Requirements 
•  Investigation and configuration of an escrow systems adapted to European needs. 
5.2.5.  Management  Services for Names and  Credentials 
Issues 
Whenever parties engage in bi- or multi-lateral electronic transactions, they need beforehand 
some non-transient information on their partners (such as identity, legal representatives or any 
other kind of credentials eg public keys). This does not imply permanent recording of such 
information. 
Discussion  . 
Management Services for Names and Credentials are established to facilitate access to this 
type of  information, whereby service subscribers are provided with up-to-date data pertaining 
to the parties listed in there. Because partners may conclude the transactions on the basis of 
the  information (at the  minimum,  the  authenticated identity of their partners) they are 
provided with, and because some of the  information stored by  such a  service may be 
protected by privacy legislation, the service itself must be trustworthy and the data it provides 
correct 
Management Services for Names and Credentials keep objects which are referred to by 
"Distinguished Names". A Distinguished Name is unique to a communication subject. A 
subject may have a number of (unique in the above sense) "Alias Names". It is required that 
the service can reference Alias Names to their subject's natural names. An Alias Name may 
be a pseudonym. Whether or not the service ~  allowed to reference a pseudonym and let 
inquirer know the result will depend on the subject's data -privacy rights. 
If, as  is likely going  to be  the case,  there  is  more than  one provider and certifier of 
information, the Management Services for Names and Credentials must be part of a network 
of information  suppliers.  Network can be  organised according  to  either geographical 
distribution or business sector or information taxonomy or all three of them. Users may have 
to subscribe to more than one such service or service type (eg "Public Key directory for the 
banking sector"). Users may have a number of different roles in an enterprise, each of which 
needs access to a set of different services. In the case of a multiple service and network of 
providers, one can speak of a system of Management Services for Names and Credentials. 
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Management Services for Names and Credentials must apply due care in its operations. In the 
case of proven negligence the service could be  held liable if inaccurate infonnation were 
provided. The creation, update and destruction (eg in the case of certificate revocation) of 
information is either mandatory or forbidden. In critical cases (eg; certificate revocation), the 
update may have to be notified to subscribers without request. 
The management of the Management Services for Names  and Credentials must thus  be 
accountable. There must be legislation, rules and regulations governing it. 
I 
Obviously, the service must cover and be available on an international level. 
Obviously there is the  issue of standardisation of the  service  at the  user end (external 
interface) and between service providers (internal interface). 
Since  international  Management  Services  for  Names  and  Credentials  are  akin  to 
internationally distributed data bases, they face  the same legal questions: who is legally 
responsible for the infonnation (between the creator, the storer, the distributor)? 
Market pressures are bound to promote the advent of sectorial Management Services for 
Names and Credentials, and possibly their subsequent interconnection or integration into 
larger network. In order to avoid fragmentation among proprietary services, there may be a 
need to lay down base rules for naming, binding, certificates and the associated IPR rules. 
Requirements 
•  Provision of  .Management Services for Names and Credentials, 'tO  include identity, 
name infonnation, and credentials such as public keys or any signature-verification data 
•  interoperability specifications and standards for names and credentials 
•  international harmonisation of legislation, rules  and regulations for Management 
Services for Names and Credentials. 
5.2.6.  The  Management of  TTPs 
5.2.6. 1.  Operating Principles of  TTPs 
Issue 
The need for common operating principles for TIPs. 
Discussion 
To be effective, TTPs must : 
•  operate within a consistent legal framework across the Community 
•  offer a range of services, with a defmed minimum 
•  confonn to European or international standards, where available 
•  follow accepted good practice 
•  allow for independent arbitration, without compromising security 
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•  have a public policy on service refusals, if applicable 
•  assume responsibility of liability within defined limits for availability and quality of 
service. 
The key questions include : 
•  Has the TIP a contractual obligation of results in terms of availability, integrity and 
confidentiality?  · 
•  How and by whom are the loss and penalty determined in cases of fraud, negligence or 
failure of the TTP? 
•  What assurance to the ~nal user is offered by the accreditation of the TTP? 
Requirements 
•  Harmonised legislation to provide an appropriate framework for arbitration, supervision 
and litigation 
•  model for TIPs meeting the requirements of users and authorities. 
•  baseline for accepted good practice including a  study of the level of availability, 
privacy and security required for the TTP by the final  users and how much they are 
ready to pay for it  · 
•  definition of quality of service, including availability, confidentiality, response-time, 
rules of  disclosure to law enforcement agencies 
•  operational guidelines, including descriptions of minimum set of services and standards 
to conform to 
•  standard clauses for the contract between the TIP and the user, concerning the liability 
of the TIP. 
5.2.6.2.  lnterworklng of  TTPs 
Issue 
Openness and protection. 
Discussion 
In practice, the level of information security is dynamically adapted to a given situation. This 
leads· to the concept of  Dynamic IS Management and the need to be able to define domains, in 
which information security is applied homogeneously. 
Security Domain Concept 
Domains are user groupings sharing some of their functions and support. For some activities 
they operate as virtually closed user groups, but have the possibility to interwork with other 
domains as long as certain minimum requirements ensure no loss of trust or a transparent 
downgrading. 
The notion of  a security domain is therefore important for two reasons. Namely, 
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•  It can be used as a building block in modelling security relevant activities that involve 
elements under distinct security authorities. 
Examples of domain activities are: 
•  accesses to elements (eg a database for network management) 
•  a communications link 
•  operations relating to a specific management function 
•  non-repudiation operations involving a notary. 
Security Policy 
The organisation of security within enterprises in terms of business control structures or in the 
case of some user environment (eg legal, accounting, audit etc.) and functions (eg IT, human 
resources, insurance) needs to  be  supported by a set of security policies, standards (both 
public and in-house), laws and regulations (eg computer crime manual), guidelines and codes 
of  practice etc. 
The security policy defines what is meant by security within the domain, the rules by which 
security may be obtained to the satisfaction of the security authority, and the activities to 
which it applies. The security policy may also define which rules apply in relations with other 
security domains in general, and in relations with particular other security domains. 
The management of inter-domain openness and protection may be different depending on 
similarities in purpose, and agreements will  be  needed to achieve appropriate levels of 
assurance. Mechanisms by which TIPs achieve efficient, coherent management of policies, 
procedures and controls between domains need development. 
Requirements 
•  Guidelines for domain creation, management and control 
•  common framework for domain interworking 
•  agreement on management, TIPs, accreditation,  auditing and relations  with  law 
enforcement agencies. 
5.2.6.3.  lnterworklng of Autonomous Confidentiality Services 
Issue 
Till such time that a universal service is being offered, interworking between autonomous 
confidentiality services is likely to be the normal situation because of the differentiated 
requirements. This implies the need for generally accepted rules for the relationship between 
these services. 
Discussion 
For quite a time the conflict between national security issues and the business need for 
international communications has blocked significant progress in the area of confidentiality 
services in telecommunications. With the recent US  initiatives, pressure from  European 
companies will grow to have access to equivalent services. But within Europe we have the 
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security policies are hannonised enough to have a single confidentiality service scheme with 
a single algorithm established within the foreseeable future. Therefore it is necessary to have 
a framework, which enables user-transparent interoperability between different national or 
regional  schemes and which do not block the  way  for a  single  scheme  which  may  be 
established in the far future. Interoperability is also required with non-European schemes like 
the US. scheme. To provide this interoperability the way information is passed from  one 
national security domain to another has to be specified and the national schemes have to be 
compatible  with  this  specified  way.  The  establishment  of  such  a  framework  for 
interoperability is therefore a  subject which needs international harmonisation.  Aspects 
related to this are requirements for the cryptographic algorithms and for key management 
issues. 
Requirements 
•  Minimum requirements to ensure interoperability, including standards, specifications, 
rules of  procedure and operating practices 
•  demonstration of trans-European confidentiality services using a suitable application, 
eg the realisation of administrative telematics applications. 
5.2.6.4.  Accreditation and Audit of  TTPs 
Issue 
The need for hannonised procedures for the accreditation and audit of  TIPs. 
Discussion 
Although the accreditation and audit of TIPs may be a local or national responsibility, the 
procedures to be followed must be hannonised and have a common basis in order to ensure 
mutual trust. 
It is assumed that national governments will be responsible for approving accrediting bodies. 
This may require to create new national laws or to adapt existing laws. 
From the TIP point of view, timely and fair responses to requests for accreditation will be 
important. 
From  the user point of view, the agreed terms of the  accreditation need to  be  properly 
documented and inspectable. 
To maintain public trust in ITPs, an audit process must be put in place. 
Other issues are related to the 
•  requests for accreditation from service providers in other EC and non-EC countries 
•  certification of  certificates 
•  signature of authority and accreditor. 
Existing Community rules for accreditation (eg of test centers) should be used as a basis for 
this work. 
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•  Development of international· guidelines for the accreditation and audit of  TTPs 
•  adaptation of applicable legislation or regulations  to provide an  appropriate legal 
framework for use throughout the Community and in the relations with third countries. 
5.3. Supply Related Issues - Evaluation of Trusted Solutions 
5.3.1. Evaluation of Procfucls. Syslams, Servtces and Appllca I 
15.3.2. lntema1lonal Harmonisation and Mulual Recogn ·  I 
5.3.3. Supplierr Declarations  I 
5.3.4. Self-evaluatior  I 
.  15.3.5. Evaluation of Application  I 
5.3.6. Evaluation of Communication Servic  I 
5.3. Supply Related Issues - Evaluation of Trusted Solut 
5.3.7. Trusted Network Manageme 
15.3.8. Evaluation of Me-R  Toe  I 
5.3.9. Physical and Procedu~llssu  I 
5.3.1 0. Modifications to Evaluated Products and Re-evalu.: 
5.3.11. Performance Reporting for Trusted Produ  I 
~5.3.12. Rationalisation of Evaluatiot  I 
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Issue 
Need for evaluations in support of  communication requirements in both the public and private 
sectors. 
Discussion 
There is a whole spectrum of  possible evaluation methods in use today. These range from: 
•  supplier declarations (the most common practice at the moment is that the vendor's 
product information states the intended functionality and quality of the product but not 
the level of  assurance) 
•  acceptance testing by the purchaser (also common, where the purchaser trials  the 
product before committing to it) 
•  indirect evaluation (where a  supplier has a  product range with a common product 
architecture, and the top-of-the-range product has been put through a formal evaluation. 
Though the other products in the range have not been evaluated directly, assurances can 
be inferred from the fact that one product has been successfully evaluated) 
•  acceptance testing by a.  third party (also known as a Security Qualification, where a 
third party performs specific security testing on behalf of the purchaser, but without the 
formality of a formal evaluation) 
•  formal evaluation by an accredited test laboratory (this can be a third party test facility 
or a manufacturer's test laboratory). 
Obviously, mutual recognition and acceptance of standards, criteria and evaluation processes 
are necessary to achieve fully cost effective solutions from all perspectives, ie user, supplier 
and service provider. 
Requirements 
•  Commitment of  management to the security function within enterprises 
•  establishment of common definitions for the different evaluation options 
•  Community and international standards for criteria and methodology 
•  choice in the access to independent evaluation capabilities. 
5.3.2.  International Harmonisation and  Mutual Recognition 
Issue 
At the moment different evaluation criteria and evaluation schemes are in use. These are 
especially the US, TCSEC, the European ITSEC and the Canadian CI'CPEC. Other countries 
like Japan have first drafts of criteria. This situation is  not acceptable to international 
manufacturers who would have to perform different evaluations against different ·criteria and 
sehemes for a single product. This will unnecessarily increase the cost of the product without 
enhancing the security features. 
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Various activities are currently under way to harmonise evaluation criteria and evaluation 
schemes. The ITSEC and ITSEM is the result of such a harmonisation prQCess within Europe. 
The United Kingdom, France, Germany and the  Netherlands are discussing the mutual 
recognition of each other's certificates based on ITSEC and ITSEM, .with the intention of 
achieving agreement in 1994. 
In North America, the US and Canada co-operated in the production of the frrst draft of the 
Federal Criteria. Following publication of the Federal Criteria in early 1993, it has been 
decided to make all effort to align the ITSEC and the Federal Criteria to produce a joint 
European/North American set of Criteria compatible with existing practices in both North 
America and Europe in  1994. This is  the first  step towards international harmonisation 
between the two groups and would be a major step forward. ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27, Working 
Group 3 is also working on an ISO standard for evaluation criteria, based on the ITSEC and 
the Federal Criteria. 
Harmonisation of evaluation criteria is only the frrst step to reaching mutual recognition of 
evaluation results. It will need to be accompanied by agreement on evaluation methodology, 
evaluation  schemes,  certification  and  accreditation  practices.  Only  then  will  mutual 
recognition between North America and Europe be possible. Even within the European 
Community mutual recognition has turned out to be an arduous task and mutual recognition 
of certificates is not yet achieved, mainly for legal reasons. This indicates that world-wide 
mutual recognition of  certificates requires many, yet unknown, problems to be solved. 
Looking into the international arena, the only evaluation process and certification scheme in 
the area of communications security (ie computer networks) which has been in place for a 
sjgnificant time is the US TCSEC evaluation scheme. The focus of this scheme is mainly to 
evaluate  and certify  commercial  operating  system  products  suitable  for  government 
applications. Currently the US are trying to widen this scope with the Federal Criteria and the 
accompanying trust technology programme of NIST whose main goal is to establish a more 
commercially oriented evaluation and certification scheme with industrial evaluation facilities 
like the IT Security Evaluation Facilities (ITSEFs) in Europe. 
Both the Federal Criteria as well as the trust technology program look like a much better basis 
for international harmonisation but nevenheless a considerable amount of work is necessary 
to achieve this goal. Also, since both the new US criteria and commercial evaluation process 
are not yet well established there is an opportunity to influence this process. The fact that the 
US  have sponsored two parallel ITSEC evaluation of their TMach operating system show 
clearly that the US side watches the European activities in this area very carefully and tries to 
get as  much information as  possible (both  positive and negative!)  about the European 
evaluation process. 
Thus there is a will for co-operation which is clearly based on the fact that US manufacturers 
sell large quantities of products in Europe. Other countries like Sweden, Australia and Japan 
are watching this process very carefully. 
Requirements 
•  Establishment of conditions ·and procedures for mutual recognition of  evaluations 
•  establishment of  conditions and procedures for EC-wide/international evaluations 
•  international and EC standardisation of  evaluation criteria and methods. 
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Issue 
For solutions that need security, but not the kind requiring formal evaluations, supplier 
declarations are used. Currently, these are not defined in terms of what they cover, what 
assurance they offer compared to formal evaluation or who is liable if such products or 
systems fail. 
Discussion 
Between the requirements for formally evaluated solutions and no evaluation at all, there is a 
market for security products used by business and the general public. Vendors do incorporate 
security features in their products and provide some level of assurance, by virtue of the 
normal quality standards used to develop and maintain the product and the specific claims 
made by the supplier about the product. 
Currently,  end-users  are  not  able  to  reliably  compare  such  products  from  different 
manufacturers because there are no guidelines which specify the minimum content of supplier 
declaration documentation. Users have to rely on supplier sales literature. 
Supplier declarations need to address the issue of assurance and liability, if a fault in the 
product causes loss, injury or death to users~ This would then enable the user to calculate what 
the risks are in using products covered by vendor declarations rather than products that have 
been formally evaluated. 
It may be possible to extend the fonnal evaluation scheme to include vendor declarations as a 
sub-El methodology. The scope of vendor declarations could be specified, together with the 
documentation required (for example, the claims on security features could use the same 
format as the ITSEC security target), quality procedures needed and auditing of vendors 
(perhaps  by  EDP auditors).  This  method  would  also allow  users  to  see  how  vendor 
declarations compared with formal evaluation, in terms of security features and assurance 
requirements and keep a single, coherent evaluation scheme. 
It may also be necessary to ascertain exactly where vendor declarations could be used, or 
more importantly, where they should not be used. For example, it may not be applicable for 
use in safety-critical systems. 
Requirements 
Agreed definition of scope and liabilities of supplier declarations 
incorporation of supplier declarations in the ITSEC/ITSEM evaluation scheme 
specification of the types of systems which should not rely on products covered by 
supplier declarations. 
5.3.4.  Self-evaluation 
Issue 
To reduce the time and cost of formal evaluations, and to facilitate re-evaluation, there is an 
opportunity for vendors and service providers to both develop and formally evaluate systems, 
products and services. 
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Currently there are two methods used by users to assess the technical security measures 
provided by a product or service and their assurance: 
•  supplier declarations, and 
•  assessment by an  organisation licensed to undertake formal  evaluations;  using ·an 
evaluation scheme. 
In general, vendors and service suppliers have a quality assurance department which monitors 
and audits the development of products and the use of services, ensuring that this is all done 
.to the company quality standards. This provides support for supplier declarations. 
Vendors and service suppliers could set up  a department which  would be  an  in-house 
evaluation facility and would undertake formal evaluations in the same manner as current 
independent ITSEFs  Such in-house ITSEFs would be monitored and controlled in the same 
way as third party ITSEFs. The only difference would be that the in-house ITSEFs would be a 
part of the vendors organisation. 
Self-evaluation may speed up evaluations, reduce their costs, and help with re-evaluation as 
the evaluations could be done as an integrated part of the development planned and executed 
by the same company, but different departments. 
There are certain types of systems for which self-evaluation would be deemed not appropriate 
due to them requiring high-levels of assurance. End-users may also wish to have independent 
formal evaluation rather than self-evaluation to ensure that there is no conflict of  interest. 
End-users must be made aware of the advantages and disadvantages of supplier declarations, 
self-evaluation and third party evaluation so that they can procure a product/system with full 
knowledge of the security features and assurance they are getting. 
Self-evaluation compliments independent formal evaluation. The ITSEC/ITSEM evaluation 
criteria should be extended to incorporate self-evaluation and specify how it fits in between 
supplier declarations and third party evaluation. 
Requirements 
•  Specification of  accreditation for in-house evaluation facilities 
•  extension of the ITSEC/ITSEM evaluation criteria to include self-evaluation. 
5.3.5.  Evaluation of  Applications 
Issue 
The user interest is finally with the security of his application. The use of secure products, 
systems  and services  is  a  necessary  but  not  a  sufficient  condition  to meet  the  user 
requirements for the protection of the application. 
Discussion 
At present, evaluations and certification schemes address primarily products and systems. 
Communication  services  are  only partially  addressed and applications running on the 
products and via networks (in particular public networks) are left to the user to address. 
However with the restrictive handling of confidentiality mechanisms and opposition against 
end-to-end encryption, the user is left exposed. 
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•  Methods for evaluations. to cover services and applications. 
5.3.6.  Evaluation of  Communication Services 
Issue 
With the ITSEC and ITSEM Europe has already a scheme for the independent security 
evaluation of IT-products and (to some extent) IT-systems. At the moment this scheme does 
not fully cover the aspect of the evaluation of communication services, but extensions to this 
scheme seem possible which are able to address the items not yet covered by the current 
ITSEC/ITSEM scheme. 
Discussion 
The main item where communications security is considered in the public is in the area of 
telecommunication services. Especially when people send sensitive information ·to others 
using telecommunication services they are interested that this information 
•  gets to the intended recipient(s) in time 
•  is not altered by the service 
•  it not received by anyone else than to the intended recipient(s). 
Not all these aspects are of the same importance for each kind of  communication. The level of 
importance is highly dependent on the kind of information one wants to transfer. 
The use of telecommunication services grows rapidly as  more powerful equipment and 
services become available. A lot of companies and especially administrations have policies 
which forbid the use of specific telecommunication services for highly sensitive information 
since they do not trust the  communication  services  providers  that  some of the  above 
mentioned security issues are enforced adequately. They use conventional techniques for the. 
exchange of sensitive information with conventional security measures (eg sending sealed 
letters by registered mail or by courier). 
In a time where industrial success depends on the fast exchange of all types of information 
these conventional techniques become more and more unacceptable. So the service providers 
will incorporate security provisions within their services. But nevertheless a lot of companies 
(and the national governments) will continue to use the conventional techniques since they do 
not trust those security services unless they are under their own control or being verified by 
independent experts. 
Providing a security service as part of a telecommunication service will normally result in all 
entities involved in  the  provision of tl;le  telecommunication  service  being involved in 
providing the security service. Additional entities may even be necessary (like eg a trusted 
third party for key management issues or authentication services). These entities use systems 
and products to provide their pan of telecommunication (and security) service. The total 
service is therefore provided by an interaction of all the entities. 
The current ITSEC/ITSEM scheme is aimed at the technical evaluation of security measures 
within products and systems. It does not cover organisational, personnel, administrative or 
non-IT related physical security measures. Still many security services for telecommunication 
will heavily rely not only on IT  -security measures but also on the above mentioned other 
security controls. For example a trusted third party will surely need extensive organisational, 
personnel and non-IT physical control. So it is clear that an extension to the ITSEC/ITSEM 
Green Paper on the Security of Information Systems  Page91 evaluation scheme is necessary to cover these aspects. The following section tries to identify 
how this can be done and which areas are not yet covered. 
Looking at communication  services  one can easily identify  several different  types  of 
communications-products and systems which have to co-operate to provide the service. This 
includes for example 
• 
• 
the end user equipment (telephone, modem or even his computer) 
digital dialling switches 
•  data concentrators 
•  conventional  computer  systems  with  databases  for  eg  user  profiles,  directory 
infonnation 
• 
• 
conventional computer systems providing mailbox services 
the communication media 
•  gateways etc  . 
For a specific telecommunication service one can identify the task each of these products or 
systems has to fulfil to provide this service. The same is  true for security  ~ervices. Each 
component involved contributes for one aspect of the security objectives or functions. These 
will then differ significantly in the functionality as well as in the assurance level required. 
Various topics regarding this may lead to problems, for instance:. assumptions on the security 
provisions to be taken in the environment of the product or system. Some of the security 
measures will heavily depend on hardware features. Evaluation of non-IT security features, 
like effectiveness of personnel and administrative security measures has to be established. 
The integration of all security measures has to be checked for consistency, completeness and 
effectiveness. For the evaluation of a communication service, therefore, different evaluations 
of systems involved in providing the service are necessary before the whole service can be 
evaluated. 
Requirements 
•  Evaluation of  communications hardware and infrastructure security features 
•  formal accreditation scheme for secure communication services 
•  accreditation guidelines for the telecommunication sector 
•  trial service evaluations for existing telecommunication services 
•  articulation of the requirements of service evaluation. 
5.3.7.  Trusted Network Management 
Issue 
Trusted Network Management systems  need to maintain  a  given  assurance level while 
optimising the  use of communication assets  to achieve good economics and quality ·of 
service. 
Discussion 
There is a growing dependence in the security of network management systems for managing 
and controlling the provision of telecommunications. This is due to an increased reliance on 
distributed systems, the provision of new value added services and operations, and on the 
increased sophistication and richness of network and service functionality. Such dependency 
is placing greater demands on performance and quality of service. Tomorrow's electronic 
highways should be managed networks that should ideally interoper~te in a seamless way to 
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broad range of services, including those supplied by third party suppliers. The management of 
telecommunications systems security is thus growing in complexity commensurate with the 
growth in communications systems and the associated services and  busin~ss use. 
The major network management issues involve the protection of electronic information in 
storage, in transmission and being processed. Information used and applied to the controlling 
and maintenance of networks and services. Information that is used as input to the process of 
decision making and operational suppon, and which is also used as input to the emerging new 
wave of intelligent systems and communications. The provision of appropriate and effective 
network  management  solutions  is  fundamental  to  the  success  of  the  future 
telecommunications infrastructure for Europe. 
Given the complex telecommunication systems that are evolving, the interrelationships that 
are  needed for  multi-domain  working,  grade  of service  requirements  against  a  future 
European framework for legislation and regulation needed to maintain multi-domain working, 
· the provision and maintenance of network management security the question of security 
evaluation is  a key issue. What is  the  alternative if evaluation of network management 
security is not carried out ? 
There are a number of constraints imposed by  end users,  service providers and network 
operators  on  the  provision  of security  for  network  management  eg  concerning  the 
employment of intelligence in networks and the idea of securing shared resources, dealing 
with different threat analysis and the responsibility for service liability. 
Requirements 
•  Methods for network management evaluation 
•  definition  of Functionality  Classes  (or Protection Profiles)  suitable  for  systems, 
products and services used in network management systems 
•  accreditation guidelines for the trusted network management 
•  trial evaluations for existing network management systems. 
5.3.8.  Evaluation of  Methods and Tools 
Issue 
The methods and tools used to design, develop and maintain trusted products and systems 
need to be trustworthy. 
Discussion 
Methods and tQOls used to develop trusted products and systems must be trusted to function 
correctly. For example, a· compiler and linker must be trusted not to include malicious code in 
the resulting executable image. Such malicious code may only be visible if the executable 
image or object code is directly investigated (ie decompiled). 
There is a need for trusted compilers, linkers, semi-formal tools (CASE tools) and formal 
methods tools (eg 'Z' and LOTOS tool, etc.), configuration management tools, etc. 
The evaluation may take the form of a straight forward assessment of tools or the production 
of  rules for how each specific tool should be used to develop trusted products. 
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suitable) for the development of trusted products and systems. When a new tool is developed, 
the vendor will have to ensure that the tool is added to the list, if he wishes to use it (or sell it 
to a third party to use) on developing trusted software. The register may. also be able to say 
which tools can be used for which assurance level. 
Requirements 
•  Guidelines for the evaluation of methods and tools used to develop trusted products, 
systems and services 
•  register of methods and tools w~ich  can be used to develop trusted solutions. 
5.3. 9.  Physical and  Procedural Issues 
Issue 
Need to produce a common standard for the physical and procedural issues required to 
maintain the security of  evaluated products and systems. 
Discussion 
There is no point for two organisations in two different countries in buying the same ITSEC 
E3 product, configuring them in the same way only to find that their physical and procedural 
security  measures  (eg  personnel,  system  administration,  system .operation,  end-user 
organisation, building security, system maintenance etc.) are incompatible with the security of 
the system.  Each country would have a product with a security le,vel that included the same 
environmental assumptions,  but these  may  be  interpreted differently and the  different 
interpretations may be accepted by the system accreditors in each country. 
As well as having international hannonisation on the evaluation criteria, effort should also be 
made to produce guidelines for the physical and procedural measures required to maintain 
trusted systems which apply internationally. Thus as well as having mutual certification, it 
would also be possible to have mutual accreditation. 
Requirements 
•  Guidelines for physical and procedural measures required to maintain trusted systems. 
5.3.10.  Mod/Rcatlons to Evaluated Products and  Re-evaluation 
Issue 
The shortening life cycle of  products and the rapid evolution of services and applications due 
to competitive pressures implies the need for frequent adaptations and therefore re-evaluation. 
Discussion 
The impact of  Open System, with its emphasis on portability and interoperability, has resulted 
in many new products being incremental releases of existing products, for new operational 
platforms, applications, etc. There may be m ultip!e releases or versions of a hardware or 
software solution in a short period of time. The evaluation and certification of the product 
may take longer than the period between releases or updates to the solution. A certificate 
currently applies to a specific release or version. Changes may invalidate the certificate. 
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certified status of a product may be maintained. 
Particular concerns include: 
•  Scope of the  evaluation - Is  an  evaluation  necessary  for every  single  platform-
dependent configuration of a product already certified ? 
•  Assurance - Is it necessary to have an entire new release evaluated again in which only 
a small modification occurred (  eg a spelling mistake in the user interface) ? 
•  Re-use of previous evaluation work and results - Must the evaluation of sensitive and 
relevant but unmodified components of a product be repeated ? ITSEC and ITSEM 
have created a good basis on which to identify the key issues of re-evaluation and 
subsequent re-certification. 
Practical experience of re-evaluation is  limited but the  problem  may  be  mitigated by 
identifying key requirements. One approach is to categorise code in the security Target of 
Evaluation (ITSEC-TOE). 
This "Traffic Light" approach includes: 
a)  GREEN code that has no bearing on the security functionality of the product or system 
and that may be modified in future releases without impact on the security of the 
product or system. 
b)  YELLOW code that might impact the security of the product or system and that must 
be inspected by an independent party (such as an ITSEF) before re-certification can be 
considered. 
c)  RED code that is critical to the security functionality of the product or system for which 
may modifications may require re-evaluation of the whole product or system. 
This approach will assist developers, evaluators and certifiers in containing the level of 
necessary re-evaluation commitment following any modifications. feedback on how well this 
approach works is required. 
Experience is  available on the parallel field of quality evaluation of software products. A 
framework for re-evaluation is outlined in IS09126 and .associated processes. It is likely that 
the impact of software quality on "operational" correctness of security products will force 
alignment of  the various processes. 
Requirements 
•  Definition of  rules and procedures for re-evaluation based on methods ,currently used 
•  alignment of the  design process with the  principles of re-evaluation, "design-for-
change". 
5.3. 11.  Pedormance Reporting for Trusted Products 
Issue 
Obligation to take corrective action in the case of faults found in evaluated products. 
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Despite the successful evaluation and certification of a product or system, there is a small· 
chance, smaller with the higher assurance levels, that a security related fault will be detected. 
The Developer or Vendor is likely to have this fault reported to him and ought to take steps to 
correct this fault as quickly as possible and issue a new release of the software or hardware. 
The Certification Body needs to be infonned of the occurrence of such a fault and the steps 
the Developer inten4s to take to correct the fault. The Certification Body and the Developer 
need to discuss the need for any re-evaluation work and agree a timescale for this. 
Where a Developer is unwilling to correct the fault, the Certification Body needs to decide 
whether to withdraw the certified status and publish the fact that a fault exists (although not 
necessarily the details of the fault)  or,  perhaps, change the conditions  upon  which the 
certificate was granted. 
When a fault does occur, perhaps due to the way a system has been configured, or due to a 
specific fault  with  the  product, end-users  should be  obliged to  report  the  fault  to  the 
Developer and to their Certification Body. If this product is in wide spread use throughout the 
World, it may be necessary to infonn all end-users who could be affected that a fault exists, 
detailing the security implications. In-order to be able to this, it would be necessary to set up 
an international register of  evaluated product users (or an equivalent system). 
Requirements 
•  Incident reporting system for Certification Bodies 
•  user and supplier obligations to report incidents 
•  supplier obligations to take corrective actions, and to initiate re-evaluation 
•  register of  evaluated product and their owners. 
5.3. J  2.  Rationalisation of  Evaluations 
Issue 
Speeding up and lowering cost of evaluation and thereby improve attractiveness of security 
evaluations. 
Discussion 
Two key factors to the success of a security market enhancement are that evaluations are 
approachable and that the products or systems are developed in a way that is meant to ,meet 
the ITSEC requirements beforehand. It must also be understood that in many industrial cases, 
security, while indeed an important feature of a product or service, is only one aspect of an 
even larger target which is product quality or the quality of service. 
Considerable work has  been carried on in  the  broad field of software quality  and its 
engineering which might be valuable to the security community. Several standards address 
quality through an evaluation and certification approach, eg ISO 9000 and ISO 9126, at the 
organisation level, at the process and at the product level. 
Those standards are  well established and the  demand for certificates based on them is 
growing rapidly. There is an urgent need to consider the harmonisation of the ITSEC and 
ITSEM contents, to take into account to a much larger and clearer extent the benefits brought 
by these standards to security and to help reduce costs and needs of several, disconnected or, 
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sufficiently well accepted today to consider its integration into a broader context. A closer 
technical look at quality standards and ITSEC/ITSEM taken together shows that, although 
they are all based on the same fundamental ideas and principles, there are residual conflicts 
when evaluations are to be carried out, either due to different requirements or to different 
evaluation approaches. 
The following steps seem relevant: 
•  While preserving the current technical principles and requirements, a better distinction 
between  specifically  security  related  requirements  and  more  quality  related 
requirements should be made so that it becomes clearer, if  not explicit, what the various 
other evaluation systems and associated requirements can cover and/or contribute to. 
•  As all standards evolve, the ITSEC and ITSEM will have to be updated, at the level of 
the actually required documentation, for instance, to be directly compatible with what 
the other domains require, while still remaining specific. 
•  Parts of the current ITSEC requirements might eventually be replaced by requirements 
for relevant quality certificates, and hopefully vice versa. 
Requirements 
•  Alignment of security evaluation criteria and methods with those for quality and safety, 
where sensible 
•  portability of  results between quality, safety and security evaluations. 
5.4.  Maintenance of Safety and Assurance 
Issues 
To maintain safety and assurance in operation for systems in changing environments, with 
changing system elements over long periods of time (30 years) 
Discussion 
There is a need to maintain the safety and assurance of systems during operation and after 
decommissioning. These problems are exacerbated by the emergence of large, distributed 
systems with safety implications and the changing nature of the organisations n which they 
are embedded. There is the danger that key safety or security properties are established by 
properties of the  organisation  that  are  not made  explicit  and are  undermined as  the 
organisation changes. This could include the move to contract out work to contractors with a 
different mindset to the service provider; the slow undermining of safety culture (this is 
especially important in some Eastern European countries) and the consequential problems of 
relying on procedures and drills; ; the changing technical and linguistic skills rate of the 
workforce. 
There are also the technical issues associated with the evaluation and development of systems 
and the need for methods and techniques that recognise the impact of  these changes and 
allow for appropriate design and engineering measures to be implemented. Coupled to these 
changes to the system is the problem posed by the relatively rapidly changing technology and 
the likely obsolescence of the systems being used. The need to plan for obsolescence should 
be recognised from the outset and consideration given to the 'extent of information required 
for re-engineering. This covers the  capture of expertise, design rationale, development 
documentation and the access to tools used in developing the system that themselves may be 
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obsolescence,  how  to  determine  the  best  approach  to  re-engineering  (complete  re-
development, translation of software, emulation of old hardware etc.), when it should be done 
and  the risk, costs and benefits. 
Many systems are already obsolete and do not posses the documentation necessary for re-
engineering.  Strategies for  dealing  with  these  systems in  a  cost effective manner that 
preserves  safety  need to  be developed and associated reverse engineering techniques 
developed for the system (hardware, software, people, organisation). 
There is  also a  need to address  the  reuse of old systems  in new applications  and the 
implications for safety assurance and certification. 
Requirements 
•  Approach for tracking the  evolution of systems  and identifying when  significant 
changes to safety and security requirements are taking place 
•  strategies and techniques for re engineering of  obsolete systems. 
5.5. Technological Change 
S.S. 1.  Evolving technology 
Issue 
Changes in the way in which technology is used throughout society will result in demands for 
new  technological approaches to infonnation security. 
Discussion 
Over the next decades it is to be  expected that the macro economic climate will change 
dramatically. This is mainly driven by the shift in geographic location of the generation of  the 
worlds GDP from Nonh America and Europe to a more even spread, with the Pacific rim 
countries producing a larger share. The health and nutrition problems that will face the 
developing world will become more acute as  a greater fraction of their population enters 
adulthood. Information underpins these processes in a number of ways. 
The financial aspects of global businesses will become vital to their survival and the timely, 
accurate and where appropriate private communication of financial information on a global 
and adaptable scale will  be critical.  Health care information will  need to be routinely 
available as health carers deal with the health problems of an increasing number of mobile 
people. Transportation of food  to areas in need will require logistic  information to be 
available in remote and underdeveloped parts of the world quickly  and accurately.  As 
computer related products become more complex and are developed to go faster and to 
provide more functionality, new approaches to solving the security and safety-critical aspects 
of  these products will have to be developed. 
The developed world will make increasing use of their less structured employment patterns to 
earn money in· a variety of ways and in performing a range of tasks, less and less to do with 
manufacturing. Success will only be possible by  the exploitation of mobility and wide 
bandwidth telecommunications services. It has the potential to provide quality of  life together 
with high productivity. The effectiveness of this approach, in providing a method of revenue 
generation, will depend on the performance, reliability and security of the information and 
transportation infrastructures. 
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critical aspects of products and systems whilst they are  being developed on the drawing 
board, rather than as later add-ons, when it may be too costly or even impossible to provide a 
satisfactory level of security. 
Ultimate goals for technological change are that individuals: 
•  can communicate with each other using global personal communicators which are wire-
free and fibre-less  ' 
•  will have instant access to all types of information (eg multimedia), through databases 
and high-speed links from wherever they are located 
•  be  present  anywhere  anytime  through  virtual  presence  and  reality  (e.g. 
teleconferencing). 
•  travel faster and more safely 
•  work in a paperless office 
•  never carry cash, using instead an electronic purse or wallet. 
Driving technologies within these scenario include: 
Telecommunications:  Bandwidth will  become a commodity on telecommunication 
systems. The added value in using it comes from the quality of service provided. One 
aspect of such quality is that of security. To provide security on wide band public 
switched networks, investment is needed that is focused on those aspects of security 
that are required by the telecoms service provider for his own purposes and by the end 
user to support his application. Community wide and international specifications on 
security in  Asynchronous Transfer mode  (A TM), Synchronous Digital Hierarchy 
(SDH) and associated signalling structures will be necessary. 
Multi-media:  Multi media applications  will integrate all known representations of 
information into files, documents, messages and displays.  Representations such as 
voice,  audio,  still image,  text,  video  and  graphics  will  become  interchangeably 
available  from  a  range  of equipment that users  interact  with,  including  mobile 
telephones, personal computers,  television  sets  and personal communicators.  All 
aspects of security must be incorporated for potential implementation in all of these 
systems in order that a user may implement a level of security service appropriate to the 
application and the environment. 
Global teleconferencing: Teleconferencing is becoming the substitute for travel. In 
order to make it really cost effective applications such as multimedia, mobility, access 
to mass data and if  necessary access to ·one or more parties who are travelling in private 
vehicles· need  to be  incorporated within  the  teleconferencing  application.  True 
geographic independence will come only if such an application works on a global scale 
and provides all the security services that are needed by the community of users. Such 
an application will demand the integration of the security services provided for each of 
the sub-applications alone. Specifications to allow such integration should be defined 
and the technology to provide the security functionality developed. 
Data access: Access to huge amounts of data from a mobile terminal will be essential. 
Such data needs to be communicated securely, whether it be held in volatile memory, in 
the form of mechanically read ROM or transmitted over a network. Specifications for 
securing such data need to be developed as do the necessary bulk encryption services 
for huge data volumes. The technology components of such services will be a major 
challenge and need to be defined now. 
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already decreasing as technology becomes mor.e  reliable. If human involvement or 
individual transportation is to shrink in the same way then mass production of cost 
effective safety assured technologies will be essential. Collision ayoidance, guidance 
and navigation systems will be essential parts of every domestic vehicle and the 
requirements for the information safety and security critical elements of such systems 
need to be defined, standardised and developed. This applies to the further evolution of 
all current forms of transport, personal (e.g. car, motor bike), aeroplanes, helicopters,' 
ships etc., and future methods of  public transportation possibly involving space flight. 
Health-related technology: Much progress has been made on developing a variety of 
innovative products that diagnose and treat health problems. This includes robotics, 
micro and laser surgery and sophisticated computerised life support equipment. There 
are also many supporting technologies including the authenticity of  medical records and 
the authorisation of clinical events which currently require individuals to 'sign' (in one 
form or another) in order to provide authenticity and authorisation within a local health 
institution, nationally and internationally (throughout Europe and the World). All these 
evolving technologies have security and safety-critical implications which need to be 
resolved. Development of  electronic signature and trusted third party technology will be 
very important in resolving current authenticity and authorisation needs in the health 
domain. 
Technologically thi.s represents a major challenge going well beyond present day techniques. 
Requirements 
•  Incorporation of information security requirements into R&D and engineering of new 
systems, services and applications 
•  information security technology for multi-media and other advanced services and 
applications. 
5.5.2.  Technology for trusted products 
Issue 
Need of new technologies for the design, development, testing and evaluation of trusted 
products and systems based on future technological changes. 
Discussion 
As new technologies are developed, there is always a need for trusted variants. In order to be 
able to develop trusted variants,  the required 'trusted developers tool-kit' must also be 
improved so that the development and evaluation of trusted products is made easier for all 
levels of assurance. This will ,also encourage the development of trusted products and 
improve their cost-effectiveness. 
Areas where improvement in tools-technology is most needed include: 
•  Tools for development and verification of trusted software and hardware: Currently, 
there is no clearly accepted catalogue of tools for trusted software and hardware 
development. This makes it increasingly difficult to decide whether new development 
techniques, such as new language~ and compilers are suitable for the development of 
trusted products. Current tool technology needs to be assessed to see what is suitable 
and what isn't suitable for trusted development. Tools need to be developed for areas 
where there are no acceptable commercially available offerings. 
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maturity of the ,methods, the intellectual difficulties inherent in the use of such methods, 
the  lack of automated support tools  and the  substantial increase in costs for  the 
development process. All of these issues need to be addressed in. order for the use of 
fonnal methods to be more widely used and thus to enable high assurance products to 
be developed. 
•  Improvement in safety-critical and security evaluation tools (see above). 
Requirements 
development of tools for the development and verification of trusted software and 
hardware, where there are no acceptable commercially available offerings 
investigation into the current use and available automated support for formal methods 
to fmd out where the improvements in fonnal methods technologies need to be made. 
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6. 1..  Legal Framew<?rk 
Issue 
A differentiated approach needs to be taken to the establishment of a legal framework for 
information security. 
Discussion 
To formulate such an approach, one must to look first at the special problems that electronic 
data presents, why electronic data is or may be (legally) different from data in paper fonn, 
and what needs to be done about it. The issues identified as crucial to the establishment of a 
legal model for the security of  electronic data include: 
•  meshing European Community rules, regulations and guidelines about the security of 
electronic data with those already in  force  on the  international, supranational, and 
nationallevels;  · 
•  ascertaining the best legal measures for dealing with the legally relevant features of 
electronic data that are different from those of data on paper; 
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vis their own interaction with and response to the law of the security and the evidence 
of  electronic data; 
•  establishing a framework for the validity of asserting defences such as certification, 
information security audits ; 
•  establishing a framework for the adoption of an appropriate duty of care 
•  addressing substantive and procedural issues relating to information security law and 
law of  evidence;  and  · 
•  ensuring that the model which is created supports and is consistent with public policy. 
In addition, any model which is developed must be valid for not only computer processed 
electronic data, but also for electronic data which is transmitted over telecommunications 
networks via satellites or via other communications facilities, especially as the distinctions 
between the technologies blur. 
It is against this backdrop that the following approach to the rights, responsibilities and 
liabilities relating to the security of information systems was developed. 
In  this,  a  glossary  of concepts  and  terms  must  be  developed  so  that  the  ideas, 
recommendations and conclusions discussed in this chapter can be understood and applied 
and so that there can be a guarantee, to the extent possible, of consistency in the analysis of 
the subject matter. 
A report consisting of  preliminary recommendations for the necessity and (realistic) potential 
for the evolution of a new model for the protection of and economic rights deriving from 
electronic data and information should be prepared. 
Requirements 
•  Glossary of  concepts and terms 
•  model for the evolution of protection of and economic rights deriving from electronic 
data and information. 
6.2.  Data held in Electronic Form 
Issue 
A distinction must be made of  data held in electronic form and data held in material form. 
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Adopting the widest possible definition of information security is fundamental to creating a 
model  fQr  information security legislation.  For example,  a  substantial  body of current 
legislation relating to information security is based on the protection of intellectual property 
rights or (personal) data, and not necessarily on physical intrusions to systems. As such, new 
rights and liabilities may have to be created, and these run to the protection of economic as 
well as to intellectual property interests. Also, as much attention needs to be devoted to the 
data  (and  information)  which  systems  generate  as  to  the  systems  themselves.  Thus, 
consideration must be given to such issues as how data are: 
•  valued (as an asset) 
•  perceived (by users, owners, individuals and organisations who are subject to  this 
information) 
•  generated (by systems) 
•  potentially a threat 
A paper document nonnally consists of three aspects: 
•  the carrier (the sheet of  paper) 
•  text and pictures (the physical representation of the information) 
•  information about the originator to verify the authenticity (usually a written signature) 
The connections among carrier, text and signature are self-evident. Therefore normally only 
the carrier (the paper) is mentioned.  It gives delimitation and structure to one finalised 
representation of the content. These aspects are physically "locked" via the paper that carries 
the information in one "unchangeable" and durable combination.  Paper documents  are 
normally given the necessary signs of authenticity by a written signature: the reader has 
confidence in the information about the originator and in that the text is  not altered.  A 
signature also gives a warning before a judicial act and conforms the final content in  a 
contract, etc. Paper documents are in principle unique physical examples; originals. The 
stored state and readable state are identical. The paper document is immediately readable and 
the storing is normally in a language that the user will understand without special training. A 
manipulation of a paper document has to be a material attack, traceable upon the physical 
object. An individual makes - often unconsciously  - a visual authenticity control when he is 
reading an important paper document. The information within a paper document is directly 
transcribed from a human thought process. 
Electronic documents confer new dimensions. The carrier, the text and the "signature" are not 
related to each other in the  same  "locked" and durable form  as  in  a  paper document. 
8  The following defmitions are used in the text of this section: 
"data" means a representation of facts, concepts or instructions in a formalised manner suitable for communication, 
interpretation or processing by human beings or automatic means; 
"information" is the meaning assigned to data by means of conventions applied to that data; 
"information systems" means computers, communication facilities, computer and communication networks and data and 
information that may be stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by them, including programs, specifications and 
procedures for their operation, use and maintenance. 
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objects, the starting point. It could on occasion be difficult to obtain infonnation about how 
the  user intended to process  stored text-data and computer programs.  Without certain 
technical authentication procedures there is no "lock" for the infonnation in an electronic 
document and such objects are not immediately readable. Manipulation of a digital record 
consists of untraceable alterations of a bit pattern. The visual authenticity control of a paper 
document has no correspondence in the area of electronic infonnation services. Computerised 
materials often are the result of automatic processing that at times  may  not be directly 
connected to a human thought. 
The following may be considered factors which differentiate electronic from material (ie non-
electronic) data: 
Evidence 
Special rules apply in certain jurisdictions relating to the production and admissibility of 
computer generated infonnation and data and the burden of proof regarding computer-
generated infonnation submitted to court. 
Form 
In certain jurisdictions the law insists upon the adoption of a certain form  (embodiment) in 
order for a document or other instrument to be legally valid, eg in the UK, a will must be a 
paper document. There may also exist procedural and organisational requirements. In the 
medical sector, for example, eligibility for reimbursement of a digital imaging examination 
will be granted by some social security authorities only if the medical file can be presented in 
material form. 
Processing Facility 
Automated processing,  which characterises electronically held data, means that electronic 
data cart be processed in a way which is far faster, more efficient and more accurate than 
processing of data in paper-based systems. In some cases, processing can only practically be 
carried out electronically. For example, census data can  be  processed in  a  meaningful 
timescale only in an automated environment; such processing would be virtually impossible if 
this data were manipulated only on paper. It is nonnally impossible to show that electronic 
processing is perfectly correct. At best a reasonable belief of correctness can be achieved. 
Preservation 
Some jurisdictions require that documents be available for consultation and review for up to 
150 years. The preservation and storage of documents in material form  is increasingly a 
problem  while  the  preservation  and  long-term  storage  of non-material  (ie  electronic) 
documents  is currently  uncertain,  especially  as  to their integrity.  It is  likely that the 
technology used to store data today will be out of date at some time in the future, and that 
archives can no longer be read.  -
Accessibility 
Data in electronic form are, by definition, not in a form in which a human being can, without 
other aids, inspect, review, supervise, read or understand. In  all cases, specific technical 
methods are needed so as to represent electronic data in human processable form, and these 
methods may not be readily subject to verification. 
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Data are more and more accessible, both in terms of cost and physical convenience, as data 
compression techniques make it possible to reduce vast quantities of data to, for example, a 
single CD-ROMs, thus increasing the size and scale of  potential hann. 
Aggregation 
Aggregation involves reorganising (ie sorting, merging, appending and deleting) the data 
contained in disparate databases - a fundamental and commercial reason for implementing 
automated data processing systems.  New information (whether properly or fraudulently 
generated)  can be derived through  aggregation, thus creating output which was neither 
intended nor understood to be potentially available at the time or point of collection. The 
amount of such new information and, indeed, the number of documents that may be generated 
by aggregation, is indeterminate and potentially infinite. 
Quasi-material form 
Electronic data are non-material, but stored on a material medium. It is therefore difficult to 
ascertain which legal principles should apply. 
Dissemination 
Once data is made publicly available in an  electronic form  it is for all practical purposes 
impossible to prevent the further dissemination of that .material, even if it is inaccurate, 
incomplete or invalid. 
Persistence 
Related to  dissemination  is  persistence.  Persistence characterises  the  condition  where 
inaccurate, invalid or incomplete data may persist on multiple computers and databases, and 
may even be erroneously reinstated on computers and databases on which corrections or 
deletions were thought to have been properly made. 
Originality 
It is already often difficult (and sometimes impossible) to differentiate between originals and 
copies  of electronic  data or output  from  electronic  data  processing.  It will  become 
increasingly difficult. The same applies to photocopied data. Legal and practical requirements 
for original documents become impossible to enforce. 
Ownership (s.a. intellectual property rights) 
Information cannot be 'owned' in most jurisdictions. Often, this status derives  from public 
policy which mandates that information must be in free circulation and available to all or 
from  a  strand of legal analysis  which renders  it impossible to exert sole domain over 
information, or permanently deprive its 'owner' of use. It also reflects common sense, which 
suggests that if something is the case, it can be known by anyone and, once known cannot· 
subsequently become unknown. It is possible, however, to own the intellectual property rights 
in such information: rights such as copyright, confidentiality and trade secret protection. The 
models for information derived from electronic data and that for information held in material 
form are similar, but the nature of electronic information (which allows it to be cut, sliced, 
transmitted, transformed, etc.) may require new rights and protections to be developed (see 
reference to economic rights, above). 
Page 106  Green Paper on the Security of Information System Durability 
Documents in material form generally continue to retain their legal status even though they 
may suffer minor damage such as, for example, bent corners, small teru:s or moisture spots. 
However, minor damage to data in electronic form may severely affect the durability of such 
data and its legal status, unless special processes and techniques have been introduced to 
resist such damage. 
Expectations 
Non-specialists in electronic information and data processing and storage are largely ignorant 
and often frightened of computer processing  and computer-generated information  and 
documents.  One consequence of these  perceptions  is  that  non-specialists  have  unreal 
expectations of the confidential nature and the exclusivity of the data being collected, stored 
and processed. 
Data exchange 
Data and information have historically been exchanged in material form, thereby maximising 
the (perceived) control over dissemination and monitoring which people had of the data and 
information being exchanged. None of these "comfort" factors operate in the electronic 
exchange of data unless they have been made explicitly available. People may not know 
enough to put them in place, or to complain about their absence. In particular, in a face-to-· 
face conversation the exchange is specifically not fixed in a material form, and is limited to 
'processing' by the parties present. On the other hand, an electronic conversation may be 
fixed,  may persist and may unwittingly convert slander (spoken) into libel (embodied in 
electronic form and then generated into material form). 
Standardisation.  of  the use of  electronic data 
Conventional paper based systems are  based on  methods and interpretations which are 
assumed to be  well understood by all individuals involved. Data in  electronic form  must 
closely follow complete sets of standards (codes, formats, etc) and instructions for equipment 
use to be as intelligible as recorded conventional information. To some degree such standards 
and instructions must still be developed. 
Requirements 
•  Identification, categorisation and analysis of existing (current) rules and laws dealing 
with  data held in electronic form 
•  definition  of the  dependent  and  consequent  legal  relationships,  obligations  and 
liabilities for each of the characteristics (differences) in the context of information 
systems security. 
6.3.  Environment 
Issue 
The legal, commercial and political environment which gives rise to the requirement for 
information security has  changed more in  the  last five  years  than  in  the previous two 
thousand. It is likely that this change will become even more rapid, and will develop in ways 
which cannot be readily foreseen at present. 
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Legislative environment 
It is within this environment that legislators, and government officials must write legislation 
that is not only effective today, but will endure for some time, and not be overtaken by 
technological change as it occurs. This means that information security legislation cannot be 
drafted on a reactive basis (ie it cannot be written to correct problems which have occurred in 
the past), but rather on a proactive basis, ie it must anticipate the effect of technology on 
society. 
To achieve a proactive approach to information security legislation, legislators and their 
advisers must have detailed knowledge of information and information security.  If this 
knowledge- and control- does not exist, real dangers can emerge. For example, legislation 
based on incomplete or skewed research can result in: 
•  threats to the democratic processing of  data 
•  the evasion of weak legislative controls by  such means as  siting businesses in data 
havens. 
New thinking about information security law also requires: 
•  a reconsideration of the legislative balance between privacy and the free circulation of 
data 
•  the management of technology vis-a-vis data protection responsibilities 
•  a complete re-examination of the existing framework of commercial, company and 
other regulatory  legislation  so  that  the  new  law  of information  security can  be 
incorporated systematically. 
Commercial environment 
The rate of technological change mentioned in the previous section has an especially critical 
effect on organisations:  the rate of day-to-day changes in technology currently exceeds the 
rate at Which organisations can change in order to adopt and implement these changes. It is 
unlikely that this situation will change in the near future or the medium term. Attempts at 
implementing rapidly changing technology require substantial investment and  introduce a 
reliance upon third patties to provide essential technical infrastructure and support which was 
never necessary when information could only be processed in  a material form.  In some 
instances, organisations may be  specifically forbidden from providing some ·elements of 
infrastructure themselves, for example, telecommunications. This shift in expertise from 
inside organisations to third patties means that vulnerability and dependency is significantly 
increased. To some extent, organisations may be at the mercy of their service providers. 
Similarly, organisations find technology change difficult to manage because the requisite 
expertise is not always present at the right level, and indeed it may never be cost effective for_ 
any but the largest organisations to develop and retain such expertise in-house. 
Political environment 
Tension exists between a government's vested interest in maximising the development and 
exploitation of technology as a way of guaranteeing its country's commercial success, and its 
duty to preserve the privacy and rights of individuals. Consequently, there is a danger that 
government policy in promoting economic growth may result in the distortion of the decision-
making process for selecting save technology and vice-versa. 
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required for the management and regulation of electronic data handling and processing in the 
political environment. This debate must take place in the light of existing legal frameworks 
but the conclusions must be  sufficiently flexible as  to withstand the <;onstantly  changing 
technological and political environment 
Requirements 
•  Re-examination in  the  context of information security rights, responsibilities and 
liabilities of the management of information systems security within organisations and 
organisations' relationships with third party providers of information security (and 
related) services 
•  models to introduce certainty and consistency with respect to legal obligations for 
owners, directors, managers, employees, consultants, contractors, Trusted Third Parties, 
auditors and lawyers 
•  model clauses relating to information security which can be included in contracts or 
other agreements in place between parties 
•  an understanding of the rights, responsibilities and obligations which underpin and 
define the relationship between information security and the political environment 
requires: 
examination of  the context in which governments collect and process data. 
review of the role of information in investigatory activities and in ensuring the 
public order  , 
resolution of the conflict between  supra-national government objectives and 
national governmental objectives with respect to data collection, processing, 
transmission and storage, etc. 
6.4.  Interaction and Relationships between Private Parties 
Issue 
Central to the environment in which information security exists are the relationships which 
are formed between private parties. 
Discussion 
Such relationships include: 
•  mere communication between them (by electronic means) 
•  contracts and other agreements forged between them 
•  regulation of  their society, ie by the laws which govern their interaction. 
Requirements 
•  Identification of the interests which need to be protected and regulated, and hann which 
needs to be redressed if and when security goes wrong, whether the relevant law is civil 
or criminal. 
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•  Issue 
The harm that can be caused by the reliance on electronic communication systems. 
Discussion 
Harm is the negative by-product of reliance on electronic data systems without being able to 
develop a reliable trust in them either purposely (ie where the user or beneficiary of  the data 
processing is otherwise in a position to take appropriate security measures) or passively (ie 
where the user or beneficiary is otherwise not in  a position to take appropriate security 
measures). This is in direct contrast with the trust which has evolved in (as  well as  the 
controls over and the management ot) paper-based systems throughout their history. As  a 
result, there is a great deal of work which needs to be done to close the gap between the 
methods of inculcating trust in and controlling and managing electronic systems as opposed 
to paper-based systems. It is also important to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, 
relevant mechanisms are no more burdensome than those applicable to paper-based systems. 
A comprehensive list of the common and extraordinary threats which endanger electronic 
communication must be constructed so that the boundaries of harm can be established. It is 
likely that most threats will fall under the following headings: 
•  theft and fraud 
•  mis- and dis-information 
•  invasion of  privacy 
•  hann due to inadequate technology 
Listings of some of these threats may be obtained from work published by standards bodies or 
carried out for national and supra-national administrative bodies. It may be that additional 
work may be needed in order to avoid legislative delay.  · 
Requirements 
•  Comprehensive list of the common and extraordinary threats which endanger electronic 
communication. 
6.6. Eliminating or Mitigating Harm 
Issue 
Legal possibilities to eliminate or mitigate harm caused directly or indirectly through the use 
of  electronic communication. 
Discussion 
Options for eliminating or mitigating harm already exist in the fonn of treaties, laws and rules 
("legislation") which address to some extent the harms which threaten electronic data and 
processing. However, in many cases, this legislation has been drafted: 
•  in the context of  paper-based systems and as such is applied by analogy;  or 
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processing; or 
•  by bolting on to existing legislation provisions which relate specifically to electronic 
data and processing but which are  not followed through in  the main body of the 
legislation (and thus creating ineffective, incomplete or confusing rights, obligations or 
liabilities); or 
•  by interpreting existing legislation so that it encompasses electronic data and processing 
(eg "record-keeping" provisions) 
Existing legislation which follows one or more of these four patterns exists as or in the form 
of: 
•  Supra-national and international treaties and guidelines, eg the European Convention of 
Human Rights 
•  Constitutional rights 
•  Consumer protection 
•  Criminal acts, eg theft and the deprivation of ownership, forgery, fraud, counterfeiting, 
destruction to property 
•  Civil acts, eg libel  and slander,  trespassing, unauthorised disclosure, laws granting 
judicial immunity 
•  Company and organisational law 
•  Provisions related to professional confidentiality, mostly embodied in penal law, eg 
medical confidentiality. 
Legislation created specifically to address the harms relating to electronic data and processing 
also exists but often does not go far enough in protecting the underlying rationale (usually 
economic) or take into account. the complete matrix of rights, responsibilities and liabilities 
on the one hand, and technical obligations on  the other (eg in the form of physical and 
organisational measures): 
•  Data protection laws and principles 
•  Computer crime laws 
•  Law protecting intellectual property rights,. 
There is, however, one instrument which can be distinguished and which constitutes a strong 
foundation from which future legislation can be built, and that is the OECD Principles. 
Any action must: 
•  take into account the potential threats to the rights and responsibilities associated with 
electronic information systems 
•  consider the possibility that greater liabilities will attach in the absence of appropriate 
remedies.  · 
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•  Threat analysis so as to be able to identify, develop and implement new legal remedies 
to deflect hann 
•  re-examination of the  applicability  and  suitability  of existing  legislation  to  the 
mitigation of harm. 
6.7.  Legal Restrictions affecting Technical Solutions 
Issue 
Legal restrictions to the use of technically feasible solutions often exist. 
Discussion 
It is essential to recognise that technology and custom and practice must be considered in the· 
context of and balanced with law and legal solutions. A process must be undertaken to ensure 
that technical solutions are legal ones, and that technical custom and practice adhere to the 
laws, codes of practice, guidelines and other regulatory instruments in force. For example, a 
technological breakthrough in speeding up the production of multiple copies of copyrighted 
works  may be technically valuable, but illegal when used in  all  but a  narrow range of 
circumstances. 
Technical countermeasures to different kinds of attacks, such  as  cryptography, exist for 
communication system security which are both economically and operationally effective. 
However, legal restrictions to their use often exist, usually because of fears over national 
security and their use to hide criminal acts. 
Political debate involving governments, law enforcement agencies, commercial enterprises 
and individuals needs to take place. 
Requirements 
•  Identification of any real dangers which could exist where confidentiality measures are 
used 
•  balance illegal against valid use and extract those uses for and conditions under which 
the balance militates in favour of valid use. 
6.8.  Limitations to Liability 
6.8. 1.  Recommendations for Liability Limiting Measures 
Issue 
In case of a security incident, liability need to be properly apponioned. 
Discussion 
Codes of practice comprise an essential element in the development of information systems 
security regulation. They may provide both a basis for regulation (by setting out principles 
and guidelines to be followed) and for a possible defence ,(against claims of negligence). 
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•  Definition of the role, function and effect pf codes of practice 
•  Identification of the concerned parties, eg the beneficiaries, those addressed by the 
code, eg suppliers of goods and services, integrators and facilitators, suppliers of raw 
products 
•  Coverage, eg physical security devices, practices, services 
•  Legislative/regulatory aspects, eg 
individual  or body  empowered  to  issue  the  code  (eg  secretary  of state, 
professional body) 
scope of  the issuer's authority 
intended effect (eg binding or merely persuasive) 
•  Standards to be adopted, eg 
"in a good and workmanlike manner" 
"using materials of good quality and fit for their several purposes" 
effect of standards of care, eg "due regard" 
•  Types of liability 
•  Accountability and directors (compliance statements) 
•  Adjudication of  claims under a code 
•  Structure of  codes 
•  Drafting of baseline requirements. 
Requirements 
•  Recommendations for liability limiting measures. J 
6.8.2.  Information Security Audit 
Issue 
Ensurance of adequate compliance  to  security· measures,  Codes of Practice, laws  and 
regulation. 
Discussion  \ 
Many organisations currently undertake an information security (or computer) audit on a 
regular basis. It is a tool for ensuriQ.g that the appropriate and relevant security measures are 
in place, and it can be a defence against claims of fraud or negligence in the operation of the 
organisation's electronic data processing systems or the data which those systems process. 
· The following are key issues to be examined with respect to the information security audit: 
•  What should be covered by such audits 
•  Compliance and disclosure 
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Responsibility for failure to protect, eg 
civil penalties for non-compliance 
shareholder suits 
automatic disqualification and loss of  position 
restitution of  losses 
Wbo should be authorised to carry out such audits and the nature and extent of 
their training, and the extent of their responsibilities and liabilities 
•  Creation of the defences to liability 
Identification of  existing 
minimum standards for security 
legislation and regulation 
Creation of 
the proper balance between compliance and protection 
appropriate security measures 
•  Recommendations for the coverage and timing of audits. 
Requirements 
•  Framework for the monitoring of compliance to regulations, recommendations and 
good practices. 
6.9. Procedural Jurisdictional Issues 
Issue 
The creation of any rights or responsibilities and the identification of liabilities must be done 
within the framework of  jurisprudentially acceptable procedures and mechanisms. 
Discussion 
Within the framework of international law are concepts and definitions of procedural issues 
relating to jurisdiction which are recognised by all legal systems found within the European 
Union. 
The procedural issues and mechanisms to be addressed with respect to breaches of contract 
and of torts (specific ones relating to information security may/will have to be created) and 
the commission of crimes relating to information security include: 
•  The jurisdiction of national courts, administrative bodies, tribunals, etc, in co-operation, 
where appropriate, with the Court of Justice, to hear and rule on actions and disputes 
arising from and charges relating to information security 
•  The formulation of  rules relating to: 
the collection, presentation and authentication of  evidence (in any form) 
procedure (  eg service and form  of writs,  drafting of pleadings,  statutes of 
limitations, etc) 
•  Mutual Assistance. 
These issues are compounded by different positions in national law with regard to: 
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•  pornography (using computers for definition, dissemination and access) 
•  transborder data flow (using communication networks) 
•  interception (generally, as found in the telecommunications sphere but which involves 
computerised components of telecommunications systems) 
•  encryption (used illegally and therefore used in contravention of the criminal law) 
•  computer crime. 
The procedural  issue~ raised by these differences  should be examined further with the 
involvement of all interested parties with a  vi~w to identify their exact nature and the most 
appropriate way to overcome these or at least limit their impact. 
Requirements 
•  Development of suitable conventions 
•  agreement on electronic evidence 
•  agreement on civil procedures relating to information security and electronic evidence 
•  code on the commercial procedures relating to the use of electronic records. 
6. 10. Insurance Issues 
.Issue 
When electronic documents and information replace traditional documents, the insurance 
industry will need objective measures to assess the security mechanisms available or in use to 
determine what cover, if any, they should provide for customers using such things. 
Discussion 
Insurance is somethi.ng which is used by commerce and industry to provide relief in the event 
that a disaster occurs to them for which insurance is available.  Insurance does not, of itself 
prevent the occurrence of disasters.  It provides financial payments to the· insured, and may 
sue those who cause a disaster if there is malice or negligence involved. 
Insurance can be provided in a number of ways; a bilateral contract between an insurer and an 
insured, a mutual contract between a group of parties who are self-insuring, relief of last 
resort - usually provided by a national administration. 
Where there are insurance contracts the insurer may impose conditions upon the insured to 
conduct themselves in accordance with 'rules of behaviour' contained in  the insurance 
contract, or may vary the cost of the insurance or the extent of the indemnity provided 
according to the 'standards' observed by the insured.  · 
Most of the documents that we use today for the purposes of administration or the carrying 
out of commercial transactions are supported by an underlying basis of insurance.  Cheques 
and bearer bonds are printed by special 'fraud resisting' techniques, and as a result, insurance 
cover is available to the issuer or user in the event that a document is misused.  Commonly, 
authorised copies of documents are often issued where originals are not readily available, and 
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postal service may have an implied minimum value for insurance purposes. 
Insurance rates  are  built up  on  the  basis of a claims  history for  the. risk that is  being 
underwritten.  This may present a number of problems where there is  no claims history 
available, or where  the potential risk may  be  difficult to  quantify.  Further,  insurance 
companies may not be in a position to know what standards ought to be followed by insurers 
to minimise risks.  This may cause over-reaction by the insurance market once the first claims 
for failure come in. 
To provide for a  balanced approach  to  the  introduction  and general  use  of electronic 
documents and methods, a broader educational programme should be considered for the 
insurance sector to clarify the issues involved and methods available.  Such a programme 
could build upon the work carried out in the preparation of this document, work on baseline 
security standards by both BSI/DISC and IBAG. 
Requirements. 
•  Criteria and procedures for the assessment of insurance risks 
•  identification of situations which may need to be covered by an insurance obligation as 
a pre-condition of service provision, operation or usage. 
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7. 1.  Policy Framework and Consensus 
Purpose 
To provide a minimum framework for trusted information and communications services on 
an international scale and to establish a multi actor consensus on essential requirements and 
options for the provision of information security and related issues. 
Background 
Information and its exchange via global networks is inextricably associated with all public 
and  private  activities  involving  the  citizen,  service  providers,  operators,  vendors, 
administrations  and authorities  in  numerous  ways  for  all  kind of purposes.  With  the 
increasing  globalisation of the  economies  an  agreed framework  for  the  protection of 
information either associated with intellectual property, privacy, 'internal security and other 
legitimate reasons is needed. While there are several conventions and recomm~ndations, the 
rapid evolution  of technology  and  services  implies  the  need  to  reflect on  a  common 
framework which could assist countries and regions to maintain interworking and avoid 
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protection of  information assets. 
Solutions for open communications between a variety of parties on a global scale do exist. 
They differ in detail and convenience in usage. However, the ability to use them depends 
critically on a broad consensus on the use of one or the other option. Nationally constrained 
solutions, such as DES, RSA in the USA are of little utility if they can not be used by US 
business in the pursuit of their global business interests and vice versa if others can not make 
use of these techniques for their communications with US partners. 
To achieve agreement and reasonably .  general acceptance by  the  users  concerned is  as 
important as the technical performance of the solution in question. 
7  .2. Agreements 
Purpose 
International agreements on a minimum set of features and operational concepts as required 
for trusted and open service provision. 
Background 
While a common framework and general consensus may go a long way, there is the need to 
get formal agreement on certain aspects. These may, for example, relate to issues surrounding 
liability, accreditation and certification and the fighting of organised crime  .. 
7  .3.  Regulation and Legislation 
Purpose 
Adjustment of national regulations and legislation to permit seamless interworking of trusted 
services. 
Background 
The provision of information security is seen to be related in some areas closely to public 
order and defence issues. The related national regulations and legislations vary considerably. 
In order to avoid the creation of technical barriers to trade and communications outside the 
domains of internal order and national security, adjustments of legislation and regulations 
may be required in some countries. 
7  .4. Accreditation 
7.4. 1.  Accreditation of  Services 
Purpose 
Evaluation of  communication services. 
Background 
Common criteria for security evaluation are mainly focused on IT products and IT systems. 
However, there is a perceived need for criteria to support the evaluation of  comm~nication 
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may be a need to develop separate criteria. 
The evaluation of a service and its subsequent accreditation will be a critical requirement in 
many user applications, in particular those that need to use trans-European communication 
services. The consistency, completeness and effectiveness of the security enhancements of 
communication services needs to be checked for an overall fitness for purpose. Hence there is 
a need for a framework for accreditation of communications services. 
7.4.2.  AccredHation of  TTPs 
Purpose 
Procedures for the accreditation and audit of  TIPs. 
Background 
ITPs  will  need  to  interwork  and  communicate  internationally  to  provide  a  service 
infrastructure  to  support  a  range  of security  services  such  as  digital  signature  and 
confidentiality. TIPs will thus need to process, store and distribute a range of security-related 
information for the use and management of such services. This implies the need for a set of 
harmonised procedures for the accreditation and audit of TIPs in order to ensure mutual trust 
by the public in TIPs and the services they provide. 
7  .5.  Products and Services 
Purpose 
In order to facilitate a harmonious development of the provision of security of information 
systems in the Community for the protection of the public and of business interests, it will be 
necessary to develop a consistent approach as to its provision of security. Where independent 
organisations will have to be mandated, their functions and conditions will need to be defined 
and agreed and, where required, embedded into the regulatory framework. The objective 
would be to come to a clearly defined and agreed sharing of responsibilities between the 
different actors on a Community level as a prerequisite for mutual recognition. 
Background 
At present, the provision of security of information systems is well organised only for specific 
areas and limited to addressing their specific needs. The organisation on a European level is 
mostly informal, and mutual recognition of verification and certification is not yet established 
outside closed groups. With the growing importance of the security of information systems, 
the need for defining a consistent approach to the provision of security for information 
systems in Europe and internationally is becoming urgent. The most urgent needs identified 
relate to digital signatures and confidentiality services. 
7  .6. Common Practices and Codes of Conduct 
Objectives 
Development of Codes of  Practice to 
•  support the development and harmonisation of sectorial practices 
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controls 
•  support the development and harmonisation of baseline controls. 
Background 
Codes of practice are  found in many industries  and disciplines.  They encapsulate the 
collective wisdom  and experience of the practitioners of a trade or profession or of an 
industry. For exanwle codes of practice for the building trade. To the practitioners of a trade 
or profession, the need for codes of  practice is self evident 
Codes of practice are not always obvious because they are often given other names. In some 
situations they may be called standards manuals in others requirements specifications. The 
property that sets  them apart and makes  them  recognisable as  codes of practice is the 
encapsulation of  collective wisdom. The collective wisdom represents the means by which all 
parties to a transaction are protected from hann. In legal or business management terms this 
may be called a "standard of  due care." 
Any professional discipline needs to have a vehicle to encapsulate the collective wisdom of 
its practitioners. They help to ensure consistency across the wide spectrum of practitioners. 
That has to be true of something as important as information processing. 
We have mentioned elsewhere the move towards empowerment and distributed systems. 
Empowerment means that the person responsible for an operating unit of an enterprise is free 
to obtain its services and resources anywhere. Where once information processing. was done 
in-house, it is now just as likely to be out-sourced. 
When information was once processed centrally the computer centre was well protected, both 
physically and logically. Indeed the protection of computer centres was the trigger for the 
development of corporate information security programmes. With information processing 
spread throughout the enterprise, the need for a central site vanishes. With it goes the ease of 
justifying the costs of high levels of security. 
These two factors  taken  together mean  that responsibility  for information  security is 
fragmented and put in the hands of people who have other responsibilities. Their mind set 
does not contain the same awareness of the need for security. Neither do they understand the 
interdependence of security and control measures. 
The growth of legal, regulatory and contractual requirements for security create the need for a 
generally accepted set of controls and security measures.  Words like due diligence and 
compliance with best practice can be satisfied by compliance with codes of practice. They 
provide the baseline needed for any comparison of actual with best practice. 
Looking to the future we can see that information processing will become a basic skill for any 
skilled worker or manager. Where industries have their own codes of practice governing the 
way they operate, information security should become a sub-set. 
Codes of practice must be formulated in such a way that audits can be performed to establish 
compliance. 
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Purpose 
Improved awareness of the issues of information security by  specific actions and a greater 
emphasis in the education and training of  related professions.  . 
Background 
In the end it is the human factor which decides the level of information security, Irrespective 
of the technical and operational measures one may wish to deploy. In this sense awareness 
and the teaching of appropriate skills in the context of the information professions, is an 
important measure to be considered. This may entail the creation of special training schemes 
and curricula, but most of all the appropriate inclusion of information security related issues 
in the teaching of information professions in general. This is in many cased essential, since 
information security is very closely related to the way information is used in a given context, 
ie often it has to be em bedded in the application and management procedure and can not be 
added on as an external procedure. 
7  .8. Specifications 
Objectives 
To develop specifications for the application of security, in order to ensure interworking, 
interoperation and mutual recognition. 
Background 
Functional specifications for products or services are documents that are to be used as parts of 
purchase  specifications.  They  specify  the  functions  of a  solution  and  the  required 
performance  characteristics.  Implementation  aspects  are  only  dealt  with  if they  are 
particularly important for  the  fulfilment of a  specific function.  Specifications  call up 
standards  and  profiles,  as  far  as  available.  Options  in  the  standards  are  resolved in 
specifications. 
Common  specifications for methodologies,  eg evaluation,  serve  as  a  basis for mutual 
recognition. 
7.9. Standards 
Purpose 
Development of  standards for information security. 
Background 
European security standards developed over the next decade will have a decisive influence on 
the technological structure of the entire European market and will change the conditions of 
trade in export markets and national markets. 
The standards making infrastructure for  the  development of IT and telecommunication 
standards has become increasingly complex. The number of groups, the range of work items 
and  the  overall  process  at  different  levels  of international,  regional  and  national 
standardisation is a complex maze. Security standardisation is no exception to this situation. 
In general there is  a reoccurring problem which is  that of coordination between groups 
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duplication of work and the unnecessary waste of resource, and to ensure that the standards 
that are developed are consistent and  they fonn a coherent set. 
At the European level the establishment of the Advisory Expert Group IT  AEGV has provided 
an ideal mechanism for the coordination of security standards work within Europe. In 
addition, IT  AEGV is in the process of  developing a European Memorandum, M-IT  -06, which 
is a Taxonomy and Directory of European Standardisation Requirements for lnfonnation 
Systems Security based on market driven requirements. This memorandum also contains a 
future work programme for security standardisation. 
Traditionally the principal contributors to standards making have been suppliers, designers 
and professionals. The end user of products and services has only been peripherally interested 
or involved. The end user has been concerned that standards have been used in relation to the 
products he buys but not greatly interested in what they are. 
There is a need for a more effective mechanism and framework through which user interest is 
able to collectively express their requirements and priorities so that they can contribute to the 
standardisation process in a way which will balance the very strong interest of the supply 
industry. 
The long-term benefits of security standardisation requires investment by companies and 
users and as such they must be prepared to organise themselves more effectively to participate 
in the standards making process. 
7.10. Technology 
Purpose 
Systematic investigation and development of the technology to pennit economically viable 
and operationally satisfactory solutions to a range of present and future requirements for the 
security of  information systems. 
Background 
Work  on  security  of information  systems  would  need  to  address  development  and 
implementation strategies, technologies, and integration and verification. 
The strategic R&D work would have to cover conceptual models for secure systems (secure 
against  compromise,  unauthorised  modifications  and  denial  of  service),  functional 
requirements models, risk models and architectures for security. 
Verification and validation of the security of the technical system and its applicability would 
be investigated through integration and verification projects. 
In  addition  to the consolidation and development of security technology, a  number of 
accompanying measures are required concerned with the creation, maintenance and consistent 
application of standards, and the validation and certification of IT and telecommunication 
products with respect to their security properties, including validation and certification of 
methods to design and implement systems.  · 
The fourth RD&T Community Framework Programme might be one of the tools to foster co-
operative projects at precompetitive and prenonnative levels  . 
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3.  '  GENERAL ISSUES 
3.1.  Globalisation of the economy and mobility 
Revision of the scope and approach to infonnation security  ~  tJ. 
to reflect the new conditions, challenges and requirements 
brought about by globalisation 
Adaptation of the respective policies and regulations  tJ.  fl 
Clearly defined conventions on the expectations,  tJ.  tJ.  fl 
responsibilities, duties and liabilities, related to levels of 
security, harm, and good pmctices. 
3.2.  Internal market (ufour freedomsj 
Adaptation of the existing provisions with respect to their  A  tJ. 
confonnance to the internal market policy of the EC 
implying the removal of  existing internal barriers and the 
avoidance of the fonnation of  new technical barriers due to 
divergent application of security and safety rules, 
regulations and legislation 
Provision to business and the public of  solutions available  ·  fl  throughout the community and preferably at the 
international level respecting the "one stop" and "pay-per-
use" principles 
Consistent deployment of standards and certification where  ~  fl fl  critical for the working of  the internal market 
Certification and standards that reflect the needs of  the  fl  different market segments 
3.3.  Human rights and the protection of communications 
Common approach defining rights, responsibilities and  fl tJ.  tJ.  ~ 
duties of individuals, business and of the authorities. 
3.4.  Social acceptance of identification and authentication 
methods 
Clarification of the ownership and privacy issues related to  fl tJ.  tJ.  ~ 
the use of  biomettic data 
·Agreed classification of biomettic data and conditions  ~  tJ. 
requiring secme handling of such data 
Defmition of  the rights and responsibilities of individuals,  tJ.  A  business users, corporations and administrations using 
biometric techniques. 
3.5.  Human rights and the safety of systems 
Community wide standard for design practices and codes of  fl  A  conduct 
Harmonised legal environment for vendors and users of  ~  tJ.  A 
safety critical systems 
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3.6.  Confidence in communication systems and services 
Real-time indication for the user of the trustworthiness of a  ll  ~  ll 
service or system 
Feedback mechanisms for security and safety related  ·  ll  ~  ll 
incidents involving communications  r 
Independent assessment of the levels of trustworthiness  ~ 
being achieved 
Investigation of the reasons why ·the security and safety of  ll  !::. 
systems are compromised 
....... 
Understanding of  the relative importance of the different  !::.  !::.  L\ 
system components and the components of the wider 
system and usage context 
Methods/frameworks for evidence reporting  ~  ~  ll 
Role (costs, benefits) of certification in providing  !::. 
confidence and communicating this in the market place 
Establishment of agreed claim limits to establish  !::.  !::. 
assurability 
3.7.  Management of  openness and protection 
Generic framework for the management of open and 
protected communications in a user/business oriented  !::.  ~  !::.  !::.  ll  ll 
environment: 
Defmition of agreed security ~omains  !::.  ~ 
User interface for the management of openness/protection  ~  ll 
Objective records and procedures for the accounting of  !::.  !::.  !::. 
open/protected ttansactions 
3.8.  Comn:'on concerns of  commercial and national security 
Common requirements of business, citizens and authorities  L\  !::.  ll  ll  !::.  !::. 
to adequately protect commercial and personal information 
and its communication 
3.9.  Security and law enforcement on international scale 
Effective, internationally agreed, economic, ethical and  ~  !::.  ll 
usable solutions to meet business, administration and 
personal needs 
Mechanisms for authorised interception for law  ~  L\ ~  !::.  !::.  L\  enforcement 
Reponing of incidents and crimes adjusted to the conditions  !::.  ll  !::. 
of the internal market 
Equipment, software and an infrastructure of trusted third  ~  ~  !::.  ~  parties. 
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3.10.  Economics of the security of inf~nnation systems 
"IS-to-cost" techniques for business and private users.  ~  ll  ll  ~ 
Incorporation of good information security design practice  fl ~  ll 
in the development of products and services 
Defmition of information security as business and  fl  ~ 
marketing factor 
Identification of acceptance levels for insurers, regulators  fl  fl ~  ~  A 
and the commercial courts 
Specification of duties and responsibilities of parties to the  fl  ll  fl  ~  use of information systems and their security requirements 
Security architecture and "building blocks" specifications  ~  ll 
and standards, with a view to minimising the cost of 
providing commonly needed levels of security. 
3.11.  Social recognition of infonnation crime 
Education and training on the infonnation security  ~  requirements and concepts needed to operate in a secure 
manner in the infonnation age 
Clarification of "info-ethics" for the professional and  A  A  fl  ~  ll 
individual user in its relationship to information security 
Clarification of responsibilities of the sector actors in  ll  ll  fl  fl fl  ll 
general and in their relations within each other, with 
particular reference to open and distributed applications. 
3.12.  Human factors 
•  Adjusunent of personnel management practices and  fl  ~  fl 
organisational procedures to reduce the vulnerability by the 
actions of staff and other people 
Greater use of non-technical management controls  fl  ~ 
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3.13.  Safety critical environments 
Common approach to the handling of secmity and safety  ll  ~  ~ 
critical requirements 
Methodologies for threat, vulnerability and hazard analysis  A  ~  ll  ll ~ 
for the protection of information systems used in safety-
critical environments 
Methodologies for the design, development and  ll  ~ ~  ll  ~ 
procurement of safety critical systems, covering project 
management, development environment, auditing of 
process, configuration management and change control 
Common apprQaCh to security evaluation of information  ~  ~  ~ 
systems in safety-critical environments. 
Common approach to information systems recovery in  ~ ~  ~ 
safety critical environments 
3.14.  Embedding systems 
Methods of testing that enable standards of reliability 19 be  ll  ~  ~  ~ 
ensured, including tests to destruction where appropriate 
Approach for the certification of safe products  ~ 
Defmition of requirements for fail-safe system architectures  ~  ll  ~ 
and implementations 
Anti-tampering and protection specifications and standards.  ~  ~ 
Quality label, that indicates the quality level of the  ~  ~  A 
embedded system 
Awareness of designers of the potential impact of  ~  ~  innovation in the validity of test technology. 
4.  DEMAND RELATED ISSUES 
4.1.  Requirements for enterprises and individuals 
4.1.1.  Agreement on security requirements for enterprises 
Taxonomy and directory of business user requirements and  ~  ~ 
security objectives derived from experience with practical 
applications. 
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4.1.2.  Security administtation 
Guidelines for establishment of security administtation  ~  ~ 
function. 
Recommendation on moving towards commonality of laws  ~  ~ ~  ~ 
on data privacy and protection, particularly relating to 
individuals. 
Means to provide increased awareness and relevant  ~  education and training. 
Guidelines for consideration of balanced security, taking  ~  account of level of  risk in different areas (physical, 
personnel, hardware, software, data, etc.) 
4.1.3.  Security objectives for enterprises 
Standard techniques for drawing-up security policies for  ~  ~ 
typical situations 
Methods and techniques for agreeing levels of security and  ~  ~ 
security objectives. 
4.1.4.  Exploiting  innovation 
Assessment methods for the impact of changes on systems  ~  ~  ~ 
Procedural and regulatory framework needs to address  ~  ~ ~  convergence of safety and security etc. (implications for 
standards) 
Methods for identifying early on where innovations are  ~  ~  ~  likely to be unacceptable from a safety perspective or will 
result in such economic penalties that they are not viable 
commercially. 
4.1.5.  Sectoral specifics 
Consolidation and development of a set of codes of practice  ~  ~ 
and baseline controls addressing specific business sector 
requirements. 
4.1.6.  Security domains 
Mechanisms for management of policies, procedures and  ~  controls between domains for TrPs 
~  ~ 
Generation of guidelines for domain creation, management  ~  ~  ~ ~ 
and control 
Development of  a common framework for domain  ~ 
interworking 
~ ~ 
Agreement on management, TrPs, accreditation, auditing  ~  ~  ~  ~ ~  ~ 
and relations with law enforcement agencies. 
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4.1.7.  Security labelling 
Guidelines for security labelling.  ~  ~ 
Standard on how to express labels and on the meanings of a  ~ 
basic set of information labels. 
Codes of practice and accreditation methods for domains 
'  ~  claiming to support standard labels, and their mutual 
recognition. 
4.1.8.  Administration of access to security related data 
Easy to use tools for access right management and key  ~- a  A 
management  · 
Secure solutions for remote administration.  ~  A 
Awareness for control issues concerning security related  a  ~  A 
data; and implications of non-action. 
4.1.9.  Security requirements for individual users 
User profiles identifying standard types of users together  Ll  with typical requirements. 
4.2.  Requirements for security functions 
4.2.1.  Access control 
Group access conttol scenarios and schemes based on levels  A  a a  A  a  A 
of commonality 
Techniques, products, specifications and standards  ~  ~  addressing access control matched to the scenarios 
identified 
Parameters common to most or all of the above techniques, 
products, specifications and standards and the feasibility of  a 
establishing common fonnats for them 
Identification of the key features for coherence in the  Ll  supporting infrastructure 
Basic access conttol mechanisms for pilot implementation.  a  ~ 
Develop delegation scenarios.  a  ~  a 
· Identification of techniques, products, specifications and  a  a  A 
standards addressing delegation and their association with 
the identified scenarios. 
4.2.2.  Requirements for electronic cash 
Agreement on the concepts underlying electronic cash  Ll a A 
International standards.  ~ 
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4.2.3.  Requirements 'for security services 
Scenarios for the use of electronic security services  ~ 
User specifications for electronic security services  ~  ~ 
Establishment of  international application rules that can  ll  ~ ~ 
operate under the different legal frameworks and that 
ensure international commwticability 
Identification of different scenarios where it is appropriate  ll  ~ ~ 
for the public interest to mask or hide the identity of the end 
user, taking into account the balance between full 
anonymity and audit. 
4.2.4.  Digital signature 
4.2.4.1.  The individual Right to signature 
Clarification of the right to signature and the attached  ll  ll  ~  ll  ~ 
entitlement. 
4.2.4.2.  Consistency of  Legal principles for digital signatures 
EC-wide/international agreement on the legal functions 9f  ~ ~  ll  ~ 
signatures 
Clarification of the conditions of acceptance of the  ~ ~  ~  ~ ~ ll 
authority of  an digital signature, e.g. For legally binding 
purposes, i.e  .. As substitute for hand-written original 
signatures. 
Recommendation for the implementation for a public digital  ~ ~ ~  ~ ~ 
signature scheme for use by business, administrations and 
the general public. 
Legislative rules and, where appropriate, liabilities, for  ~  keys, certificates and TrPs to cover revocation of  any or all 
the entities involved in the "chain of proor' needed in the 
signature technique. 
4.2.4.3.  Universal acceptance of digital signatures 
Development, together with the legal profession, of- ~  recommendations for the practical use of  digital signatures  ~  ~ 
as a full equivalent to hand-written signatures in legal 
transactions including the conditions required for evidence 
-
Demonsttation, through pilot projects, that digital  ~  signatures can be used as equivalent to hand-written 
signatures 
Inclusion in the curriculum of relevant educational institutes  ~  (eg engineering, law and business schools) the use of digital 
signature. 
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4.2.5.  Privacy Enhancement 
4.2.5.1.  Perception of Requirements for Privacy Enhancement 
Frameworks and architectures which are accepted as well  ~  ~  ~ 
by the business users as by the national security agencies 
and the service providers 
Standards for services and service provision  ~ 
Compatibility of confidentiality services with existing  ~  ~  ~  ~ 
communication standards and practices where possible 
Verification of practicability of proposed solutions through  ~  ~  ~ 
suitable pilot projects 
Model contracts for confidentiality services  ~ ~  ~ 
Awareness improvement of sector actors of the potential  ~  losses due to the absence of  confidentiality services. 
4.2.5.2.  The case for the Provision of public confidentiality services · 
Architectures that minimises service vulnerability  ~  ~  ~ ~ 
Framework for the provision of trans-domain  ~ 
confidentiality services 
~  ~  ~ 
Guidelines for pan-European confidentiality service  fl.  fl.  fl.  ~ fl.  ~ 
providers (including accountability) 
Model contract for relationship between service providers  fl.  ~  across national boundaries 
Assurance criteria for service providers and operators  fl.  fl.  ~ 
Accreditation process for mutual recognition.  ~ 
4.2.6.  Use of  names and certification of credentials 
Guidelines covering the use of names.  ~  ~  l1  ~ 
Guidelines covering the use of certificates.  fl.  l1  l1  l1  ~ l1 
4.2.7.  Security of electronically stored  information 
Common approach to the security of electronically stored  ~ 
information 
~ !::.  ~  fl.  !::.  ll 
Unforgeable secure storage  fl.  ~  l1  !::.  ~ 
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4.3.  Requirements for the safety of communication systems 
Platform for a dialogue on risk including users, regulators,  ~  vendors and service providers 
Policy on risk management on a societal level based on  ~  A  ~ 
objective risk assessment methods 
Techniques that permit an integrated approach to the  ~  ~  different types of risk (safety, security, commercial?, 
Direct, indirect) 
4.4.  Requirements for evaluations 
4.4.L  TrustworthinCS$ of communication solutions 
International agreement on criteria and evaluation methods,  ~  A  ~ ~  ~ A 
and mutual recognition of test results 
Clarification of the commercial value of "certified  ~ ~  products", e.g. In terms of liability limitation 
Clarification of the status and implied liability of vendor  A  ~ ~ ~ 
declarations 
International agreement on the methods for evaluating  A  ~  ~·  ~ 
security and safety critical system development processes, 
and the qualifications and experience needed for individuals 
-that are involved in these processes. 
4.4.2.  Motivation to acquire evaluated solutions 
Rapid adoption of common criteria  ~ 
Agreement on common evaluation method  ~  ~ 
Portability of test results and mutual recognition  ~  ~  ~  A 
Work-sharing between vendors, test centres and users to  ~  ~ A 
speed up the evaluation process 
Establishment of the "value-added" for the use by  ~  administrations and business, e.g. In terms of liability 
protection 
4.4.3.  Consistency of procurement practices 
Identification of categories of application requiring  ~ ~  A  ~ 
evaluated solutions 
Alignment of national  procurement policies concerning  ~  ~  A  A 
evaluated products 
Development of guidelines on applicability of evaluation  ~  ~. A 
levels 
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4.4.4.  Operational Systems Accreditation 
Definition of the inputs, process and outputs involved in  A  A  fl  A 
operational systems accreditation and their agreement by 
relevant communities 
guidelines for the establishment of schemes for operational  A  ~  A 
systems accreditation within different communities 
guidelines for organisations to determine the appropriate  A  ~  fl 
individual or body to perform the accreditation including 
the  skills and  training required  by  operational  systems 
accreditors 
4.5.  Requirements for security and ,safety methodologies 
4.5.1.  Risk analysis and management 
Consideration of the "claims sttucture" as a standard  ~  mechanism for specification of  requirements, evaluation  A  A 
and the selection of  risk analysis and management methods 
Evaluation of the "claims structure" for applicability in the  ~  A  fl 
safety domain 
Support for the "claims structure" as an international  ~  standard 
Further evaluation of methods using the "claims structure"  A  fl  A  fl 
Accreditation of organisations to conduct risk analysis and 
management method evaluations.  ~  A 
4.5.2.  Metrics for Loss Assessment 
~pping  of  certified product features to specific security  ~  fl 
incidents 
common, product independent risk analysis processes.  ~  A 
4.5.3.  Techn~logy  assessment 
Identification of the information security issues may be 
solved within the Technology Assessment process  A  A 
Technology Assessment pilot in Europe in the field of  ~  A  fl 
information security to assess the consequences for future 
information security applications and provide options for 
political and legal actions. 
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4.5.4.  Analysis of audit trails 
Rules and regulations for the design, handling &  d  ~  ll  ll 
exploitation of audit trail information, in conformance with 
right-of-privacy laws and practices. 
Prevention of audit data base compromise (e.g. Techniques  d  ll  ll 
of separation of information) 
Services for the independent acquisition, management,  d  ~ 
and/or analysis of audit trails 
Development of  Innovative technologies (AI-based) for the  d 
exploitation of large audit trails). 
4.5.5.  Safety specific methodologies 
Assessment of  areas of  common interest between safety  d 
critical and security information practitioners 
Software engineering processes and techniques for safety  d 
applications including their application and evaluation 
Understand the special needs for engineering safe systems  d 
4.6.  Requirements for audits 
Guidelines for audit review of information security  d  ~  ll 
activities 
Audit tools to enable reviews of security implementations  ~  ~ 
and identify weaknesses (eg using artificial intelligence) 
Guidelines on reviewing any or all security changes  d  ~  ll 
Suitable and consistent level of competence for security  ll  ~ d  ~ 
auditors and organisations to be accepted throughout the 
Community 
Greater commonality of formats for audit ttails, so that they  d 
can be used between systems. 
Mechanisms to enable qualified auditors to be involved in  ~ ll 
system development 
4.7.  Information valuation 
Development of common practices for information  d  ll  ll  ~ 
valuation 
Assessment of current methods of information valuation  ll  d 
Defmition of  the rights and duties of  information ownership  d 
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5.  SUPPLY RELATED ISSUES 
5.1.  Supply related issues- ways to meet the security demands 
5.1.1.  Security services 
Harmonisation of legislation on the legal status of evidence  ~  ll  fl  fl 
generated by any TI"Ps and especially on the intra- and 
extra- community recognition thereof. 
Litigation services based on existing international bodies  fl  ~  ll fl  fl 
such as the international chamber of commerce 
Techniques for the establishment, handling and recording of  ll fl  ll A  ~ 
electronic negotiable documents. 
Date and time stamping for time-critical transactions and  ~  A  ~  ~  ll 
applications, including a range of  granularities of timing. 
International harmoniSation of  rules and services for time  ll ll  ~  ll 
stamping, with the objective of  achieving general 
recognition and acceptance of time stamps and their 
provision by suitably accredited service providers. 
5.1.2.  Signature schemes 
Specifications and standards for an international signature 
scheme 
Specifications and standards for the integration of the 
signature schemes into practical applications 
General application programming interface (API) for the 
integration of signature schemes into applications. This 
should include codes which explain the purpose of the 
applied signature. 
Development of  transaction-oriented multiple signature  A  ll  ll  ll  ~  schemes 
Licensing of  cryptographic algorithms.  ll ll ~  A  A 
5.1.3.  Confidentiality schemes 
Consensus on the principles of  confidentiality services for  ll ll ~  ll ll  ll  ll 
use by individuals, enterprises and administrations 
Trustworthy confidentiality scheme and its supporting  A  ll ~  administration. 
5.2.  Supply related issues • security management 
5.2.1.  Role of trusted third parties (TIPs) 
Establishment of  international framework for the operation  A  ll A  ll ll A  fl 
ofTI"Ps. 
Setting up of  conditions for the operation of TI"Ps in the EC  A  ll ll ll ll ll 
adapted to meeting the needs  of national and international 
users. 
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5.2.2.  Key usage 
Standards and profiles in particular to support and improve  &  L\ 
CCITI' X.509. 
5.2.3.  Key management service 
Single digital signatme mechanism and specifications,  L\  L\  & & 
preferably consistent with other leading countries 
Adoption of a confidentiality algorithm standard and  A  L\  L\  L\  & A 
specification, and a key distribution mechanism based on an 
asymmetric public key algorithm 
Establishment of "domain assurance" levels and criteria for  & L\  & A  & 
TIPs to use for confidentiality key management purposes 
Codes of practice for TIPs engaged in key management  &  A  & L\  A 
activities, and the provision of escrow services and the 
methods by which those codes of  practice would be audited 
Set of criteria for mutual recognition between TIPs acting  A  &  & & 
on behalf of  organisations who wish to communicate 
securely. Merging of signature directories and secure inter-
domain communications are fundamental issues. 
5.2.4.  Distributed-secret escrow systems 
Investigation and confaguration of an escrow systems  A  A  &  ·&  A 
adapted to European needs 
5.2.5.  Management services for names and credentials 
Provision of Management Services for Names and  A  ~ A  &  L\  Credentials, to include identity, name information, and 
credentials such as public keys or any signature-verification 
data 
lnteroperability specifications and standards for names and  A  & & 
credentials 
International harmonisation of legislation, rules and 
regulations for Management Services for Names and  & L\  & 
Credentials. 
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5.2.6.  The  management of  TIPs 
5.2.6.1.  Operating principles of TIPs 
Hannonised legislation to provide an appropriate  ~  ~ 
framework for arbitration, supervision and litigation 
Model for TIPs meeting the requirements of users and  ~  ~ ~ 
authorities. 
Baseline for accepted good practice including a study of the  ~  level of availability, privacy and security required for the 
TIP by the final users and how much they are ready to pay 
for it 
Defmition of quality of service, including availability,  ~  ~ ll 
confidentiality, response-time, rules of disclosure to law 
enforcement agencies 
Operational guidelines, including descriptions of minimum  ~  ~ 
set of services and standards to conform to 
Standard clauses for the conttact between the TIP and the  ~  ~ 
user, concerning the liability of the TIP. 
5.2.6.2.  Interworldng of  TIPs 
Generation of guidelines for domain creation, management  ~ ~  ~ 
and conttol 
Common framework for domain interworking  ~ ~  ~ 
Agreement on management, TIPs, accreditation, auditing 
and relations with law enforcement agencies. 
~  ~  ll 
5.2.6.3 ..  Interworldng of autonomous confidentiality services 
Minimum requirements to ensure interoperability, including  ll  ~  ~  .ll 
standards, specifications, rules of procedure and operating 
practices 
I 
Demonsttation of ttans-European confidentiality services  ~  using a suitable application, e.g. the realisation of 
administrative telematics applications. 
5.2.6.4.  Accreditation and Audit of  ITPs 
Development of international guidelines for the  ~  ~  ~ ~  ~ 
accreditation and audit of  TIPs 
Adaptation of applicable legislation or regulations to  ll  ~  provide an appropriate legal framework for use throughout 
the community and in the relations with third countries. 
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5.3.  Supply related issues -evaluation of trusted solutions 
5.3.1.  Evaluation of products, systems, services and applications 
Commitment of management to the security function within  ~  enterprises 
Establishment of  common definitions for the different  ~  A 
evaluation options 
Community and international standards for criteria and  ~  methodology 
Choice in the access to independent evaluation facilities.  ~ 
5.3.2.  International haimonisation and mutual recognition 
Establishment of conditions and procedures for mutual  ~  A  !>.  A  !>. 
recognition of evaluations 
Establishment of conditions and procedures for EC- A 
wide/international evaluations  A !>.  4 
International and EC standardisation of evaluation criteria  A  A  !>.  ~ 
and methods. 
5.3.3.  Vendordechuations 
Agreed definition of scope and liabilities of vendor  A 
declarations 
A  !>.  !>.  A  !>.  A  A 
Incorporation of vendor declarations in the ITSEC/ITSEM 
evaluation scheme  !>.  !>. 
Specification of the types of systems which should not  A  !>. 
incorporate products covered by vendor declarations. 
5.3.4.  Self  -evaluation 
Specification of accreditation for in-house evaluation  A 
facilities  !>.  !>.  A 
Extension of the ITSEC/ITSEM evaluation criteria to  A 
include self-evaluation  !>.  !>.  A 
5.3.5.  Evaluation of applications 
Methods for evaluations to cover services and applications.  A  !>.  A 
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5.3.6.  Evaluation of  communication services 
I 
Evaluation of communications hardware and infrastructure  ~ ll 
security features 
Formal accreditation scheme for secure communication  ~  services 
Accreditation guidelines for the telecommunication sector  ~  ~ 
Trial service evaluations for existing telecommunication  ~  ~  ~  ll 
services 
Articulation of  the requirements of service evaluation.  ~  ~ 
5.3.7.  Trusted network management 
Methods for network management evaluation  ~  ~ 
Defmition of functionality classes (or protection profiles) 
suitable for systems, products and services used in network 
management systems 
Accreditation guidelines for the trusted network  ~  ll  ~ 
management 
Trial evaluations for existing network management systems.  ~ ~  ll  ll 
5.3.8.  Evaluation of methods and tools 
Guidelines for the evaluation of methods and tools used to  ~  ll  ~ 
develop uusted products, systems and services 
Register of methods and tools which can be used to develop  ~  ll 
uusted solutions. 
5.3.9.  Physical and procedural issues 
Guidelines for physical and procedural measures required to  ~  ll  ll  ll 
maintain ttusted systems. 
5.3.10.  Modifications to evaluated products and re-evaluation 
Defmition of  rules and procedures for re-evaluation based  ll ll  ~ ll 
onmethodscmnmtlyu~ 
Alignment of the design process with the principles of re-
evaluation, "design-for-change". 
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5.3.11.  Performance reporting for uusted products 
Incident reporting system for certification bodies  ~  ll 
User and supplier obligations to report incidents  ~  ll 
Supplier obligations to take corrective action and to initiate 
re-ev8Iuation 
ll  ~ 
Register of evaluated product and their owners.  ~  ~ 
5.3.12.  Rationalisation of evaluations 
Alignment of security evaluation criteria and methods with  ~ ll  ~ ll A 
those for quality and safety, where sensible 
Portability of results between quality, safety and security  A  A  A  A 
evaluations. 
5.4.  Maintenance of  safety and assurance 
Approach for tracking the evolution of systems and 
identifying when significant changes to safety and security 
~ A  ~ A  A 
requirements are taking place 
Sttategies and techniques for re engineering of obsolete  A  A  A 
systems. 
5.5.  Technological change 
5.5.1.  Evolving technology 
Incorporation of information security requirements into  A  A  ~  R&D and engineering of new systems, services and 
0 
applications 
Infonnation security technology for multi-media and other  A  A  ~  advanced services and applications 
5.5.2.  Technology for uusted products 
Development of tools for the development and verification  A  A  ~  of uusted software and hardware, where there are no 
acceptable commercially available offerings 
Investigation into the current use and available automated  A  A  ~  support for formal methods to find out where the 
improvements in formal methods technologies need to be 
made 
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6.  RIGIITS,  RESPONSmiiJ11ES AND UABILITIES 
6.1.  Legal frameworlc 
Glossary of  concepts and terms 
', 
~  Ll  ~ 
: 
Model "for the evolution of  protection of  and economic  ~ ~ 
rights deriving from electtonic data and information 
6.2.  Data held in electtonic form 
I 
Identification, categorisation and analysis of existing  A  A  A  A  ~ 
(current) rules and laws dealing with data held in electronic 
form 
Defmition of the dependent and consequent legal  ~  A 
relationships, obligations and liabilities for each of the 
characteristics (differences) in the context of information 
systems security. 
6.3.  Environment 
Re-examination in the context of information security  A  A  ~ A  A 
rights, responsibilities and liabilities of the management of 
information systems security within organisations and 
organisations' relationships with third party providers of 
information security (and related) services 
Models to inttoduce certainty and consistency with respect  ~ A  ~ 
to legal obligations for owners, directors, managers and 
employees, consultants, contractors, ttusted third parties~ 
auditors and lawyers 
Model clauses relating to information security which can be  Ll  A  A 
included in contracts or other agreements in place between 
parties. 
An understanding of the rights, responsibilities and 
obligations which underpin and define the relationship 
~  A  ~ ~ 
between infonnation security and the political environment 
requires: 
Examination of the context in which governments collect  A  A  ~ 
and process data 
Review of the role of information in investigatory activities  A  A  ~  A  ~ 
and in ensuring the public order. 
Resolution of  the conflict between supra-national  ~ A a  ~ A 
government objectives and national governmental 
objectives with respect to data collection, processing, 
ttansmission and storage, etc. 
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6.4.  Interaction and relationships between private parties 
Identification of the interests which need to be protected  f1  ~ 
and regulated, and hann which needs to be redressed if  and 
when security goes wrong, whether the relevant law is civil 
or criminal. 
6.5.  Harm 
Comprehensive list of the common and extraordinary  f1  ~  threats which endanger electronic communication. 
6.6.  Eliminating hann or mitigating hann 
Threat analysis so as to be able to identify, develop and  f1  ~  implement new legal remedies to deflect harm 
Re-examination of  the applicability and suitability of  f1  ~  f1 
existing legislation to the mitigation of harm. 
6.7.  Legal restrictions affecting technical solutions 
Identification of any real dangers which could exist where  ~  confidentiality measures are used  !l  A. 
balance illegal against valid use and extract those uses for  ~  and conditions under which the balance militates in favour  !l !l  !l 
of valid use. 
6.8.  Limitation of liability 
6.8.1.  Liability  management 
Recommendations for liability limiting measures  !l ~ 
6.8.2.  Infonnation security audit 
Framework for the monitoring of compliance to regulations, 
recommendations and good practices.  A.  f1  !l !l 
6.9.  Procedural jurisdictional issues 
Development of suitable conventions 
Agreement on electronic evidence  ~  !l  f1  f1 
Agreement on civil procedures relating to infonnation  ~  security and electronic evidence  ~  A.  f1 
Code on the commercial procedures relating to the use of  ~  ~  A.  f1 
electtonic records 
6.10.  Insurance issues 
Criteria and procedures for the assessment of ins~nce  ~  A.  f1 
risks 
, Identification of situations which may need to be covered  !l  ~  f1 
by an insurance obligation as a pre-condition of service 
provision, opemtion or usage. 
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Action line I - Development of a strategic framework for the 
security of information systems 
Issue 
Security of information systems is recognised as a pervasive quality necessary in modem 
society. Electronic information services need a secure telecommunications infrastructure, 
secure hard- and software as well as  secure usage and management. An overall strategy, 
considering all aspects of security of information systems, needs to be established, avoiding a 
fragmented approach  .. Any strategy for the security of information processed in an electronic 
form must reflect the wish of any society to operate effectively yet protect itself in a rapidly 
changing world. 
ObJective 
A strategically oriented framework has to be established to reconcile social, economic and 
political objectives with technical, operational and legislative options for the Community in an 
international context.  The sensitive  balance  between  different concerns,  objectives  and 
constraints are to be found by sector actors working together in the development of a common 
perception and agreed strategy framework. These are the are the prerequisites for reconciling 
interests and needs both in policy-making and in industrial developments. 
Status and  trends 
The situation is characterised by growing awareness of the need to  act. However, in the 
absence of an  initiative to co-ordinate effons, it ·seems very likely that dispersed effons 
various  sectors  will  create  a  situation  which  will  de  facto  be  contradictory,  creating 
progressively more serious legal, social and economic problems. 
Requirements, options and  priorities 
Such a shared framework would need to address and situate risk analysis and risk management 
concerning the vulnerability of information and related services, the alignment of laws and 
regulations associated with computer/telecommunications abuse and misuse, administrative 
infrastructures including security policies, and how these may be effectively implemented by 
various  industries/disciplines,  and  social  and privacy concerns  (eg  the  application  of 
identification, authentication,  non-repudiation  and  possibly  authorisation  schemes  in a 
democratic environment ). 
Oear guidance is to be provided for the development of physical and logical architectures for 
secure distributed information services, standards, guidelines and definitions for assured 
security products and services, pilots and prototypes to establish the  viability of various 
administrative structures, architectures and standards related to the needs of specific sectors. 
Security awareness must be created in order to influence the attitude of the users towards an 
increased concern about security in information technology (IT). 
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requirements for the security of information systems 
Issues 
Security  of infonnation  systems  is  the  inherent  prerequisite  for  the  integrity  and 
trustworthiness of business applications, intellectual property and confidentiality. This leads 
inevitably to a difficult balance and sometimes choices, between a commitment to free trade 
and  a  commitment to  securing  privacy  and  intellectual  property.  These  choices  and 
compromises need to be based on a full  appreciation of requirements and the impact of 
possible options for the security of  information systems to respond to them. 
User requirements imply the security functionalities of information systems interdependent 
with technological, operational and regulatory aspects. Therefore, a systematic investigation of 
security requirements for information systems forms an essential part of the development of 
appropriate and effective measures. 
Objective 
Establishing the nature and characteristics of requirements of users and service providers and 
their relation to security measures of  information systems. 
Status and  trends 
Hitherto,  no concerted effort has  been  undertaken  to identify the  rapidly evolving and 
· changing requirements of the major actors for the security of information systems. Member 
States of the Community have identified the requirements for harmonisation of national 
activities (especially of the "IT security evaluation criteria"). Uniform evaluation criteria and 
rules for mutual recognition of evaluation certification are of major it:nportance.  · 
Requirements, options and  priorities 
As a basis for a consistent and transparent treatment of the justified needs of the sector actors, 
it is considered necessary to develop an  agreed classification of user requirements and its 
relation to the provision of security in information systems. 
It is also considered important to identify requirements for legislation, regulations and codes 
of practice in the light of an assessment of ttends in service characteristics and technology, to 
identify alternative strategies for meeting the objectives by administrative, service, operational 
and technical provisions, and to assess  the  effe·ctiveness,  user friendliness  and costs of 
alternative security options and strategies for information systems for users, service providers 
and operators. 
Action Line Ill • Solutions for immediate and interim needs of users, 
suppliers and service providers 
Issues 
At present it is possible to protect adequately computers from  unauthorised access from the 
outside world by "isolation", ie  by  supplying conventional organisational  and physical 
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on a dedicated network. The situation is very different if the information is shared between 
user groups  or exchanged  via  a  public,  or generally  accessible,  network.  Neither the 
technology, terminals and services nor the related standards and procedures are generally 
available to provide comparable security for information systems in these cases. 
ObJectives 
The objective has to be to provide, at shon notice, solutions which can respond to the most 
urgent needs of users, service providers and manufacturers. This includes the use of common 
IT  -security  evaluation  criteria.  These  should  be  conceived  as  open  towards  future 
requirements and solutions. 
Status and  trends 
Some user groups have developed techniques and procedures for their specific use responding, 
in  particular,  to  the  need for  authentication,  integrity and non-repudiation.  In  general, 
magnetic cards or smart cards are being used.  Some are using more or less sophisticated 
cryptographic  techniques.  Often  this  implied  the  definition  of user-group  specific 
"authorities". However, it is difficult to generalise these techniques and methods to meet the 
needs of  an open environment. 
ISO is working on OSI Information System Security (ISO DIS 7498-2) and CCITI in the 
context  of X400.  It is  also  possible  to  insert  security  segments  into  the  messages. 
Authentication, integrity and non-repudiation are being addressed as  part of the messages 
(EDIFACf) as well as part of the X400 MHS. 
At present, the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) legal framework is still at the stage of 
conception. The International Chamber of Commerce has published uniform rules of conduct 
for the exchange of commercial data via telecommunications networks. 
Several countries (eg Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States) have 
developed,  or  are  developing,  criteria  to  evaluate  the  trustworthiness  of IT  and 
telecommunication products and systems and the corresponding procedures for conducting 
evaluations. These criteria have been co-ordinated with the national manufacturers and will 
lead to an increasing number of reiiable products and systems starting with simple products. 
The  establishment of national  organisations  which  will  conduct evaluations  and offer 
certificates will suppon this trend. 
Confidentiality provision is considered by most users as  less immediately important. In the 
future, however, this situation is likely to change as advanced c6mmunication services and, in 
particular, mobile services will have become all-pervasive. 
Requirements, options and  priorHies 
It is essential to develop as soon as  possible the procedures, standards, products and tools 
suited to assure security both in information systems as such (computers, peripherals) and in 
public communications networks. A high priority should be given to authentication, integrity 
and non-repudiation. Pilot projects should be  carried out to establish the validity of the 
proposed solutions. Solutions to priority needs on EDI are looked at in the TEDIS programme 
within ~e  more general content of this action plan. 
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evaluation and certification in respect of the security of 
information systems 
Issues 
Requirements for the security of information systems are pervasive and as  such common 
specifications and standards are crucial. The absence of agreed standards and specifications 
for IT security may present a major barrier to the advance of information-based processes and 
services throughout the economy and society. Actions are also required to accelerate the 
development and use of technology and standards in several related communication and 
. computer network areas that are of  critical importance to users, industry and administrations. 
ObJective 
Efforts are  required to provide a  means  of supporting and performing specific  security 
functions in the general areas of OSI, ONP, ISDN/IBC and network management. Inherently 
related to standardisation and specification are the techniques and approaches required for 
verification,  including  certification  leading  to  mutual  recognition.  Where  possible, 
internationally agreed solutions are to be supported. The development and use of computer 
systems with security functions should also be encouraged. 
Status and trends 
The United States, in  particular, has  taken  major initiatives  to address  the  security of 
information  systems.  In  Europe  the  subject  is  treated  in  the  context  of  IT  and 
telecommunications  standardisation  in  the  context  of ETSI  and  CEN/CENELEC  in 
preparation of  CCITT and ISO work in the field. 
In view of growing concern, the work in the United States is rapidly intensifying. and both 
vendors and service providers are increasing their efforts in this area In Europe, France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom  have  independently  started similar activities,  but a 
common effort corresponding to the United States is evolving only slowly. 
Requirements, options and  priorities 
In the security of information systems there is inherently a very close relationship between 
regulatory, operational, administrative and technical aspects. Regulations need to be reflected 
in standards, and provisions for the security of information systems need to comply in a 
verifiable manner to the standards and regulations. In several aspects, regulations require 
specifications which go beyond the conventional scope of standardisation, ie include codes of 
practice. Requirements for standards and codes of practice are present in all areas of security 
of  information systems, and a distinction has to be made between the protection requirements 
which correspond to the security objectives and some of the technical requirements which can 
be entrusted to the competent European standards bodies (CEN/CENELEC/ ETSI). 
Specifications and standards must cover the  subjects of security services of information 
systems (personal and enterprise authentication, non-repudiation protocols, legally acceptable 
electronic proof, authorisation control), their communication services (image communication 
privacy, mobile communications voice and data privacy, data and image data-base protection, 
integrated services security), their communication and security management (public/private 
key system for open network operation, network management protection, service provider 
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for secure information systems). 
·Action line V -'Technological and operational developments in the 
security of information systems 
Issues 
Systematic investigation and development of the technology to permit economically viable 
and operationally satisfactory solutions to a range of present and future requirements for the 
security of information systems is a prerequisite for the development of the services market 
and the competitiveness of the European economy as a whole. 
Any technological developments in the security of information systems will have to include 
both the· aspects of computer security and security of communications as most present-day 
systems are distributed systems, and access to such systems is  through communications 
services. 
Objective 
Systematic investigation and development of the technology to permit economically viable 
and operationally satisfactory solutions to a range of present and future requirements for the 
security of  information systems. 
Requirements, options and· priorities 
Work  on  security  of information  systems  would  need  to  address  development  and 
implementation strategies, technologies, and integration and verification. 
The strategic R&D work would have to cover conceptual models for secure systems (secure 
against  compromise,  unauthorised  modifications  and  denial  of service),  functional 
requirements models, risk models and architectures for security. · 
The technology-oriented R&D work would have to include user and message authentication 
(eg through voice-analysis and electronic signatures), technical interfaces and protocols for 
encryption, access control mechanisms and implementation methods for provable secure 
systems. 
Verification and validation of the security of the technical system and its applicability would 
be investigated through integration and verification projects. 
In  addition  to the  consolidation  and development of security  technology,  a  number of 
accompanying measures are required concerned with the creation, maintenance and consistent 
application of standards, and the validation and certification of IT and telecommunication 
products with respect to their security properties, including validation and certification of 
methods to design and implement systems. 
The third RD&T Community Framework Programme might be used to foster co-operative 
projects at precompetitive and prenormative levels. 
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Issues 
Depending on the exact nature of the security features of information systems, the required 
functions will need to be incorporated at different parts of the information system including 
tenninals/computers, services, network management to cryptographic devices, smart cards, 
public and private keys, etc. Some of these can be expected to be embedded in the hardware or 
software provided by vendors, while others may be part of distributed systems (eg network 
management), in the possession of the individual user (eg smart cards) or provided from  a 
specialised organisation (e. g. public/private keys). 
Most of the security products and services can be expected to be provided by vendors, service 
providers or operators. For specific functions, eg the provision of  public/private keys, auditing 
authorisation, there may be the need to identify and mandate appropriate organisations. 
The same applies for certification, evaluation and verification of quality of service which are 
functions which need to be addressed by organisations independent of the interests of vendors, 
serv_ice providers or operators. These organisations could be private, governmental or licensed 
by government to perfonn delegated functions. 
ObJective 
In order to facilitate a harmonious development of the provision of security of infonnation 
systems in the Community for the protection of the public and of business interests, it will be 
necessary to develop a consistent approach as to its provision of security. Where independent 
organisationS will have to be mandated, their functions and conditions will need to be defined 
and agreed and, where required, em bedded into the regulatory framework. The objective 
would be to come to a clearly defined and agreed sharing of responsibilities between the 
different actors on a Community level as a prerequisite for mutual recognition. 
Status and  trends 
At present, the provision of security of information systems is well organised only for specific 
areas and limited to addressing their specific needs. The organisation on a European level is 
mostly infonnal, and mutual recognition of verification and certification is not yet established 
outside closed groups. With the growing importance of the security of infonnation systems, 
the need for defining a consistent approach to the  provision of security for infonnation 
systems in Europe and internationally is becoming urgent. 
Requirements, options and  priorities 
Because of the number of different actors concerned and the close relations to regulatory and 
legislative questions, it is particularly important to pre-agree on the principles which should 
govern the provision of the security of  information systems. 
In developing a consistent approach to this question, one will need to address the aspects of 
identification and specification of functions requiring, by their very nature, the availability of 
some independent organisations (or interworking organisations). This could include functions 
such as the administration of a public/private key system. 
In addition, it is required to identify and specify, at an early stage, the functions which in the 
public  interest  need  to  be  entrusted  to  independent  organisations  (or  interworking 
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certification and similar functions.· 
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ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENY.(OECD) 
CONCERNING GUIDELINES FOR 
1HE SECURITY OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
1HE COUNCIL, 
HAVING REGARD TO: 
26 November 1992 
the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
of 14 December 1960, in particular, articles 1 (b), 1 (c), 3 (a) and 5 (b) thereof; 
the  Recommendation of the  Council concerning Guidelines Governing  the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data of 23 September 
1980 [C(80)58(Final)];  · 
the Declaration on Transborder Data Flows adopted by the Governments of 
OECD Member countries on 11 April1985 [C(85)139, Annex]; 
RECOGNISING: 
the increasing use and value of computers, communication facilities, computer 
and communication networks and data and information that may be  stored, 
processed, retrieved or transmitted by them, including programs, specifications 
and procedures for their operation, use and maintenance (all hereinafter referred 
to collectively as information systems); 
the  international  nature  of  information  systems  and  their  world-wide 
proliferation; 
that  the  increasingly  significant role  of information  systems  and growing 
dependence on them in national and international economies and trade and in 
social, cultural and political life call for special efforts to foster confidence in 
information systems; 
that,  in  the  absence  of ·appropriate  safeguards,  data  and  information  in 
information systems acquire a distinct sensitivity and vulnerability, as compared 
with paper documents, due to risks arising from available means of unauthorised 
access, use, misappropriation, alteration, and destruction; 
the need to raise awareness of risks to information systems and of the safeguards 
available to meet those risks; 
that present measures, practices, procedures and institutions may not adequately 
meet the challenges posed by information systems and the concomitant need for 
clarity, predictability, certainty, and uniformity of rights and obligations, of 
enforcement of rights, and of recourse and redress for violation of rights relating 
to information systems and the security of information systems; 
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the challenges posed by information systems, the potential detrimental effects of 
a lack of co-ordination and co-operation on national and international economies 
and trade and on participation in social, cultural and political life, and the 
common interest in promoting the security of information systems; 
AND FUR  TilER RECOGNISING: 
that the Guidelines do not affect the sovereign rights of national governments in 
respect of national security and public order ("ordre public") subject always to the 
requirements of  national law; 
that, in the particular case of federal countries, the observance of the Guidelines 
may be affected by the division of powers in the federation; 
RECOMMENDS THAT MEMBER COUNTRIES: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
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establish measures, practices and procedures to reflect the principles concerning 
the security of information systems set forth in the Guidelines contained in the 
Annex to this Recommendation, which is an integral part hereof; 
consult, co-ordinate and co-operate in the implementation of the Guidelines, 
including international collaboration to develop compatible standards, measures, 
practices an procedures for the security of  information systems; 
agree as expeditiously as possible on specific initiatives for the application of the 
Guidelines; 
disseminate extensively the principles contained in the Guidelines; 
review the Guidelines every five years with a view to improving international co-
operation on issues relating to the security of  information systems. 
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QUIDELINES FOR 1HE SECURITY OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
26 November 1992 
I. AIMS 
The Guidelines are intended: 
To raise awareness of risks to infonnation systems and of the safeguards available to 
meet those risks; 
To create a general framework to assist those responsible, in the public and private 
sectors, for the development and implementation of coherent measures, practices and 
procedures for the security of  infonnation systems; 
To promote co-operation between the public and private sectors in the development and 
implementation of such measures, practices and procedures; 
To foster confidence in infonnation systems and the manner in which they are provided 
and used; 
To  facilitate  development  and  use  of  information  systems,  nationally  and 
internationally; and 
To promote international co-operation in achieving security of  infonnation systems. 
II. SCOPE 
The Guidelines are addressed to the public and private sectors. 
The Guidelines apply to all infonnation systems. 
The Guidelines are capable of being supplemented by additional practices and procedures for 
the provision of the security of  infonnation systems. 
ill. DEFINITIONS 
For the purposes of these Guidelines: 
"data" means a representation of facts, concepts or instructions in a fonnalised manner 
suitable for communication, interpretation or processing by  human  beings or by 
automatic means; 
"infonnation" is the meaning assigned to data by means of conventions applied to that 
data; 
"infonnation systems" means computers, communication facilities,.computer and 
communication networks and data and infonnation that may be stored, processed, 
retrieved or transmitted by them, including programs, specifications and procedures for 
their operation, use and maintenance; 
availability means the characteristic of data, infonnation and infonnation systems being 
accessible and usable on a timely basis in the required manner; 
Green Paper on the Security of Information Systems  Page 153 confidentiality means the characteristic of data and information being disclosed only to 
authorised persons, entities and processes at authorised times and in the authorised 
manner; 
integrity means the characteristic of data and information being accurate and complete 
and the preservation of accuracy and completeness. 
IV. SECURITY OBJECTIVE 
The objective of security of information systems is the protection of the interests of those 
relying  on  information  systems  from  harm  resulting  from  failures  of availability, 
confidentiality, and integrity. 
V. PRINCIPLES 
1. Accountability Principle 
The responsibilities and accountability of owners, providers and users of information systems 
and other parties concerned with the security of information systems should be explicit. 
2. Awareness Principle . 
In  order to foster confidence  in  information  systems,  owners,  providers  and users  of 
information systems and other parties should readily be able, consistent with maintaining 
security, to gain appropriate knowledge of and be informed about the existence and general 
extent of measures, practices and procedures for the security of information systems. 
3. Ethic Principle 
Information systems and the security of information systems should be provided and used in 
such a manner that the rights and legitimate interests of others are respected. 
4. Multidisciplinary Principle 
Measures, practices and procedures for the  security of information systems should take 
account of and address  all relevant considerations and viewpoints, including technical, 
administrative, organisational, operational, commercial, educational and legal. 
5. Proportionality Principle 
Security  levels,  costs,  measures,  practices  and procedures  should  be  appropriate  and 
proportionate to the value of and degree of reliance on the information systems and to the 
severity, probability and extent of potential harm, as  the requirements for security vary 
depending upon the particular information systems. 
6. Integration Principle 
Measures, practices and procedures for the security of information systems should be co-
ordinated and integrated with each other and with other measures, practices and procedures of 
the organisation so as to create a coherent system of security. 
7. Timeliness Principle 
Public and private parties, at both national and international levels, should act in a timely co-
ordinated manner to prevent and to respond to breaches of security of  information systems. 
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The security of infonnation systems  should be reassessed periodically,  as  infonnation 
systems and the requirements for·their security vary over time. 
9. Democracy Principle 
The security of information systems should be compatible with the legitimate use and flow of 
data and information in a democratic society. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION 
Governments, the public sector and the private sector should take steps to protect information 
systems and to provide for their security in accordance with the Principles of the Guidelines. 
In achieving the Security Objective and in implementing the Principles, they are urged, as 
appropriate,  to  establish  and  to  encourage  and  suppon  the  establishment of legal, 
administrative, self-regulatory and other measures, practices, procedures and institutions for 
the security of  infonnation systems. Where provision has not already been made, they should, 
in particular: 
Policy Development 
Adopt and encourage the adoption of appropriate policies, laws, decrees, rules, and 
international agreements, including provision for: 
•  hannonised world-wide technical standards, methods and codes of  practice; 
•  promotion of  expertise and best practice in the security of  information systems; 
•  formation and validity of contracts and other documents created and executed in 
or by means of information systems;  -
•  allocation of  risks and liability for failures of the security of  infonnation systems; 
•  penal, administrative or other sanctions for misuse of infonnation systems; 
•  jurisdictional  competence  of  courts,  including  rules  on  extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, and administrative competence of  other bodies; 
•  mutual assistance, extradition and other international co-operation in matters 
relating to the security of information systems; and 
•  means of obtaining evidence in infonnation systems and the admissibility of such 
evidence in penal and non-penallegal and administrative proceedings. 
Education and Training 
Promote awareness of the  necessity for  and the  goals of security of information 
systems, including: 
•  ·  ethical conduct in the use of infonnation systems; and 
•  adoption of  good security practices. 
Provide and foster education and training of: 
•  developers, owners, providers and users of  information systems; 
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•  specialists and auditors of security of  information systems; and 
•  law enforcement authorities, investigators, attorneys and judges. 
Enforcement and Redress 
Provide accessible and adequate means for the exercise and enforcement of rights 
arising from  the implementation of the Guidelines and for recourse and redress for 
violations of those rights. 
Provide prompt assistance in procedural and investigative matters relating to breaches 
of security of  information systems. 
Exchange of Information 
Facilitate  the  exchange  of  information  relating  to  the  Guidelines  and  their 
implementation. 
Publish generally measures, practices and procedures established in observance of the 
Guidelines and for the security of information systems. 
Co-operation 
On national and international levels, consult, co-ordinate and co-operate between and 
among governments  and  the  private  sector to  encourage  implementation of the 
Guidelines  and to  harmonise  as  completely as  possible measures,  practices  and 
procedures for the security of  information systems. 
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